Rapher is the use to which a people puts that surplus of goods which it produces beyond its minimum requirements for life. For this surplus can be both a stimulator of the growth of output per inhabitant and a facilitator of other agencies such as technological improvements which may make for growth of output. As population and other data indicate, the capacity of non-industrial peoples to produce such a surplus varies greatly as does the surplus brought into being (for reasons that remain “obscure”). The surplus is utilized largely to support “social leisure,” which means, since this surplus is quite unevenly divided, a leisure class considered superior by the underlying population. This class commands the surplus partly in virtue of its providing “government” and serving the “supernatural.” The surplus is devoted largely to what Vablen called conspicuous consumption, a form of consumption that adds to the prestige of the leisure class. A problem confronting those who wish to convert a non-industrial into a modernized society is that of diverting the capacity to produce a surplus to the formation of income-producing wealth.

The resolution of this problem is not gone into by the author, nor is the resolution of many analogous problems suggested by discussion found elsewhere in the study under review. This omission, of course, is intentional. Nonetheless, in view of the great importance presently attached to the modernization of non-industrial societies, it would be worth while making the findings of this book bear more directly, in so far as this is possible, upon the selection of the approaches best suited to the modernization of these societies.

J. J. Spengler

POPULATION CHANGES IN EUROPE: 1939–1947

From the point of view of demographic trends, few periods in Europe’s history can have been as eventful, or confused, as the years from the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 through the initial period of readjustment following V-E Day. The continuing decline of civilian death rates and the unusual, still not

fully understood, behavior of birth rates that seems to have begun in the mid-thirties would have kept students of population busy in both empirical and theoretical pursuits even had there been no political or military developments of importance. When there were superimposed on these trends the manifold demographic effects of war, the situation became statistically almost unmanageable. Short-run changes in fertility patterns; wartime civilian and military deaths; mass movements of soldiers, prisoners of war, laborers, and displaced persons; and the disruption of record-keeping and census-taking procedures left much uncertainty about the size and development of Europe’s population.

A great advance toward supplying the missing information has now been made by Gregory Frumkin, who was throughout its existence editor of the **Statistical Year-Book** of the League of Nations. The core of Frumkin’s book is a series of “balance sheets” detailing the sources of change in the population of individual countries from 1939 to 1945, and again from then until 1947. The territory covered includes all of Europe outside the present boundaries of the USSR with the exception of Albania, Turkey, Iceland, and a few very small areas. (In December, 1938, the population of the regions not covered by the study was less than 1 per cent of the total population of Europe outside the present Soviet Union.) Each “balance sheet,” which is really more like a profit and loss statement in the usual terminology of accounting, contains the following items, or such of them as are applicable:

### A. 1939–1945

a) Population, end of 1938  
b) Population change resulting from territorial change  
c) Births  
d) “Normal” deaths  
e) War losses  
   i) Military  
   ii) Civilian, excluding Jews  
   iii) Jews killed  
f) Population shifts  
f’) Inward
Such a “balance sheet” form has a number of advantages for the organization of this type of material. Comparison between countries, computation of figures for groups of nations, and discovery of gaps and inconsistencies in the data are facilitated. Wider general use of the technique than has heretofore been the case may be desirable, though it will be necessary to guard against the development of rigidity in patterns of thinking about demographic problems and against the temptation to make estimates to fill in empty lines on a balance sheet when no justifiable approximation is possible.

In Chapter I, “Population background,” a brief history of European population movements in the last half century is given, chiefly through a series of graphs showing the course of the birth rate, death rate, and rate of natural increase for each country. The need for knowing the components of population change in addition to the number of people at census dates is pointed out, with special emphasis on the problem of assessing what past developments imply for the future.

Chapter II, “Method of approach: technicalities,” presents the outline of the balance sheet form to be used, with comments on the various items. Although difficulties arose at all stages of the preparation of the balance sheets, “population shifts” proved to be the most serious problem, both the movement of prisoners of war and other forms of migration being sources of uncertainty. (P. 28.) Here, as in other parts of the work, it was often necessary to go beyond published or unpublished official data, consulting with authorities in the vari-
ous countries and often making somewhat arbitrary original estimates. Each item of the balance sheet was, in general, worked out independently without the use of any residual category that would make the net outcome check with the returns from postwar censuses. The reviewer agrees with Frumkin that the similarity between the results of the study and of the censuses is surprisingly good.

The bulk of the volume (130 pp.) is taken up with the individual reports for each country, the articles varying in length from less than a page for Malta to 23 pages on the difficult case of Germany. Each balance sheet is accompanied by a discussion of the particular problems involved in handling the data used. A list of main sources is given for each country and the text is cross-referenced to this list. Through the use of a simple system of symbols, indication is made of the degree to which the published figures represent adjustments of official statistics or original estimates of the author. Although the data available are too few to permit inclusion of the Soviet Union as part of the formal study, Chapter III includes a section summarizing such information as could be found relative to the population development of that country.

For the majority of readers the concluding chapter, “General results,” will be of most immediate interest. Here the balance sheets for all the countries are brought together in convenient tabular form, arranged in five groups: Western belligerents (including Italy), Central belligerents (Germany and Austria), Eastern belligerents, Northern countries, and other countries (all the neutrals except Sweden). Combined balance sheets are presented for each group and for Europe as a whole. A useful summary discussion of the main features that emerge from the study points out that it is not so much the pattern for Europe as the differential development in the different regions that is of interest. Thus the Western, Northern, and neutral groups of countries each gained in population between 1939 and 1945, in spite of the war, while the Central and Eastern countries lost about 10 million persons, net, during the same period. (P. 175.) The distribution between civilians and the military of deaths due to the war, including genocide, also showed marked regional differences. Whereas in the Northern countries over
90 per cent of the war losses were military, in the Eastern group about 88 per cent of the war losses were civilian, almost equally divided between Jews and non-Jews. (P. 181.) A point at which Frumkin’s analysis leaves him with a view divergent from that apparently held by many concerns the number of unrepatriated prisoners of war, which he concludes “can hardly be considerable.” (P. 183.) The number of deaths due to the war is probably (correspondingly) larger than many have believed.

A book such as this whets the appetite for other, perhaps unobtainable, statistics. Having now an orderly study on a comparable basis of the total population of European countries, one would like to have the figures for age and sex groups, in particular for the population of working age. The author is of course aware of this and originally aimed his efforts at such a more detailed goal, but found it impossible to work out an age-sex series of balance sheets. Some small questions may be raised as to the presentation of the results. Thus, in spite of the difficulty that would be involved in setting forth completely the sources of data and the procedures used for estimation, somewhat more detailed documentation than even the considerable amount given would have been of much help to individuals employing the book either as a reference work or as a basis for further investigations of their own. Some of the comparative tables in the final chapter would be enhanced by the inclusion of percentage as well as absolute figures. The statement (p. 187) that “with the exception of the ‘Axis’ Powers, . . . the greatest toll in human lives was paid by the civilian population” appears to overlook the cases of the United Kingdom and the countries of the Northern group, where military war losses exceeded civilian. It is of course true that when the non-Axis countries are taken together, civilian losses predominate because of the great weight of numbers in the Eastern countries. These are minor matters, however, relative to the large accomplishment that this book represents. Everyone concerned with the development of Europe’s population must be grateful to Frumkin for preparing the study (and to his publisher for making it available). Its place as a standard reference is assured.

George F. Mair