

EUROPEAN MIGRATIONS: PREWAR TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

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IN the chaotic years through which Europe has just passed it has often seemed as though the entire European population were caught up in a swirling tide of human movement. One wave of refugees after another has swept across the continent. Whole populations during the war were arbitrarily uprooted from their ancient lands and set down in strange surroundings; at best they found poor quarters in their new homes, at worst they encountered the concentration camp and the extermination center. Millions of workers were recruited by force or persuasion to serve the combatants as cogs in the machines of war. These shifting currents left a large residue of permanently displaced persons, many of whom can never hope to return to the lands of their origin in decency or safety. Many more millions are being permanently exiled from the regions of their birth and nurture by the dictates of the peace.

The problems of the refugees and displaced persons ought properly to be one of the heaviest on the conscience of the world; they have been the subject of innumerable articles and an endless flow of debate. They have brought the problems of migration to the fore. But they may obscure the long range problems of Europe at peace. Now that international order is in the process of reestablishment, we should not overlook the broad picture, in which the refugee problem holds an important place without being the exclusive center of focus. Thus, what are the underlying migration potentials reflected in historical trends? What are the potential sources of postwar international migration? What are the potential outlets? What are the factors that determine the actual volume of migration? What elements in the postwar world are favorable to migration, what unfavorable?

In attacking these complicated questions it is useful to

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


Fig. 1. Origins and destinations of overseas emigration from Europe as measured by the statistics of European-born persons living in overseas countries.




Fig. 2. Net balance of international migrations within Europe as determined from place-of-birth and nationality statistics (including only those movements with a net balance exceeding 25,000 persons).

approach the problem at two levels, first, to evaluate the pre-war trends and the extent to which they reflect the underlying migration potentials, and, second, to consider how these basic migration potentials and their expression in actual migration may have been modified by the Second World War.

We may turn first to the migratory trends of the past, and especially to those migrations occurring in what are often regarded as more "normal" periods of European history than the recent past.² These movements are commonly thought to reflect the migration potentials existing in the absence of restrictive barriers and political disorder. They fall readily into a dichotomy: (a) overseas migration and (b) international migration within Europe.³

The residue of these two movements in the interwar period, as represented by place-of-birth statistics,⁴ is shown in Figures 1 and 2. In these maps the flow lines measure the balance of persons living outside their country of origin as reported in the countries of residence in the middle of the interwar period. It is obvious that on the numerical scale employed overseas emigration has been much the more important form of international migration of Europeans.⁵

² The following discussion of historical trends draws heavily on materials presented in the sections on migration in a forthcoming book by the author entitled *EUROPE'S POPULATION IN THE INTERWAR YEARS*. (In press.)

³ A distinction is often made between intercontinental and intracontinental migration, but the above distinction is a more usable one. Thus, movement across the indistinct land boundaries separating European and Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union, though intercontinental, are properly regarded as internal migration.

⁴ Supplemented in part by nationality statistics in those countries lacking usable statistics of place of birth.

⁵ The comparison is clearly not a rigorous one. Technically Figure 1 refers only to emigration and does not take account of persons born in other continents and living in Europe. These are of course a small number and their inclusion would not seriously modify the results, especially since they would undoubtedly be more than balanced by the number of European-born persons living in overseas countries not included in the computations. A second and more important basis of non-comparability is the fact that gross residue of migration for movements within the continent is much larger than the net balance indicated in Figure 2. Thus the total number of Europeans living outside their country of origin, but still in Europe was some 12 million, as compared with somewhat over 20 million Europeans in overseas countries, and there undoubtedly was a much more rapid turnover of migrants within the continent. The residue of overseas migration is thus greater than that of intracontinental migration, but not in so large a ratio as might be indicated by a hasty comparison of Figures 1 and 2.

THE GREAT MIGRATION

The peopling of other continents by Europeans is the largest and one of the most dramatic migrations in history. At least 60 million Europeans have sought new homes overseas since the first colonization efforts of the sixteenth century. Many perished or returned home disappointed; but the survivors and their descendants form a majority in areas that combined exceed Europe in size and natural resources. In many other regions Europeans and their descendants form a solid core of European cultural influence with or without direct political association with the mother continent.

Overseas emigration has been a well-nigh universal phenomenon in Europe. Every nation in Europe has fed the stream to overseas countries, and, as may be observed in Figure 1, the net residue of this movement amounted to sizable figures for all but the smallest countries of Eastern Europe.

It is obvious that so huge and generalized a movement was a response to very widespread motivations. It differed from earlier mass migrations in that it was a movement of individuals, not of tribes or of entire peoples. Furthermore, though there were many specific instances of forced deportation, the bulk of the overseas migration arose from voluntary choice and not as the result of expulsion. Although political and religious persecution were important causes of migration in colonial times, by the early nineteenth century economic motivations were firmly entrenched as the leading factor. As early as 1820, potential migrants were acquainted with the fluctuations of economic opportunity and migrated or not according to their information. The course of overseas migration for a century prior to the First World War was dominated by successive waves increasingly governed by the fluctuation of opportunity in the receiving countries and by the progress of alternative economic opportunities through industrialization at home.⁶ In contrast with preceding migrations it was notable

⁶ The individual motivations promoting early overseas migration are well set forth
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


Fig. 3. Average annual overseas emigration from Europe, 1846-1939, distinguishing (a) "old migration" from the British Isles, Scandinavia, Germany, Switzerland, France, and the Low Countries, and (b) "new migration" from the remaining countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe.

for the lack of interference by the governments of both sending and receiving countries in the free movement of individuals.

In the course of its development, overseas migration experienced widely recognized changes in its numerical volume, in

by Marcus Lee Hansen in *THE ATLANTIC MIGRATION, 1607-1860*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1940. This volume draws heavily on the opinions and personal accounts given in letters and contemporary periodicals. The high correlation between European emigration and economic conditions in the United States prior to the First World War is thoroughly documented in Jerome, Harry: *MIGRATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE*. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1926. The degree of coincidence of prosperity and European immigration in Canada and Australia is examined by William D. Forsyth in his *THE MYTH OF THE OPEN SPACES*. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1942, pp. 30-32. The importance of industrialization and prosperous business conditions in the countries of emigration as a deterrent to overseas emigration is discussed in the several chapters devoted to individual countries in Willcox, Walter F. (ed.): *INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS, Vol. II, INTERPRETATIONS*. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929. A detailed study with respect to a particular country with excellent statistics is incorporated in Thomas, Dorothy Swaine: *SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SWEDISH POPULATION MOVEMENTS, 1750-1933*. New York, Macmillan Co., 1941, pp. 166-169, 319-321.

the countries of its origin, and in the predominant character of the migration. Changes in the volume of overseas emigration from Europe are shown in Figure 3. It is apparent that there have been wide fluctuations, the movement rising and falling with changing economic conditions. But in the overall picture it is clear that there was a sharply rising trend in the seventy-five years preceding the First World War. The earlier mass migrations had been drawn chiefly from Western Europe, and especially from the British Isles, Germany, and Scandinavia. With improvements in communication and transportation, each new wave drew into its vortex people from an ever-widening perimeter of lands in Europe and each thereby surpassed its predecessor. In its later stages the great migration was notable for its enormous flood of "new migration" from the peasant regions of Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe. In the years just before World War I it reached a tremendous peak, with a total of 14 million in the decade 1906-1915.

THE END OF THE GREAT MIGRATION

The First World War marked a crucial turning point in the history of overseas emigration. The movement progressively shrank during the 'twenties, and in the 'thirties reached the lowest point in a hundred years. Even the movements of refugees in the late 'thirties were of little numerical significance relative to the earlier economically motivated migrations. The interwar period witnessed the fading and virtual disappearance of mass migration from Europe.

Thus, in rough figures, Europe lost a balance of 8 million through overseas emigration in the decade 1900-1910, and 5 million in the decade 1910-1920 despite the cessation of emigration during the First World War. There was some revival in the 'twenties, but the net loss of population was only about 3 million, the greater part of which occurred in the first half of the decade. During the 'thirties new European emigration was almost entirely offset by the return of earlier emigrants, there




Fig. 4. Overseas immigration into the chief countries of destination, 1900-1939 (for the United States: fiscal years).

being comparatively little revival of the overseas movement despite the improved economic conditions and the substantial number of political refugees set adrift in the last half of the decade. The relative importance of the latter may be illustrated by the fact that all of the European political refugees in 1939 amounted to less than the average annual emigration from Europe prior to the First World War.⁷

It has been easy to assert that the decline of overseas migration was the result of the two obvious causes: restrictive legislation and economic depression. These were undoubtedly of very great importance in the sharp curtailment of overseas migration that occurred in the interwar years. As may be observed in Figure 4, immigration into the United States fell off sharply following the institution of the quota system in 1921 and the legislation of even tighter restrictions in 1924.

⁷ Thus about 400,000 refugees were reported to have left greater Germany prior to September 1, 1939, and some 450,000 Spanish refugees entered France after the collapse of Republican Spain, of which about 140,000 still remained in February, 1940. Cf. Kulischer, Eugene M.: *THE DISPLACEMENT OF POPULATION IN EUROPE*. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1943, pp. 42-44. The average annual overseas migration in the decade preceding World War I was 1,400,000.

Furthermore, even the limited quotas of the 1924 law were far from filled in the economic depression of the 'thirties.

It is important to recognize, nevertheless, that there were important factors tending to restrict overseas migration quite aside from these specific causes. Two symptoms may be noted. First, it is significant that American quotas were not subject to severe pressure from the industrial countries of Western Europe even during the 'twenties. In fact, despite the absence of important legislative barriers, emigration from these countries has followed a downward secular trend since 1880.⁸ Second, it may be mentioned that despite oft-noted pressure on their American quotas there was relatively little substitute migration from Southern and Eastern Europe to other overseas countries not applying restrictions on the American pattern.⁹ The drop in the volume of immigration in the 'twenties was greatest in the United States, but there was also a decline from prewar levels in countries without such legislation. Thus the three major overseas countries of immigration after the United States, namely, Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, had a combined immigration of almost 800 thousand in 1913, but in no postwar year did their combined total reach half that figure.

The underlying forces reducing overseas migration were (a) changing economic opportunities in overseas countries and (b) the progress of industrialization and urbanization in Europe. Conditions in overseas countries were becoming less attractive to mass immigration as these countries developed the characteristics of more mature economies. The remaining "open spaces" were not suitable for intensive European settlement

⁸ Cf. Fig. 3. If proper allowance could be made for the increasing element of temporary migrants, especially British, in the interwar period the decline would be more pronounced. Another factor in maintaining substantial migration from Northwestern Europe was the renewal of German emigration owing to the difficult postwar conditions in that country.

⁹ As might be expected Canadian immigration increased somewhat with the curtailment of immigration into the United States, and there is some presumptive evidence that the migration to South America from Poland, for example, was larger in the late 'twenties than it would have been without the American quota system. But these were comparatively small diversions, and insufficient to maintain immigration in these countries of free immigration at prewar levels.

without extremely high capitalization and in any event their products were a glut on the international market.¹⁰ Furthermore, the changed opportunities were not simply a matter of the "filling up" of overseas countries, as is often supposed, but also of institutional changes in the economy. In the overseas countries, as in Europe, land has ceased to be regarded as the chief wealth and principal source of profitable occupation. Land long since lost its appeal to the majority of migrants, who have sought the more lucrative occupations of the towns. The greatest migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not chiefly composed of land-hungry peasants; they were essentially a rural-urban migration, from the overcrowded farmlands of Europe to the glittering opportunities for economic advancement presumed to exist in the cities of the New World.¹¹

In periods of rapid industrialization there has been a great demand for labor in overseas countries. But with increasing economic maturity, labor has also been a growing and more vocal force in national life. It has become increasingly effective, especially in the English-speaking countries, in its opposition to the competition of immigrant aliens. At the same time, increasingly important channels of social advancement in the "white collar" occupations are barred to the immigrant by differences in language and education. An expanding part of the labor force has been diverted to governmental and other service occupations, and in the United States, for instance, the alien is explicitly barred from the former. Furthermore, the increasing interest of government in the economic welfare of

¹⁰ The "myth of the open spaces" is especially well exposed in Forsyth, *op. cit.*, with reference to Australia. Surveys of the possibilities of this and other areas are discussed in Bowman, Isaiah (ed.): *LIMITS OF LAND SETTLEMENT*. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1937; Bowman: *THE PIONEER FRINGE*. New York, American Geographical Society, 1931; Joerg, W. L. G. (Ed.): *PIONEER SETTLEMENT*. New York, American Geographical Society, 1932. The particular problems attendant on international resettlement are reviewed in Moore, Wilbert E.: *Economic Limits of International Resettlement*. *American Sociological Review*, 10: 27-281, April 1945.

¹¹ Thus as early as 1890, 62 per cent of the foreign-born white persons in the United States were resident in urban communities as compared with only 26 per cent of the native white. U. S. Census Bureau: *THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES*, Vol. I, *POPULATION*, 1910. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1913.

its citizenry works against migration. Thus the development of social insurance both at home and in the overseas countries intensifies the loss of economic security involved in migration. Finally, these economic disabilities have been bolstered by the rise of nationalism in overseas countries. The immigrant is no longer regarded as a welcome partner in the growth and the development of a new land. Instead, countries of immigration are increasingly concerned with the problems of assimilation. Such concern tends to defeat its own objectives by dissipating the atmosphere of tolerance in which assimilation and amalgamation most speedily occur.

Paralleling changed conditions in overseas countries were those in Europe weakening the drive and the opportunity to emigrate. Overseas emigration on the scale of the early twentieth century is probably in essence a transitional phenomenon in European life. In each area of Europe affected, emigration tended to be greatest in the early stages of modernization when the perspectives of the modern world first raised the aspirations in a peasant society without providing the means of their satisfaction at home. Also, in demographic terms, a drive to emigrate was promoted by the fact that the first phases of modernization reduced death rates without commensurate declines in the birth rate, thus creating rapid population growth. Especially in a static rural economy rapid population growth creates pressures on the land and a strong motive for emigration.¹²

The sources of heaviest migration have consequently moved across Europe with the widening circle of industrialization and modernization which have spread in all directions from their center of diffusion in Northwestern and Central Europe. After the first great wave of emigration in each area the movement has tended to subside. The pressure to emigrate is weakened by the further operation of the vital revolution, which in the more advanced stages of industrialization brings about a decline in the birth rate and a slowing of population growth. In its

¹² Cf. Moore, Wilbert E.: *ECONOMIC DEMOGRAPHY OF EASTERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE*. Geneva, League of Nations, 1945.

economic aspect the progress of modernization brings industrial development and the expansion of opportunities in the nearby towns and cities. Finally, in its political phases, modernization promotes national sentiment and greater resistance to the sacrifice of language and custom commonly involved in overseas migration. These sentiments were already being reinforced in the interwar period by national policies directed at discouraging or even prohibiting the movement.¹³

With the progressive modernization and growing nationalism in the countries of emigration there came a trend toward a drying up of the stream of migration at its source. Basic pressures to migrate still existed in the relatively backward countries; in the absence of restrictions and with economic prosperity in overseas countries these would certainly have provided a continuing overseas movement for some years to come. But viewed in the broader perspective the outlook for large-scale overseas emigration on the pattern of the past was distinctly unfavorable. In the normal course of events it seemed likely that the peopling of other continents from Europe was a passing phenomenon.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION WITHIN EUROPE

The trends of international migration within Europe have been somewhat different from those of overseas migration. This movement has been much more diversified as regards direction and has had smaller numerical results than overseas migration. Only within the past generation have there been mass migrations within Europe comparable to the overseas floods. There has always been a certain interchange of population across international boundaries attendant on commercial and cultural relationships, and this has served as a most important means of cultural diffusion. But these osmotic ex-

¹³ Thus emigration from Fascist Italy was made increasingly difficult with the withdrawal of favors to emigrants, *e.g.*, in the form of cheap transportation to ports of embarkation; and after July, 1928, emigrants had to promise not to have their families follow them abroad. See Glass, David V.: *POPULATION POLICIES AND MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940. pp. 221-225. The strongest step was taken by the Soviet Union which forbade emigration altogether.

changes of population have consisted of relatively small numbers of technical personnel, agents, teachers, exiles, etc. By contrast, the chief interwar migrations were mass movements, one type the result of economically motivated and spontaneous migration on the part of individuals, the other the politically motivated flights of refugees and transfers of ethnic minorities.

The first of these has been a movement from countries of low levels of living and agrarian overpopulation to those of slower population growth and greater economic opportunities. Thus France, owing to her slow population growth and relatively high levels of living, has long attracted substantial numbers of workers from neighboring countries. In their periods of rapid industrialization prior to the First World War, Germany and Switzerland also attracted population from less developed neighboring countries. However, in the interwar years these earlier movements were dwarfed by a huge migration into France, amounting to a net balance of some two million immigrants in the decade 1920-1930; in the latter half of that decade France supplanted the United States as the chief country of European immigration. Though there were lesser movements into the Low Countries and England, "normal" international migration in Europe was preeminently a migration from the remainder of Europe to France. In the interwar period France gained population from almost every country in Europe, but above all from Italy and Poland, each of which supplied some half million migrants.

The 'thirties saw a termination of this movement with economic depression and the introduction of severe discriminatory measures against aliens in France. Even before, migratory movements in Europe had been increasingly enmeshed in treaties, restrictive decrees, and anti-alien legislation.¹⁴ These controls were of course greatly intensified in the depression years,

¹⁴ Cf. International Labour Office: *MIGRATION LAWS AND TREATIES*, Geneva, 1928, 2 vols. Some of these treaties (cf. that between France and Poland) were ostensibly for the purpose of regularizing migratory movements and protecting the migrant, but all reflected a growing concern of the governments in controlling migration and migrants in the service of national as well as of humanitarian interests.

and international migration understandably failed to revive with the economic recovery of the late 'thirties. The outstanding exception was the large immigration of workers into Germany in connection with the armament boom in the Third Reich. In the 'thirties, Germany replaced France as the chief country of European immigration, though this movement was drawn almost entirely from peoples of German speech living outside the boundaries of Germany proper. It was thus at once a migration motivated by economic advantage and by the desire to escape the disabilities of ethnic minority status.¹⁵

The other major type of international migration in Europe was that specifically associated with the liquidation of minorities and political dissidents. The model for this solution of minority problems was the Greco-Turkish exchange of populations in the early 'twenties. In the interwar period this was the outstanding case of forced migration,¹⁶ though there were large movements of population arising from the realignment of boundaries after the First World War,¹⁷ and especially as the result of the Communist Revolution in Russia.¹⁸

With the resurgence of the more virulent forms of nationalism in the 'thirties migrations motivated by political condi-

¹⁵ The movement was a large one, probably totalling three-quarters of a million, since in the intercensal period 1933-1939 the old Reich gained 500 thousand through migration over and above the loss of some 250 thousand political expatriates. The bulk of the migration came from Austria and the Sudetenland, some of it undoubtedly occurring after the incorporation of these areas in the Reich and to that extent not representing international, but internal migration. There were also substantial contingents from German ethnic minorities and of German citizens returning from abroad. Ethnic foreigners were few, the largest group comprising about 50 thousand Italians.

¹⁶ In this exchange over a million Greeks were returned from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace and some 400 thousand Moslems were expelled from Greece. The exchanges of population affecting Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey are described in Ladas, S. P.: *THE EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES: BULGARIA, GREECE, AND TURKEY*. New York, Macmillan, 1932.

¹⁷ Cf. Figure 2. It should be noted that the migrations shown are in some cases "international" only after the fact. Thus, much of the large migration from Czechoslovakia to Austria (*i.e.*, Vienna) occurred as internal migration before the war and the subsequent erection of a political barrier between the areas. The movements into Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria depicted in Figure 2 are a combination of prewar internal migration, refugee movements, and postwar international migration.

¹⁸ The nature and problems of the many movements of political refugees in the interwar period are described in Simpson, John Hope: *THE REFUGEE PROBLEM: REPORT OF A SURVEY*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1939.

tions again came to the fore. As noted above, there were some 400 thousand refugees from Nazi oppression in the Third Reich. The Spanish Civil War resulted in the exile of many thousands more. Finally, at the close of the interwar period the liquidation of minorities through officially sponsored transfers of population gained increasing favor as a means of achieving internal unity and "racial" purity, though actual movements (*e.g.*, of ethnic Germans "returning" to the Reich), had only begun.¹⁹

The outlook for voluntary international migration on the patterns of the past was quite unfavorable in the last days of the interwar period. The geographical barriers which formerly impeded migration had been largely swept aside by modern transportation; correspondingly, the traditional immobility of the peasant rooted in the soil had been weakened by the impact of the modern world. But in place of the physical barriers to transportation and communication had arisen man-made walls restraining the free flow of migration except as desired by the state. The predominant forms of international migration in Europe at the end of the interwar period were already those of refugees fleeing political discrimination or of forced population transfers to meet the political conveniences of the moment. The intensification of nationalism in both sending and receiving countries gave little hope of a renewal of large-scale economically motivated migration without a very substantial lowering of international tensions.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The war produced enormous movements of people in Europe. Kulischer estimated a total of 30 million persons in 1943 moved from their homes as the result of military campaigns, refugee flights, forced evacuations, and the recruitment of labor to feed the Axis war machine.²⁰ This number was of course much enlarged by subsequent military action and refugee movements

¹⁹ Except that the liquidation of Moslem minorities in Bulgaria and Rumania through guided migration had been continuing through the 'thirties.

²⁰ Kulischer, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

attendant on the retreat and collapse of the Axis forces. In the course of the war there were also elaborate transfers and resettlement programs designed to eliminate ethnic minorities. Many of Europe's troublesome minority problems were liquidated effectively, though ruthlessly, in this process.²¹ The displacement of Axis populations in Eastern Europe as a result of the new territorial arrangements, have added many million more to the huge total of persons forced to move as a result of the war.

POTENTIAL SOURCES AND DESTINATIONS OF POSTWAR MIGRATION

A casual survey might suggest that we are on the verge of a great resurgence of international migration from and within Europe. On the one hand, there is evidence of a great eagerness to emigrate on the part of many Europeans; on the other hand, there are numerous reports of ambitious schemes and plans for large-scale immigration, both in overseas countries and in France, long the chief country of immigration in Europe.

Thus on the one side, we hear accounts of a great desire to emigrate from Europe, very clearly heard from displaced persons, less clearly heard from the more settled peoples. Though much the greater number of war refugees returned to their countries of origin, there remain 850 thousand displaced persons, the "hard core," available for overseas migration or for relocation in European countries other than those of their origin. These are clearly raw material for present and future international migration. Beyond these are the surviving Jews of Eastern Europe, a large proportion of whom seem eager to leave Europe at any cost.²²

²¹ The complicated skein of transfers is carefully described in Schechtman, Joseph B.: *EUROPEAN POPULATION TRANSFERS: 1939-1945*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1946.

²² According to an opinion poll taken in Greater Budapest 64 per cent of the resident Jews wished to emigrate and 12 per cent more were hesitating. The comparable proportions among Christians of Jewish descent were 40 per cent and 12 per cent. Of the combined total, 55 per cent desired to emigrate, 30 per cent expressing a preference for America, 20 per cent for Palestine, and 5 per cent for "anywhere." Hungarian Institute of Public Opinion, release of March, 1946.

In addition to the refugees and displaced persons, there is presumably a large reservoir of persons, who, for one reason or another, would like to escape the hard living conditions and political chaos of contemporary Europe. In recent months public opinion surveys have been carried on in several European countries relating to the question of emigration. The polls indicate that substantial proportions of the populations in these countries are favorable to emigration, and that the thought of emigration is widespread even in the economically most favored countries of the West. Thus, in the Netherlands, 22 per cent of the sample stated that if they had the choice they would prefer to go and live in another country.²³ In a wartime survey in Great Britain, 18 per cent indicated that they had thought of going to live in another country after the war.²⁴ Replying to a much more rigorous test of desire to emigrate, 4 per cent of the Danish people surveyed stated that they seriously planned to emigrate as soon as travelling difficulties eased.²⁵ Even in France, which herself hopes to attract millions of immigrants, a substantial proportion of the population indicated a preference for living in another country if given a free choice.²⁶

On the other side there have been numerous references in the press to grandiose plans of large-scale immigration and of colonization and settlement in the so-called underpopulated countries overseas. Thus Australia, for example, is alleged to be a country suitable for occupation by 20 million people (well over twice its present population); in a statement to the Aus-

²³ Nederlandsch Instituut voor de publieke Opinie, release of April 1, 1946.

²⁴ British Institute of Public Opinion, poll taken in September, 1943.

²⁵ Dansk Gallup Institut, release of September 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 4. Winter, 1946-1947, p. 617.

²⁶ Asked in 1945 what nationality they would prefer, 19 per cent indicated some nationality other than French. In 1946, two comparable surveys were made asking the question "If you had a choice, which would you prefer, to stay in France or to go and live in another country?" In January, 26 per cent expressed a preference for a different country, of which 9 per cent preferred European countries (in order: Switzerland, Great Britain, and Russia), 12 per cent America, and 6 per cent the French colonies. In the later (August) poll the total per cent expressing a preference for a foreign country had fallen to 16 per cent. Institut français d'opinion publique, release of September, 1946.

tralian House of Representatives on August 2, 1945, the Minister for Immigration stated that defense considerations dictated a vast increase of population; Australia could readily absorb a 2 per cent increase per annum, and since natural increase could only be expected to furnish about half of this, a migration ceiling of 1 per cent growth per annum (now about 70,000) is appropriate.²⁷ Brazil was reported to be officially eager to import 1,200,000 Italians, 500,000 Portuguese, and 600,000 Central Europeans,²⁸ not to mention farmers from the United States²⁹ and a general open door to all white races. The Argentinian Director of Migration, Dr. Santiago M. Peralta, reported a fifty-year plan to increase Argentina's population to 100 million, with an annual immigration of 100,000 farmers annually.³⁰ In Canada there have been proposals to settle northern regions with displaced persons. In the United States there has been constant agitation to admit refugees by special dispensation outside the regular quota system.

In Europe, responsible Frenchmen have spoken of importing up to two million workers in the next ten years to assist in the reconstruction of France. Even in Britain some individuals have discussed the desirability of making England the "melting pot" of Europe, or perhaps a sort of processing plant in which Europeans are received, converted to loyal Britons, and then passed on to the Dominions or retained in Britain as replacements for the overseas Empire.³¹

A NEW ERA OF MASS MIGRATION?

Between the eagerly expressed desire for migrants in several of the countries of potential immigration and the favorable attitudes of many Europeans towards emigration, it might be

²⁷ *International Labour Review*, 52, No. 4, October, 1945, pp. 402-403.

²⁸ According to plans approved by the Constitution Commission (*New York Times*, April 11, 1946).

²⁹ *Ibid.*: May 18, 1946.

³⁰ *New York Times*: August 15, 1946 and *Inter-American*: No. 5, August, 1946, p. 45.

³¹ Benvenisti, J. L.: *New Melting Pot? Commonwealth*, 43, March 29, 1946, pp. 590-592.

assumed that we are about to see a great revival of international migrations affecting Europe as soon as the means of transportation and communication are made available and the political channels have been reopened. But those who would like to migrate are not necessarily those desired by the countries of immigration and action may fall far short of expressed intentions and plans.

Let us turn first to the potential sources of migration. It is immediately evident that what were formerly the greatest potential sources of European migration now fall within the Soviet sphere of influence. Almost since its founding the Soviet Union has forbidden free emigration from the USSR. Except in certain population exchanges conducted for the purpose of eliminating troublesome minorities, the example of the Soviet Union is now being followed by several Eastern European countries and there is every reason to believe that the remaining countries in this area are likely to discourage emigration in order to husband their human resources.

There are many symptoms of the vital interest of Eastern European countries in maintaining large populations to justify their national ambitions. Several of the Eastern European countries have suffered heavy population losses through the decimations of war, through the expulsion of minorities, and through the flights of political refugees. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example, there exists an acute shortage of manpower; these countries face difficult problems in recruiting natives to take the place of Germans driven from the Sudetenland and the old German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. In other countries under Soviet influence, the Russian policies of promoting rapid population growth are being followed. Thus Yugoslavia apparently forbids emigration of her ethnic nationals, and in Bulgaria a strong pronatalist policy had already been put into effect before the war. The prospects for international migration from Eastern Europe to France and to the overseas countries seem highly unfavorable.

As has been pointed out above, Western Europe before the

war was a declining source of migration, actual and potential, owing to industrialization and to the slowing of population growth. The war has apparently provoked a new desire to emigrate if we may believe the surveys of popular opinion. However, it would be unwise to assume that anything like the proportions of the populations expressing preference for residence in a foreign country represent a long-lasting reservoir of large-scale emigration. There is some suggestion that the interest in emigration will abate rapidly with the amelioration of economic conditions and the establishment of greater political stability. A possible index of this is the sharp decline of persons in France expressing a preference for living in a foreign country. As noted above, in the few months between January and August, 1946, this proportion fell from 26 per cent to 16 per cent.

Even if large-scale emigration were to commence in those countries of Western Europe concerned about declining rates of population growth, it seems highly probable that it would quickly be discouraged by governmental action. Thus, in Norway, 51 per cent of those polled in a recent survey felt that unrestricted emigration of Norwegian citizens should not be permitted and 26 per cent felt that emigration should be completely restricted.³²

There remain two great sources of potential migration, namely, Italy and Germany. Italy, with her low standards of living and high rates of natural increase, will have large surpluses available for migration for some time to come.³³ The 13 million displaced Germans are undoubtedly the greatest single potential source of migration. Already torn loose from their homes and having little prospect of satisfactory economic adjustment in rump Germany, these people offer an enormous reservoir for international and especially for overseas migration. Countries unwilling to take Germans and Italians are

³² Norsk Gallup Institutt, release of September 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 4, Winter 1946-1947, p. 617.

³³ Spain has furnished a large amount of emigration in the past, but now has a pronatalist population policy and discourages emigration.

unlikely to attract large-scale European migrations in the postwar world.

Furthermore, the potential countries of immigration are far from ready to accept unrestricted migration. The United States, so long the chief destination of European emigration, has shown no disposition to liberalize its immigration restrictions. In a period of acute labor shortage it has not seriously considered changing the basic European quotas of the prewar period and efforts to suspend them temporarily to accommodate refugees have failed. The quotas provide for a maximum of approximately 150,000 per annum, a figure only one-eighth as high as the amount of immigration received from Europe in single years prior to World War I.³⁴ In a public opinion survey only 5 per cent of those questioned wished to see more persons from Europe admitted than came to the United States in the years before the war and a majority wished to see the number reduced or to eliminate European immigration altogether. Attitudes against European immigration were especially prevalent among veterans and among members of labor unions.³⁵

In other countries of potential immigration the rather loose generalizations regarding the need and prospects of European immigration will not bear too close scrutiny when it comes to particular cases. Thus Australia, for instance, wants immigrants, but chiefly those that can be readily assimilated to Australian institutions. A poll taken last spring indicated that in the sample taken only 35 per cent favored unrestricted white immigration in the next ten years, and only 28 per cent and 10

³⁴ The actual ceiling is slightly above 150,000 owing to the fact that every country is given a quota minimum of 100 regardless of its allocation on the national origins principle. On the other hand the maximum presumes that every nation would fill its full quota.

³⁵ To the question "Should we permit more persons from Europe to come to this country each year than we did before the war, should we keep the number about the same, or should we reduce the number," the replies were: More—5 per cent, Same—32 per cent, Fewer—37 per cent, None at all—14 per cent, No opinion—12 per cent. Of the total, 51 per cent advocated less immigration or none at all, while the comparable percentage for labor union members was 53 per cent, for veterans 56 per cent. American Institute of Public Opinion, release of January 14, 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 1, Spring, 1946, pp. 113-114.

per cent, respectively, favored immigration of Germans and Italians.³⁶ Though Australia expressed herself to the United Nations Refugee Committee as prepared to receive 70,000 European refugees annually, this offer was made subject to the easing of the economic situation, which in Australia meant the reestablishment of veterans and war workers in peacetime occupations, alleviation of the housing shortage, and the provision of adequate shipping. Canadian attitudes towards immigration are even less favorable than those in Australia. Of those asked in a 1946 opinion poll, only 21 per cent wished to see a large immigration from Europe and only 37 per cent even from the British Isles.³⁷

More favorable attitudes towards immigration from Europe have been displayed in Latin America. An opinion survey in Brazil recently showed 80 per cent favoring governmental measures to encourage the admission of new immigrants.³⁸ At the present writing Brazilian postwar immigration policy is still in the process of crystallization. In the recent past Brazil has applied very rigid restrictions with a tight quota system; her 1939 laws provided for maximum quotas of 3,000 from each European country, 80 per cent of which had to be agriculturalists. In short, Brazil desired only farmers, or persons whose technical qualifications could contribute to the acceleration of the rapid industrialization proceeding in that country. This industrialization may provide economic attractions and opportunities to European immigrants as it did at an earlier date in the United States. However, it is very questionable if immigration will provide a direct source of settlers for much of the country's hollow, practically uninhabited interior. In Brazil, as in most other sections of the world, areas are sparsely

³⁶ Australian Public Opinion Polls, release of May-June, 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 2, Summer, 1946, p. 261. It may be noted that the proportion favoring unlimited immigration had declined from the 42 per cent figure obtained in a 1943 survey using the same question.

³⁷ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, release of April 24, 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 2, Summer, 1946, pp. 260-261. Opposition to immigration was especially evident among French Canadians.

³⁸ Instituto Brasileiro do Opiniao Publico e Estatistico, release of September, 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 4, Winter, 1946-1947, p. 617.

populated precisely because they offer little economic opportunity. Furthermore, their effective settlement goes against the prevailing migratory trends of the day, which in Brazil, as in almost every other nation of the world, now favor the cities over the rural regions.

Similarly, Argentina's plans to achieve a population of 100 millions, and the advocated implementation of this program by immigration of 100,000 farmers per year, would fly in the face of the centripetal tendencies in migration even if no restrictions were attached. As it is Dr. Peralta, the Director of Migration, is quoted as asserting that immigrants "must be strong, healthy, and unaffected by the war. The misery that is left of war-torn Europe must remain there. Argentina cannot put up with that useless human wreckage." He also emphasized that Argentina must "avoid the settlement of racially inferior people."³⁹

Though conditions are still in flux in overseas countries there are no immediate prospects for the general liberalization of the restrictive policies in force in most of them before the war. Of the countries responding to questions posed by the United Nations Division of Refugees not a single one indicated an unconditional willingness to take refugees or displaced persons. Australia, for example, stated that she could not accept any non-British immigration for at least two years. Brazil, originally stated to be willing to accept 100,000–200,000, indicated that she could now accept only a very much smaller (unspecified) number.⁴⁰

When plans are brought down to specific cases the immigrant usually has few partisans. If compromises must be made it is easy to make them at the expense of the potential migrant or alien who does not vote. This is especially true in the more industrialized English-speaking overseas countries, where the

³⁹ *New York Times*, August 15, 1946. Plans discussed for the admission of 1,000 Norwegian "quislings" and negotiations to bring General Ander's Polish army were later denied and at the time of writing nothing apparently has been done to suit action to rather bold words.

⁴⁰ Aide-memoire to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, September 14, 1946.

strength of labor parties generally assures the continuation of restrictive measures.

Many of the overseas countries genuinely desire immigration; but in practice they are usually willing to accept mass migration only when the migrants will take places at the bottom of the economic ladder. Aside from numerically unimportant technical personnel they want persons who will occupy jobs and lands that are too poor to meet their own economic requirements.

Similarly, in the potential countries of immigration in Europe, general statements are very quickly subject to qualification in terms of actual policy. In the case of Britain, for example, the two outstanding concrete proposals for immigration relate to coal miners and to domestic servants, in order to fill occupations that native English do not care to occupy. Furthermore strong opposition has been expressed to such an obvious means of recruitment as the settlement of Polish troops not desiring to return to Poland.⁴¹

Or we may take the case of France, in which questions of migration are a vital issue. In the first place there is a division of interest among the advocates of immigration, notably as between those interested in securing a labor supply for reconstruction and those who are concerned with immigration as a demographic measure. The first, concerned at once with the necessities of the economy and with the interests of French workers, are desirous of securing a large working force immediately and are much less interested in the permanent effects on the French population. French demographers, on the other hand, have laid down a rational basis for an immigration policy best suited to strengthen the weak points in the demographic structure of France. Thus they advocate the immigration of adults at ages 26–35, in order to fill in the gashes in the age pyramid arising from the birth deficits of the First World

⁴¹ In a recent survey only 30 per cent approved of the Government's decision to permit Polish troops unwilling to return to Poland to remain in England. British Institute of Public Opinion, June 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 3, Fall, 1946, p. 437.

War. Instead of the characteristic migration of young single males they prefer more equal proportions of the sexes and the immigration of families with young children, the latter serving to strengthen the small cohorts of children born in France during the past decade, and thereby to offset the high proportion of the aged in the French population.⁴²

A more serious difficulty arises from the extremely important political considerations hampering the choice and attraction of migrants. Thus the introduction of so obvious a source of immigration as the displaced persons (especially the Poles and the Balts) was balked by political opposition from both inside and outside of France. Political objections have also naturally been raised against the permanent immigration of Germans and Spaniards, and even against the Algerian colonial citizens of France. For the time being, at least, immigration from Eastern Europe has been written off. Though immigration from Scandinavia and the Low Countries would be welcomed, it is recognized that aside from the Netherlands these countries have no population surpluses and in any event their citizens are not likely to be drawn to France. In practice prospective sources of mass immigration into France have narrowed down to Italy and, under special circumstances, Germany.

The above survey indicates that the war has not improved the outlook for the revival of free international migration of Europeans. It seems likely that a modest flow of Europeans to overseas destinations will appear, and that there will be a substantial movement from Italy into France. But even more than in the interwar period it seems probable that migratory movements of the future will be highly selective; they will be closely controlled, where not actually choked off, by the intervention of interested governments. There are few grounds for either hope or fear that the great spontaneous migrations of the past will be revived in the postwar world.

⁴² Cf. Vincent, Paul: *Vieillessement de la population retraites et immigration. Population*, 2, April-June, 1946, pp. 213-244.