

NOTES ON THE POPULATION THEORY OF EUGENE M. KULISCHER

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INTRODUCTION

EUGENE M. KULISCHER, who introduced the phrase "displaced persons," is best known as an authority on human migration, and secondarily as an expert on Russia. The former suggests knowledge, or expertise, about only one portion of demography, and the latter—familiarity with Russia—can imply almost anything. It is the writer's belief that Kulischer's writings range over the entire field of population, and in particular, contain a great deal of population theory. In fact, they may contain more theory than he himself may have realized, since he subsumed almost all the social sciences under the term "migration." He titled almost everything he published (with the exception of several pieces concerned with Russia) as "migration," "displaced persons," or some other term designating migration.

It is the writer's thought that, scattered throughout the published articles, books and the unpublished manuscript which he left, there is a consistent theory of population. This is well worth highlighting, both for academic purposes and for the insights and guidance which it can furnish toward a better understanding of current world events. It is with these thoughts in mind that the writer is attempting to set down here his interpretation of Kulischer's writings; he hopes that he will be at least partially successful.

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Writings on population theory (and/or speculation) can be traced back historically almost as far as written materials are available. One can argue that everything being written today on population theory can be found in "earlier" writings and that there is nothing "new." Perusal of the "History of Population Theories" in the United Nations publication, *DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION TRENDS*,¹ suggests that every idea that can be conceived has already been written by one thinker or another.

Several years after the appearance of the United Nations' volume, there appeared *THE STUDY OF POPULATION*, edited by Hauser and Duncan. A summary of population theory, particularly the writings which appeared in print after the United Nations' volume, is here included.²

Notwithstanding this plethora of intellectual activity, additional articles continue to appear, many, in our opinion, having some contribution to make. Two such articles of recent vintage are by Gutman and Van Nort.³ Since we believe that these two articles are particularly pertinent for a better appreciation of Kulischer's writings, we shall very briefly review them here.

Gutman's argument, in essence, is that American demographers, most of whom were raised in the discipline of sociology, are ashamed to apply the word 'theory' to their research and writings. This is because of the "fashion which has taken hold in sociology of reserving the label 'theory' for a set of very abstract propositions which are systematically and logically related but which usually have no empirical referents; indeed, have no apparent connection with society as it is." (p. 332). Since demographers work with historical and observed data about people, they have been reluctant to use the word 'theory'.

¹ Chapter III, *Population Studies No. 17* (New York, 1953.)

² Chapter IV, *DEMOGRAPHY AS A BODY OF KNOWLEDGE*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959). 864 pp.

³ Robert Gutman, In Defense of Population Theory, *American Sociological Review*, xv, 3 (June, 1960), pp. 325-333; Leighton van Nort, On Values in Population Theory, *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, xxxviii, 4, (October, 1960), p. 387.

Gutman then mentions several approaches to population theory and concludes:

Might it not be the path of wisdom to accept a pluralistic conception of population theory? . . . Should we not define population theory simply, as 'the widest body of rigorous reasoning' concerned with the impact of population variables on society; with the solution to the population problem; and with the trend of population size, the rate of population growth, and the various population processes and characteristics? (p. 333).

As we shall see Kulischer's writings embody this pluralistic conception.

Van Nort is bothered by the thought "that much of demographic theory is culture-bound. Its account of demographic reality rests in part on humanistic value-postulates derived from Western culture." (p. 387). He pays due homage to transition theory (see following) and then raises a number of questions centered about the proposition: how might demographers have viewed transition theory if they had been raised and educated in cultures other than our own. One of Kulischer's contributions is precisely his ability to view this theory—indeed, the entire subject of demography—from a much wider perspective than our own Western European culture of the last two or three centuries.

What the volume by Hauser and Duncan, and the articles by Gutman and van Nort and others have in common is their failure to recognize Kulischer's thoughts and observations—this despite the fact that his theory is set forth over and over again in his various writings. We hope our following remarks will help break down this semi-ossified, culture-bound outlook on life which pervades so much of our demographic thinking.

SOME BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES⁴

Born in Kiev, Russia in 1881; died in Washington, D.C., in 1956, Eugene Michael, as we knew him, was a displaced person

⁴These notes are derived from Michael K. Roof, In Memoriam, Eugene M. Kulischer, *R. E. M. P. Bulletin*, IV, 3 (July–September 1956) together with our own recollections of a decade of friendship and professional collaboration.

much of his life. In 1920 he fled Russia before the advancing Communist armies and went to Berlin. In 1935 he fled Germany from Hitler and went to Denmark, and in 1936 to Paris. Being in occupied France in 1941, he again fled Hitler—Kulischer was now 60 years of age—and crossed clandestinely into occupied France, ultimately making his way to the U.S. His younger brother, with whom he had previously written *Kriegs und Wanderzüge, Weltgeschichte als Völkerbewegung* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1932), was arrested by Petain's guards when crossing the demarcation line, and died in a concentration camp.

In Russia he had been a successful lawyer and professor of law and sociology at Kiev State University. In Germany he was professor of international law at the University of Berlin, and in France and the United States he carried on research in demography and allied fields. Such research was undertaken for the International Labor Office, the United States government and private organizations. Throughout his adult life he investigated and wrote on the subject of population. In his earlier years this was an avocation; in later years, a vocation.

We think that his interest in "migration" *per se* stems in large measure from his own experiences as a forced migrant—a displaced person—and from the influence of the Russian historian, V. O. Kluchevsky. Indeed, Kulischer's father who was very much interested in, and had written on the subject of, migration during the latter part of the 19th century, and the younger brother who had co-authored *Kriegs und Wanderzüge . . .* as well as Eugene M., all seem to have been greatly influenced by Kluchevsky.

Kluchevsky attempted to explain all of Russian history in terms of migration. "Thus we see that the principal fundamental factor in Russian history has been migration or colonization and that all other factors have been more or less inseparably connected therewith."⁵ Eugene M. Kulischer, in

⁵ V. O. Kluchevsky, *A HISTORY OF RUSSIA*, Vol. 1, translated by C. J. Hogarth, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1960), p. 2. [Kluchevsky lived from 1841 to 1911; his *HISTORY* appeared in five volumes published between 1904 and 1921.]

his attempt to explain world history rather than only Russian history, evolved what we consider to be his population theory.

Kulischer was a man of great historical depth and perception. One had to live in the present, but one should remember that the present is but an infinitely small portion of all history and that the present itself is but a product of previous history. Accordingly, he was always seeking the broadest possible basis—both geographically and temporally—for interpreting and understanding current events, both academic and nonacademic. Population theory, to be of any validity, had to account for as much of history as possible. An “explanation” of a demographic event circumscribed in time and space, to him was not an explanation.

At the time of his death he was working on a manuscript, *HISTORY AS MOVEMENT OF PEOPLES AND CIVILIZATIONS*,⁶ which might have eventuated into a work of several volumes. In this work he began with discussion of the postglacial spread of mankind over the earth’s surface, followed by the birthplaces of civilization. He then continued with the history of the peoples of eastern and central Asia, of the ancient Middle East, and the Mediterranean, and so on down to modern times. Judging from the outline he left behind, he contemplated covering the entire world (with the possible exception of Africa south of the Sahara) from earliest times to the present.

Let us now try to abstract what we believe to be the essence of his argument.

THE TRANSITION THEORY—SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS

We have already suggested that Kulischer was an intellectual maverick, at least insofar as American demographers were concerned. Let us review then, and very briefly, this intellectual climate into which he did not fit neatly.

American demographers—perhaps many Europeans also—have been enamored of the transition theory. For a thumb

⁶ The general outline of this history was adumbrated in his article “Migration” published in the 1952 edition of the *ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA*.

naïl description of this theory we may refer to Hauser and Duncan:⁷

. . . the 'generalization of the historical demographic experience of Western countries which have achieved very low levels of mortality and fertility.' . . . The growth of European peoples in the modern era involved declining mortality, which was produced by 'the whole process of modernization' including 'rising levels of living, new controls over disease, and reduced mortality.' . . . Fertility responded more slowly to modernization but ultimately began a decline through the widespread use of contraception.

Countries can then be arranged in stages: beginning of transition, when mortality and fertility are both high and population growth is low; middle, when mortality is lower but fertility is still high and population growth is high; end, when mortality and fertility and population growth are all low.

Some proponents of this theory have hailed it as having general validity. However, Hauser and Duncan, among others, have raised a number of questions about its relevancy, particularly for predicting what is likely to happen in the underdeveloped parts of the world.

It is our feeling that the transition theory is a direct outgrowth of Western European and American experiences during the last century or so. With all of the virgin lands in the Western Hemisphere available to European settlers, and with the industrial revolution underway, it was possible for populations to increase greatly in size without any deterioration in levels of living. In fact, this increase was often accompanied by substantial improvement in these levels. Since historical facts "proved" Malthus to be wrong (as well as Petty and Botero who had developed this argument long before Malthus), American demographers would not follow Malthus.

Furthermore, during the 19th century, and indeed up to World War I, the world of the Western Europeans was relatively peaceful and mortality rates were largely unaffected by

⁷ Hauser and Duncan, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

warfare or famine; even epidemics had been brought under control by the middle of the 19th century. Accordingly, war, famine, epidemics, were thought of as unusual events which occasionally interfered with "normal" trends in mortality by raising them instead of permitting mortality to continue its "natural" decline. Accordingly, the transition theory⁸ was developed to explain the "universally natural" sequence of demographic events which "every country has or will undergo" once it achieves the "civilized Western European" culture.⁹

With these thoughts in mind now let us view Kulischer's ideas.

KULISCHER'S IDEAS¹⁰

With Respect to the Transition Theory. Kulischer, clearly, had but little respect for this theory:

Today's demographers tacitly assume that populations grow in accordance with 'normal' birth and death rates, barely touched by the 'normal'—that is, legally restricted—migrations. The role of cataclysms is minimized. They are considered casual irruptions of extraneous forces into the normal evolution of population, which is presented as a quiet process affecting successive generations.

Most scholars are rooted in their environment. They differ in their ability to outgrow it. The Malthusian theory was an ingenious formulation of the substance of the demographic course which in the time of Malthus was common to almost all peoples of the globe, but had become particularly manifest in the first stages of the industrial revolution. Malthus was impressed

⁸ What Hauser and Duncan refer to as "psychological theories of fertility" (p. 96) are largely additional theoretical arguments to help explain the transition theory. It seems to us that these should not be considered as alternatives to the transition theory.

⁹ Since World War I, mortality in Europe as a result of war and its accompanying hardships, has often resulted in a very high death rate. Indeed, over the past three to four decades, it has been in civilized Europe more than anywhere else that population has been kept in check by the Malthusian forces of war and famine.

¹⁰ The following thoughts (which embody our interpretation of his writings, both published and unpublished) are, of course, not completely unique to Kulischer. Wm. F. Ogburn, for example, viewed the subject of population in substantially the same light, we believe. Nevertheless, Kulischer propounded his thoughts at a time and place when such ideas were unfashionable and unorthodox; and in so doing he influenced the course of demographic thinking.

by the fact that the greatly increased means of subsistence caused a growth of the population of England rather than any improvement in the living conditions of her working masses. Reasoning and observation enabled him to generalize so broadly concerning the relation between means of subsistence and population growth that it was possible for Darwin to use his thesis as an explanation of the evolution of all living beings.

The modern approach to demographic problems, finding its expression in the population projections, is an inadequate generalization based on the temporary situation of a few nations which for several decades were able to eliminate both the pressure on means of subsistence and the impact of migration and war. Up to the second World War no economic barriers seemed to impede the natural increase of population in various western countries. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand they have been, indeed, practically removed. Simultaneously, immigration has been sharply restricted. Wars—merely transoceanic expeditions—left the size and the composition of populations nearly unaffected. Thus, population changes appeared to be self-regulating processes. Hence arose the belief that the size of the coming population could be foretold either with the help of a 'logistic curve' or by projecting past and present trends into the future. Proud of their scientific autonomy and equipped with data on age distribution and birth and death rates, demographers began to project and to predict for all parts of the world the growth of masses already pressing up on the limits of their means of subsistence. Fantastic figures have been calculated, but their compilers have not questioned whether conditions would permit the accumulation of the expected hundreds of millions. Formulas and hyperbolas have overshadowed the main problem of demography: the relation between the changes of populations and their economic bases.¹¹

It is also clear that he saw a limited use for this theory.

This is not to imply that population projections based on the assumption of the continuation of 'normal' fertility and mortality trends are of no value or validity. On the contrary, such

¹¹ EUROPE ON THE MOVE, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 4, 5.

projections are often useful as a tool for conducting research on past demographic changes (for instance, war losses). If combined with economic and political prospects, impending social changes, and probable migratory trends, such projections may also help to visualize the vague contours of future populations. A projected population is not a picture of the future population, but a hypothetical concept, because in sad reality population changes are determined not only by 'normal' fertility and mortality but also by wars, epidemics, and other forms of excess mortality, as well as by the uprooting of peoples by the might of a conqueror.¹²

In the above remarks we see emphasized his historical perspective, his understanding of the events which have affected the course of human population growth—and decline—over the millenia. The events which have occurred to the western European populations during the last several decades, or even century, are not representative or typical of the story of mankind. Furthermore, we see his belief that world conditions have not changed sufficiently so that we can be sure that past history will not be recapitulated. And who are we, living as we are in a period when nuclear weapons might be used, (the results of which could far overshadow the effects of the 14th century Black Death when perhaps one-quarter of Europe's population died) to say that Kulischer's belief is wrong?

Whether mankind will ever achieve the state where peace will reign forever and anon so that population growth will truly reflect normal birth and death rates together with peaceful migration, will be determined by political considerations. Political factors, in turn, are affected by population growth and other factors. At this point we approach the heart of Kulischer's theory.

Kulischer's Formulations. In his opinion a theory which would account for changes in the size of the population within a specified geographic area, and for changes in the characteristics of the population (whatever factors might be subsumed

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 6.

under the term "characteristics"), would be but part of a larger theory of social change. In this connection he seems to have considered the following items as all intimately interrelated: population, technology, the economic structure, natural resources, the political structure, political developments (including war), and man's psychology and personality.¹³

Now these factors are all interrelated in a very complex manner so that each affects the others, and in turn, is affected by them. Several of these relationships he has specified rather clearly by means of historical examples rather than by trying to erect "a set of very abstract propositions which are systematically and logically related but which usually have no empirical referents," to quote Gutman again. The fact that he held to the belief that there are additional relationships (other than those we can find precisely stated in his writings), can be inferred from his writings together with his conversations.

In any event, Kulischer's writings were never quite recognized as theory by most of the current crop of demographers—or other social scientists—precisely because he never stated them in the "proper fashion" as described by Gutman.¹⁴

If we have a series of factors which we believe are all closely intertwined, and we wish to talk about them, we have to start somewhere; exactly where may be irrelevant. Accordingly, Kulischer could begin with population and from this point, spread into the other subjects. (He could have equally well begun with technology, for example, and ultimately reached population). Furthermore, within the field of population Kulischer chose to begin his talks and writings with the subject of migration; from this starting point he finally worked his way throughout the complicated network of interrelated factors. Let us try to express his major propositions as follows:

- 1) If technology (including ethnotechnics) remains un-

¹³ On the last, for example, consider the following statement: "Political progress requires psychological predisposition which would make the next step acceptable." (Unpublished ms., "Birthplaces of Civilization: Strategic Position").

¹⁴ Perhaps also the fact that he was unorthodox in his thinking contributed to the lack of recognition of his theory by his contemporaries.

changed, the economic structure is likely to remain unchanged also; then, within a specified geographic area, population will continue to grow as long as there are unused natural resources. When the natural resources are used up the population will attempt to migrate to other geographic areas. If they can migrate to vacant lands the migration is peaceful and the process of population growth is repeated; if the neighboring lands are occupied, war ensues.

Further events depend on who wins the war. If the attackers win the attacked may flee¹⁵ and, in turn, attack their neighbors and so start off a chain reaction which may ultimately affect populations thousands of miles away.¹⁶ If the attackers are beaten off, and there are a series of battles over a considerable time period, the population may be so depleted that the original land area will again support the people, and no migration ensues.

2) If technology changes, the economic structure is likely to change, after which population adjustments will occur. If the economic base expands, population will expand also, and if it contracts population will contract.

3) Population will not necessarily expand to the limits of the economic base in the Malthusian sense. The desired standard of living to which the population aspires will be of importance in determining ultimate population size. Thus the expansion of the economy may be a substitute for migration and war.

4) There are some three different types of technological in-

¹⁵ In some cases, of course, the losers may become the slaves or servants of the conquerors. Sometimes the vanquished may so outnumber the victors that it becomes a question as to which group absorbs which. For example, historically the Chinese absorbed conquering tribes into the Chinese culture, as the Manchus were absorbed.

¹⁶ Kulischer reviewed a body of literature which relates the conquest of the Roman Empire by the Huns to wars and migrations all through Asia and into China. When the nomads of central Asia were barred from China (the Great Wall of China had been built for this purpose), "They, [the nomad power of the Juan-Juan,] could expand only to the West, pushing the Huns and their companions before them into the steppes to the north of the Balkhash and Aral Seas—the pasture grounds of their Western Hunnish cousins. In such manner engendered the last and decisive drive of the Huns toward Europe" culminating eventually in the fall of the western Roman Empire. (Unpublished ms., "The Barbarian Stream to the West.")

novations which can affect population movements differently: a) those which directly increase the economic base; b) those which improve means of communication and travel and therefore make migration easier;¹⁷ c) those of a military nature which make it easier for one population to attack another.¹⁸

5) Changes in population size, in turn, can affect the economy; for example, there may be insufficient people in an area to utilize the natural resources so that an increase in the number of people may lead to greatly increased production which, in turn, will support an even larger population.¹⁹ On the other hand, if increases in population are not accompanied by commensurate increases in production, the larger population in itself, eventually may reduce the population supporting capacity of the economy, thus leading to a smaller population.²⁰

¹⁷ "The sea has played the double role of the most formidable barrier for migratory currents and a far-ranging highway. . . . Only by the middle of the 19th century was the Atlantic so easily spanned that peaceful migrations could roll in the one direction from east to west across the continents of Europe and America. Because the natural barrier was almost eliminated by technological and commercial progress, it was artificially reerected in order to uphold the more favorable economic density in the United States. . . ." (ENCY. BRIT., *op. cit.*, p. 4).

¹⁸ The domestication of the horse "that probably lived mainly in the great Eurasian steppe," the invention of the war chariot for the successful use of which good horses were indispensable, and the acquisition of metal for tools and weapons helped make the wandering Asian nomads formidable warriors 3000 and more years ago. (Unpublished ms., "The War Chariot Peoples").

¹⁹ Kulischer commented, ". . . for an underpopulated country, immigration is the only means of utilizing its productive forces and assuring a development commensurate with its natural resources. Furthermore, progress can be achieved only through an influx of manpower in places where, because of the natural richness, the means of existence can be increased far beyond the hitherto achieved limits of production, and where the potential possibilities surpass actual production and returns," Jewish Migrations, Past Experiences and Post-War Prospects, in *JEWS AND THE POST-WAR WORLD* (American Jewish Committee, Pamphlet Series No. 4, [New York: 1953]). 51 pp.

²⁰ Kulischer (in his available writings) seems not to have developed this point fully. He points out, for example, that the population in parts of Asia increased very rapidly during much of the 18th and 19th centuries, largely as a result of strong governments stopping the almost continuous warfare and banditry. "Up to the seventeenth century unlimited production of children was offset by slaughterhouse mortality," (Teeming Asia and the West, *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVIII, 4, (December, 1953), p. 482. As a result of internal peace the populations increased so much more rapidly than did the economies that these peoples are now destitute and consequently are accepting Communist rule, *Loc. cit.*

The connection which we should add is as follows. A more rapid rate of growth of population than of the economy decreases the amount of savings possible, since the people insist on consuming the produce. This decrease in savings leads to smaller

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6) Changes in the political and social structure independently of economic changes (such as forcing a religious minority to flee) can also affect the chain of events—population size, economic base, technology, political situation, migration, etc., etc.

7) Superimposed on these human factors are a whole host of possible changes in the natural environment (such as climatic changes, earthquakes, etc.) which in turn, can affect the population supporting capacity of an area, or affect the size of the population in that area.

8) Finally, and in order to complicate Kulischer's theory, he did not believe in the inevitability of any particular human or nonhuman event or relationship, except one.²¹ He believed that as long as one people were better off economically than another, or that people were not as well off as they thought they should be, trouble would erupt sooner or later, depending on various circumstances. For this reason he saw history as a continuous battleground. And when he viewed the world in the mid-twentieth century, with its have and have-not nations, he could foresee no change in the visible future; the gods of war and disaster will continue to exact tribute and human sacrifice. If only the politicians, who are supposed to lead, and the people, who are supposed to follow, would understand history, perhaps the world could be converted into a peaceful state. He was not very sanguine about the possibility of this in the reasonable future.

Kulischer, in his writings, tended to give undue emphasis, in

investments and decreased expansion of the economy. Further, since land, machinery, and other production equipment will soon be used up if capital investments for their maintenance and improvements are not made, the lack of savings, eventually, can lead to the diminution in the means of production and the contraction of the economy. Now, since the population continues to increase, poverty also can increase, leading to wars, famine, and epidemics, which can decrease the populations. This last step has not occurred as yet in Asia (to this writer's knowledge) due to a variety of factors, including the food and other assistance provided by other nations.

²¹ He wrote, for example, "No demands, however pressing they might be, guarantee by themselves political progress. After the atomic bomb was invented, formation of a world government has become imperative. . . . Nonetheless there is not the slightest hope that the so badly needed step in political organization can be reached as long as our present political psychology continues." (Unpublished ms. "Birthplaces of Civilization: Strategic Position").

our opinion, to the statement: "Migratory movements are expressions of a trend toward equalization of economic density, which is the ratio between the number of inhabitants and the resources at their disposal."²² In one form or another he repeated this statement in all his writings. To the casual reader this sounds like a single cause theory of history and human nature. It is only when one examines the historical materials in his writings, and notes his frequent comments, which are often side remarks, that one realizes that there was far more to his theory than appears in this statement.

On the other hand, Kulischer's brief statement is very similar to the purpose of the Research Group for Europe Migration Problems, which reads as follows:

The level of prosperity, and with it that of human happiness in a broader sense, depends to a large degree on how well the means of subsistence and the population are balanced in their distribution over the earth. In a world where more and more voices are pointing out the threat of overpopulation, the desirability of such a balance has become most urgent. . . . A number of European economists, sociologists, and demographers have joined together in order to consider the situation in Europe, both in the sparsely as well as in the densely populated areas. They intend to study on an international level the problems arising from the unbalance between population and means of subsistence and also the consequences of the solutions which will be provided. . . .²³

SOME COMMENTS ON KULISCHER'S FORMULATIONS

Some students may argue that the previously listed eight points, which in our opinion summarize Kulischer's thoughts, constitute a theory of social change rather than population theory. Let us consider this.

Population is part and parcel of human society. One may have separate theories about how bees determine direction (if they can), or how salmon can return to their birth stream

²² ENCY. BRIT., *op. cit.*, p. 2.

²³ Statement of Purpose of the REMP, *R. E. M. P. Bulletin*, VII, 2 (April-June 1959), p. 57.

to spawn, or to explain that cigarettes are (or are not) cancerigenic. But one cannot propose a theory to explain changes in the size and characteristics of human populations which is independent of other human activities. In this sense, Kulischer took seriously the title of the United Nations volume DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION TRENDS.

Migration—the movement of people—was the most obvious form of population movement to Kulischer, possibly because he, personally, was most sensitized to this subject. Yet even when he began with “migration” he ended with technology, politics, and the entire complex of human social structure and relations. He summarized the history of population growth:

The first preagricultural wave of population growth was intimately connected with migration; man replenished the earth because he multiplied, but he could multiply only as far as he occupied new hunting grounds. The next step in population growth was inaugurated by the neolithic revolution; people multiplied faster and this process became less closely allied with their migrations: an agricultural community can grow on the spot for a time, the length of which depends upon the availability of new land close to the settlement and on the degree to which cultivation has been intensified; but when the population has outgrown the means of subsistence, which under the given condition can be produced, a partial exodus must take place. The third step set in with the radical change of living conditions; in the two hundred years that elapsed since 1750, population grew three times as much as in the preceding two hundred thousand years; in the course of this period people movements were greatly disentangled from direct food production and partly replaced by movements of goods. The next step, that of Atomic Revolution, either will destroy—or at least sharply reduce—the world population, or if connected with its somewhat more rational redistribution and growth, it will progressively liberate mankind from dependence on local resources of power, raw material and food.²⁴

Within this broad framework such topics as differences in

²⁴ Unpublished ms., “Population Growth and Migration.”

fertility rates among social classes or economic groups or urban vs. rural residents; or the sex and age structures of a population; or differences in marriage and divorce rates among the several parts of a society; these and others with which present day demographers are concerned, were really minor aspects. He had thoughts on all these topics, but as far as we know, never set them systematically down in writing.

With regard to differences in fertility rates he wrote:

As to factors promoting higher fertility, a search for such factors is unnecessary when we observe that 'animals procreate without benefit of cultural sanctions.' What we have to ask is why some 'normally' developing peoples worked out devices against unlimited procreation earlier than others.²⁵

In "Teeming Asia and the West" Kulischer wrote:

In the West the transition from a traditional to a rational approach to childbearing was not the cause but rather the result of a changed pattern of economic and social life. It was mainly a by-product of industrialization and urbanization. . ."²⁶

Despite these latter remarks it is clear that he did not look upon the birth rate as a passive dependent variable; he commented frequently in his writings on how changes in population size and characteristics, which would result from changes in birth rates, in turn influenced the economy and political structure. Rather, his purpose in making this last remark was to emphasize that birth rates could not be changed independently of changes in the entire social, economic, and political structure. In so doing he was taking issue with at least one group of present day demographers who tend to believe that the birth rate can be lowered in underdeveloped countries without otherwise affecting the social and economic structure.

By thus incorporating population theory as an integral part of the process of social and economic change Kulischer's remarks, in our opinion, are of the greatest value in understand-

²⁵ *Loc. cit.*

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 485.

ing and dealing with the problems posed in economic development today, in particular the problems of the grossly underdeveloped areas. On the one hand, the position taken by certain groups (including at least one large religious organization) that population growth is not a relevant factor in economic development, is clearly mistaken and can have dire consequences. On the other hand, the position taken by some family planners that a reduced birth rate will solve all economic, social, and political problems is also mistaken, and the results will be valueless, if not harmful.

In our opinion Kulischer's formulation leads to the notion of an all out simultaneous attack on as many aspects as possible of this interrelated population-economic-social-political-technological problem. It seems to us that Kulischer has set forth a meaningful "pluralistic conception of population theory," such as Gutman called for (in the previously cited paper).

Insofar as the economically well developed parts of the world are concerned Kulischer's thoughts lead to the conclusion that migrations will continue for an indefinite time into the future, —migrations, which cannot be stopped permanently by man-made immigration laws. The historical pressures which formerly led to immigration to the "lands of opportunity" (and which demographers recognize today when they speak of the "economic factor" in migration) are operating today and will continue to operate indefinitely into the future.

Since World War II many millions of persons have migrated to new homelands; some went voluntarily, others were forced to move. How many is difficult to say with any exactness. G. Beijer sets forth an estimate of 40 million refugees.²⁷ Kirk speaks of vast numbers and of the estimated 600 million rural surplus population of Asia who constitute potential—if they are not already actual—migrants.²⁸

Since the establishment of the United Nations, international migration (including refugee) problems have been handed to

²⁷ *R. E. M. P. Bulletin*, VII, 3 (July-September, 1959), p. 68.

²⁸ Dudley Kirk, *Major Migrations Since World War II, Selected Studies of Migration Since World War II*, Milbank Memorial Fund, New York, 1958.

that agency to "solve." The indications are that this will become an ever increasing burden for this organization, and for the member governments which are to supply the required funds; and these are the economically well developed countries. If we follow Kulischer's arguments we must conclude that these migrations are continuing affairs and will occur as long as some countries are much more economically developed than others. The solution, if there is one, is to raise to a very considerable degree the economic levels of the have-not states and to reduce their birth rates drastically. This may not be a sufficient condition to bring relative peace and order to mankind, but it is a necessary condition.

SOME FURTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

The most obvious implication to us is that demographic problems must be studied within the framework of history and the entire socio-economic-cultural-political pattern. In particular, if the investigator is interested in a specific problem in order to appraise the future, must he take these factors into account. For example, the writer of the otherwise admirable introduction to *Population Trends and Related Problems of Economic Development in the ECAFE Region*²⁹ in discussing the decreasing mortality trends over the past decade or so, assumes that mortality will continue to decline indefinitely into the future. The writer recognizes the historical observation that significant declines in mortality accompanied significant growth of the economy in certain parts of the world; furthermore, this historical observation is in accord with all available theory and knowledge regarding the process whereby a rapidly growing economy will be associated with large decreases in the death rate. However, the economies of the several countries in Asia and the Far East have not fared sufficiently well in the past decade. Accordingly, the writer of the "introduction" seems to have decided that long time trends in the death rate can occur without changes in other parts of the society.³⁰

²⁹ *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, x, 1 (June, 1959).

³⁰ The declines in mortality which have occurred in the past decade or so can
(Continued on page 205)

Another type of example which can be culled from the population literature is that of the large number of studies which have been made of age composition. In so many of these studies the population of a geographic area is divided into those of "productive" and those of "unproductive" ages. The ratio of "productive" to "unproductive" is computed and the investigator worries—and invites others to worry with him—when this ratio decreases. In most of these studies no recognition is taken of the level—and possible changes in the level—of labor productivity. At one time labor productivity in all societies must have been so low that almost everyone had to work if he wished to survive; in such societies almost everyone was in the "productive" ages.³¹ With increasingly higher levels of labor productivity relatively fewer workers are required and the ratio of "productive" to "unproductive" can decrease greatly. Many other factors in addition to labor productivity enter into an analysis of the "productive" ages, or the working force, of course; we cannot examine them all here. We only wish to add that in our opinion, one of the elements which many present day investigators unconsciously bring to their analyses, is the historical value that work is "good and moral" and failure to work is "bad and immoral." Therefore, the ratio of "productive" to "unproductive" should always increase.

We could continue with other examples of current and past demographic research which in our opinion,—and we think also in Kulischer's opinion—fail for any purpose precisely because they neglect to consider the many other important aspects of society. But enough is enough.

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be accounted for in terms of public health and other influences brought into the countries from outside. Such short run declines are consistent with the general theoretical framework regarding population movements.

³¹ For a discussion of the working force, see for example, A. J. Jaffe and Charles D. Stewart, *Manpower Resources and Utilization*, Part I. (1951).

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