

FUTURE MIGRATION INTO LATIN AMERICA¹

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DEMOGRAPHICALLY speaking, the potential migration pent up in today's world is enormous. Not only is the earth's total population increasing at the fastest rate ever known, but the increase is extremely unequal as between different regions.² Generally the fastest growth is occurring in the poorest regions, the slowest growth in the richest. As a result the previous inequalities of population distribution are being aggravated rather than alleviated. Certain backward, primarily agricultural regions are glutted with people and are showing signs of even greater glut in the future,³ while other areas, primarily industrial, are casting about for means of increasing their birth rates. Between the two kinds of areas the differences in level of living are fantastic. What more natural, then, than to expect the destitute masses of the underprivileged regions to swarm across international and continental boundaries into the better regions? The situation is analogous to atmospheric pressure. The human population of the earth is characterized by high and low pressure areas, and one expects an inevitable current of migration from one zone to the other.

Actual migration, however, is not governed solely by high and low pressure. It is governed by economic costs, political barriers, ethnic attitudes, and limited horizons.⁴ So it is not safe to predict the volume of future migration on the basis of impoverished density alone.

Among the regions commonly believed to be enjoying a low demographic pressure, and therefore to be open to mass immi-

¹ From the Office of Population Research, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

² See World Population in Transition. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1945, Vol. 237, various articles.

³ DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES OF SELECTED AREAS OF RAPID GROWTH. New York, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944.

⁴ Hutchinson, Edward P. and Moore, Wilbert E.: Pressures and Barriers in Future Migration. *Annals, loc. cit.*, pp. 164-171.

gration, is Latin America.⁵ The reason for this opinion is that the area has less than its share of the world's population, as indicated by its lower than average density. Whereas it embraces 16 per cent of the world's inhabitable land area, it has only about 6 per cent of the world's people. Except for Africa and Australia, it has a lower density than any other major region. Asia (excluding the USSR), with a population of almost 1.2 billion, has an over-all density nearly seven times that of Latin America. Also, the Latin American region, especially South America, is known to have tremendous expanses of territory, rich in resources, where little exploitation has occurred and few people live. One thinks of the Amazon valley, a virtually uninhabited basin as large as the United States,⁶ of the vacant plains of Argentina,⁷ the unworked forests of Southern Chile,⁸ the Llano country and Guiana highlands of Venezuela⁹—huge areas that could undoubtedly support large populations. Surely in a crowded world Latin America offers a vast potential opportunity for millions of people.

This view, popular inside as well as outside the region, is not so much wrong as naive. It jumps from a demographic fact to a social conclusion. There is no doubt that under certain conditions Latin America's physical capacity to absorb migrants could be realized. But there is grave doubt that the proper conditions will come to pass. Briefly it can be said that Latin America cannot attract the kind of immigrants it wants and does not want the kind it can attract; and also that it does not need mass immigration anyway. The evidence follows.

THE MYTH OF THE FOREIGN PIONEER

One sign that Latin America will not receive many immi-

⁵ In this paper the term "Latin America" is used to cover the entire area south of the United States.

⁶ Hanson, Earl Parker: *THE AMAZON: A NEW FRONTIER?* New York, Foreign Policy Association, March 20, 1944.

⁷ Bunge, Alejandro E.: *UNA NUEVA ARGENTINA*. Buenos Aires, Guillermo Kraft, 1940, Chaps. VII, X.

⁸ McBride, Geo. McCutcheon: *CHILE: LAND AND SOCIETY*. New York, American Geographical Society, 1936, Part II.

⁹ James, Preston E.: *LATIN AMERICA*. New York, Odyssey Press, 1942, pp. 68-74.

grants is her lack of industry. Her present stage of industrial development has been compared to that of the United States in the 1870's, which means a 70-year lag.¹⁰ Of course, there is much evidence that industrialization will continue at a rapid pace, and, on the analogy of the United States, this suggests an enhanced immigration. But things have changed since 1870. Mature industrialized areas are now more numerous, and new ones more widespread; also, the world movement of goods and peoples is now more controlled. Most significant of all, the old regions from which industrial immigrants were formerly drawn—first northwestern Europe and then southern and eastern Europe—can no longer furnish immigrants in great abundance, because their rate of population growth has declined markedly. Countries faced with potentially declining populations are often unwilling to allow their citizens to emigrate. The few surplus laborers available for migration from European countries will be in demand either within Europe itself or in other industrial areas (*e.g.*, the Dominions) that promise higher returns than Latin America offers.

Actually, however, when the Latin Americans think of immigration they are not thinking of industrial laborers. They are thinking of farmers and farm laborers, because these are what they want. Like peoples everywhere, they want somebody else to do what they themselves are loath to do—in this case the hard labor on the big estates or the pioneer farming in the hinterland. Of the two types of agriculturalist, it is the desire for *estancia* labor that has generally determined the immigration policy of the republics rather than the desire for pioneer homesteaders.¹¹ But in any case the policy has been directed

¹⁰ Wythe, George: *INDUSTRY IN LATIN AMERICA*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, p. 11.

¹¹ "The shortage of workers, *falta de braços*, is the central theme of Brazil's social and economic history. . . . It would be difficult to find a single treatise which does not make reference to the nation's need for more workers." There has been a 400-year struggle to supply hands for the plantations. First the native Indians were hunted, captured, and enslaved. Then millions of Negro slaves were brought from Africa. Finally, with the abolition of slavery, inducements were offered to bring over millions of cheap European laborers, some permanent and some seasonal. São Paulo

toward securing agricultural rather than industrial personnel. Any tendency of immigrants to settle in cities has been roundly deplored.¹²

Yet, despite policy and desire to the contrary, the city is precisely where the immigrants have tended to settle. Their movement has been, in one sense, a phase of the widespread rural-urban exodus, the peasant of one country simply settling in the city of another. This tendency has accelerated with time, and it means that even in the heyday of immigration into Latin America, which occurred rather late, the main attraction did not come from the open spaces nor did the newcomers settle in the hinterland.¹³ Indeed, in all areas of the world, European overseas migration has long ago passed the era when it was directed toward the pioneer settlement of new lands. The direction is now more than ever toward the centers of secondary and tertiary industry. Not only are the new lands accessible to markets already taken up, but industrial areas are now more widespread and offer a higher level of living to the immigrant; also, since Europe has itself become heavily industrialized and

became the champion of a policy of importing labor for the coffee, cotton, and sugar estates of the nation. The states to the south, especially Rio Grand do Sul, pursued a policy of establishing colonists on the land as independent farmers. But on the whole the São Paulo plan won the balance. It systematic recruitment and subsidization of farm hands, gave Brazil the lion's share of her immigration, especially after 1885. Smith, T. Lynn: *BRAZIL: PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS*. Baton Rouge, University of Louisiana Press, 1946, pp. 160-164, 265-266, 546-547, 557-558.

¹² One objection to Jewish immigration is the tendency of these people to settle in the city, or to use the agricultural colony as merely a way station to the city. See Zorraquin Becu, Horacio: *EL PROBLEMA DEL EXTRANJERO EN LA RECIENTE LEGISLACION LATINO-AMERICANA*. Buenos Aires, Guillermo Kraft, 1943, pp. 22-24. Alejandro Bunge uses the phrase *desequilibrio economico* to describe the population distribution in Argentina, and views the tendency of immigrants to settle in the city as having contributed to this disequilibrium. See his *Ochenta y cinco años de inmigración*. *Revista de Economía Argentina*, January, 1944, Vol. 43, p. 65. Brazil has undertaken legislation forbidding the foreigner who enters as a rural laborer to abandon the countryside within five years, the penalty being a fine and exportation; immigration is viewed as having in the past simply exaggerated a regrettable tendency toward urbanization. See Brasil, Conselho de Imigracao e Colonização, ANTE-PROJECTO DE LEI SÔBRE IMIGRAÇÃO. Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa nacional, 1943, pp. 39, 74, 148-149. Boero Brian, Jorge Justo, and Molina Serrano, Francisco: *ENSAYO SOBRE LA EVOLUCIÓN DE LA POBLACIÓN DE LAS AMÉRICAS*. Vol. II, *Argentina*, Montevideo, 1946, p. 20, view cityward immigration as a manifest danger.

¹³ Davis, Kingsley and Casis, Ana: *URBANIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA*. New York, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1946, pp. 15, 31-32. T. Lynn Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200. Bunge, Alejandro: *Ochenta y cinco años de inmigración*, *loc. cit.*, p. 65. Boero and Molina, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

urbanized, with an accompanying high standard of living, its potential emigrants are effectively discouraged from accepting peonage on a plantation or subsistence on a remote insect-ridden farm.¹⁴ It is not that the pioneer spirit is dead. It is as latent as ever, but the conditions required for evoking it are gone. The open spaces of Latin America, so often mentioned in connection with potential immigration, so fondly wished off on the foreigner, are unable to attract a mass migration from Europe. They are slowly and haltingly being settled,¹⁵ but more by the expansion of old settled areas than by the importation of aliens. The common belief in Latin America that the hinterlands can be settled by the simple process of bringing over masses of European immigrants and placing them on the land is a myth that never was strictly true for this region, and certainly is not true today.¹⁶

THE NEW ORIENTAL EXCLUSION

It will be noticed that the discussion so far has centered on European immigrants. What is true of them is not necessarily true of others. There are literally hundreds of millions of Asiatics who, under conditions far less favorable than those being proposed, would be willing to migrate to new territories in Latin America, especially the tropical parts so difficult for Europeans.¹⁷ But the Oriental exclusion policy of the United

¹⁴ For the general theory of modern European migration, see Forsyth, W. D.: *THE MYTH OF THE OPEN SPACES*. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1942, Chaps. 3, 6. Also Hutchinson and Moore, *op. cit.*, and Moore, Wilbert E.: *Economic Limits of International Resettlement*. *American Sociological Review*, April, 1945, Vol. 10.

¹⁵ Rasmussen, Wayne D.: *Brazil's Advancing Frontier*. *Land Policy Review*, October, 1941, Vol. 4, pp. 18-24. Preston James, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

¹⁶ It has not been true of the United States. "The European immigrant was not a frontiersman. By neither experience nor instinct was he equipped to battle with forest or prairie. . . . Day by day, in spite of ceaseless toil, the woods grew thicker and the plains became wider, until the newcomer, seized with despair, confessed defeat by deserting to the city slum or the laborers' camp. No attempt to found a colony of foreigners on the edge of the wilderness ever succeeded. . . . Yet this was exactly the environment in which the native Westerner could thrive." Hansen, Marcus Lee: *THE ATLANTIC MIGRATION, 1607-1860*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941, p. 14.

¹⁷ Radhakamal Mukerjee cites Latin American areas as among those parts of the world inadequately exploited and hence capable of receiving heavy Asiatic immigra-

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States and Canada has now been taken over by the Latin American republics. Brazil prefers that only "white" persons shall be admitted as immigrants,¹⁸ and its quota system operates in that direction. Guatemala forbids not only Negroes and Gypsies, but also the entrance of persons of Mongolian race! Bolivia excludes, in addition to Jews and Negroes, the Chinese. Other countries express similar attitudes.¹⁹ The resistance to Asiatics springs apparently from the fifth-column activities of the Japanese colonies in Brazil and Peru,²⁰ from the impression made by the Indian indentured laborers brought to British and Dutch possessions in the Caribbean area between 1840 and 1917, and from the competitive advantages gained by Chinese merchants in Panama, Cuba, and other countries. The whole world has been manifesting an increasing tendency to exclude Asiatics, as North America, Africa, and even Asia itself indicate.²¹ Latin America is therefore merely following a global trend. There are still about 400,000 Asia-born persons in the region, and perhaps a million of Asiatic descent.²² The present

tion. *MIGRANT ASIA*. Rome, Tipografia Failli, 1934, especially pp. 264-266. Warren S. Thompson points out that the population increase in India, China, and Japan combined could easily reach 175 million per decade. "There is much evidence that all these people make good pioneers under conditions which are quite impossible to Europeans. They can settle on new land in the tropics and thrive in much the same way as the Europeans did in North America and elsewhere in the temperate climates when they left what seemed to them crowded Europe." *POPULATION AND PEACE IN THE PACIFIC*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946, p. 323.

¹⁸ *Ante-projeto de lei sobre imigração e colonização*, p. 22. See also, report of first Brazilian Economic Conference, Rio de Janeiro, December 18, 1943, mentioned in *International Labour Review*, March, 1944, Vol. 49, p. 362.

¹⁹ Zorraquin, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

²⁰ Normano, J. F. and Gerbi, Antonello: *THE JAPANESE IN SOUTH AMERICA*. New York, John Day Co., 1943. Hauser, Henri: *Japanese Immigration in Brazil*. *New Mexico Quarterly Review*, February, 1942, Vol. 12, pp. 5-17. Even after the end of the war, as late as 1946, the secret societies of the Japanese in Brazil continued to terrorize and assassinate those of their fellows who admitted Japan's defeat. Recommendations were made after numerous terroristic acts that either Hirohito or President Dutra send an official declaration to the Japanese in Brazil that the war is over. *New York Times*, July 31 and August 4, 1946. See also Nieves Ayala, Arturo: *EL PERÚ Y LA INMIGRACIÓN DE POSTGUERRA*. Lima, 1946, pp. 60-61.

²¹ There has been considerable reaction against Indian immigrants in Burma and Malaya, against Chinese in Malaya and Java, and against Japanese nearly everywhere. Gyan Chand, an Indian himself, concludes that the Indians have nowhere to go. *INDIA'S TEEMING MILLIONS*. London, Allen and Unwin, 1939, pp. 291-295.

²² The extent of past Asiatic immigration into Latin America seems not to be

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tenor of opinion indicates that in the future the number of Asiatic immigrants will be small indeed.

Thus the Latin Americans, still nourishing illusions about the nature and volume of possible European immigration, are erecting bars against the one kind of immigrants most likely to serve as laborers on the estancias and pioneers in the tropical frontiers.

NATIONALISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY

The exclusion of orientals, however, is but one aspect of a far-reaching change of immigration policy that has come over the Latin American nations—a change connected with the whole evolution of these countries in recent times. We may call this final stage in immigration policy the nationalistic phase. The two earlier stages were the exclusionist policy of colonial times, lasting throughout the period of foreign control, and the pro-immigration policy, lasting from the Wars of Independence to about 1930.

During the colonial period, as is well known, both Spain and Portugal followed a monopolistic imperial policy, which had two sides to it. On the one hand it gave special advantages to one type of immigrant—the person born in the Peninsula. He was a “national” in a peculiar sense, a special citizen of the colonial world who was privileged to hold government positions and claim economic benefits forbidden to the creole. It was a

generally realized. According to data collected and estimated in the Office of Population Research, approximately 550,000 Indians migrated to Latin America between 1834 and 1937, and of these about 400,000 remained in their new home. Most of these Indians settled in British and Dutch possessions. The Chinese had a wider distribution, but probably a smaller number. During the period of World War I, when she was furnishing sugar for the Allied nations, Cuba admitted some 150,000 Chinese, according to Corbitt, Duvon C.: *Immigration in Cuba. Hispanic American Historical Review*, May, 1942, Vol. 22, p. 307. Probably no other Latin American nation has taken as many Chinese immigrants as Cuba, but they are found to some extent in nearly every country. The Japanese are more concentrated than either the Indians or Chinese, having come primarily to Brazil and Peru. “Approximately 200,000 Japanese immigrants have been legally admitted to Brazil since the first contingent of about 800 arrived in 1908. Those who should know believe that many more have entered the country illegally. . . . To many it will come as a distinct shock to see that Japan ranks fourth, ahead of Germany, as a contributor of immigrants to Brazil. . . . In the fifteen years preceding Pearl Harbor, Japan sent as many immigrants to Brazil as did Germany in her whole history.” T. Lynn Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

policy that favored the immigrant as against the native-born.²³ At the same time, the colonial system, especially of the Spaniards, was one of rigid exclusion of the foreigner. It aimed at a complete monopoly of trade, religion, and population for the mother country. It therefore excluded all other immigrants except those from the Peninsula itself.²⁴ Its one great loophole, of course, was slavery, and it seems safe to conclude that during the colonial period more Negroes came to the Latin American region than non-Peninsular Europeans. The net effect of the colonial policy, therefore, was to set a special foreign class against a native class, to limit severely the total volume of free immigration, and to introduce into the population a large number of Africans.

The break with this policy came soon after the Wars of Independence in the first half of the nineteenth century. Freedom of trade, freedom of speech, freedom of democratic institutions all came quickly as a reaction to the restrictions of the past. The movement to abolish slavery got under way at once, and it extended even to the areas that remained colonial under the French, British, and Dutch. The new nations, feeling that they needed labor to replace the slaves, settlers to populate the land, capital to prime the economic pump, and ideas to overcome the colonial isolation, threw open their doors to immigration. They granted aliens the same rights as citizens, and in many cases even more. The Argentine constitution of 1853, for example, inspired by Alberdi's famous dictum that "in South America to govern is to populate," was so liberal that the foreign-born were in a better position than the citizens, because they had all the advantages that the latter enjoyed and yet were exempt from certain obligations, like military service, that weighed

²³ Ots, José M.^a: INSTITUCIONES DE LA AMERICA ESPAÑOLA IN EL PERIODO COLONIAL. La Plata, Universidad de La Plata, 1934, Chap. 2. Chapman, Charles E.: COLONIAL HISPANIC AMERICA. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1933, Chap. 7.

²⁴ Irizarry y Puente, J.: Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in Latin America. *American Journal of International Law*, April, 1942, Vol. 36, pp. 252-254. Chapman, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32, 109-110, 129-130, 151, 157. Davie, Maurice R.: WORLD IMMIGRATION. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1936, pp. 445-446. Needless to say, the Spaniards were more successful in the policy of exclusion than were the Portuguese.

upon the natives.²⁵ In a way, despite the reaction against the colonial regime, there was a heritage from it. The natives, made up of Indians, ex-slaves, and creoles, long benighted by colonial provincialism, were the barbarians; the European immigrants were the civilizers. Hence the emphasis was not so much on assimilation of the stranger as on assimilation of the native. The immigrant enjoyed a maximum of advantages, and maintained a certain superiority in place of the stigma ordinarily attaching to the stranger.²⁶ He often began or soon climbed high up in the economic ladder. He was often connected with foreign economic interests.

The new policy, risky for new and weak nations, at first had little success in attracting immigrants. Political and economic conditions were so unstable that not many Europeans were ready to gamble. Not until the 1870's did the real current of immigration get started.²⁷ From that time on, however, the flow was substantial. For example, during the thirteen years prior to 1870 in Argentina, only 88,000 net immigrants were recorded, but during the twenty years thereafter, 743,000 were registered, and the next twenty years (1890-1910) saw 1,440,000 come in. To judge by those countries for which statistics are available, the peak of immigration to Latin America occurred between 1900 and 1914. This was the peak period in the movement of Europeans to all parts of the world.²⁸ After the slump caused by World War I there was another but lesser peak in the 20's, followed by a prolonged slump during the depression and World War II. The changes in volume of immigration were not primarily due to variations of immigration policy, but to economic and political conditions in both Europe and America. The immigration policy throughout the entire

²⁵ Bunge, Alejandro E. and Garcia Mata, Carlos in Willcox, Walter F. (Ed.): *INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS*. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1931, Vol. II, p. 147.

²⁶ Zorraquin, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

²⁷ Davie, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

²⁸ Ferenczi, Imre in Willcox, Walter (Ed.): *INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS*. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929, Vol. I, p. 183.

century from 1830 to 1930 remained dominantly laissez-faire. It did reserve the right to forbid entry to certain types of persons, but the grounds of exclusion were chiefly concerned with health and public relief, not with the questions of assimilation, political allegiance, economic competition, etc. It reserved the right to expel the transient alien for cause, but not the domiciled alien.²⁹ On the positive side, it offered encouragement in many ways. It allowed private associations and companies to recruit immigrants, pay their steamship fare, and give them good contracts and working conditions. It fostered good treatment of immigrants, economically and socially, for they tended without hindrance or prejudice to climb the social ladder rapidly, and they experienced little or no restraint on practicing their own customs and adhering to their own nationality groups. They could settle where they wished, and could move freely. If anything, the very fact that they were foreigners seemed somehow to give them advantages.³⁰

A reaction to the laissez-faire immigration policy was inevitable. It came as a consequence of the following: (1) the great influx of foreigners under the laissez-faire policy; (2) the concentration of these foreigners in particular areas; (3) their resistance to assimilation; and (4) their economic and social success. The historical setting in which these factors expressed themselves and became acute included, of course, the depression of the 1930's, World War II, and the maturation of the nations to the south. The result was a somewhat abrupt change of immigration policy from one of generous welcome to one of nationalistic caution. The constitutions prior to 1930

²⁹ Irizarry y Puente, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-256.

³⁰ T. Lynn Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 294, points out that each of the major foreign-born groups in São Paulo is more heavily represented among the farm proprietors than among the rural population generally. The Italians, for instance, owned in 1934 no less than 12.2 per cent of the farms although they comprised only 3.9 per cent of the rural residents. "Even the Japanese, most of whom had immigrated in the decade preceding the census, owned 5.1 per cent of the farms, although they made up only 3.0 per cent of the rural population. Farms owned by foreigners were smaller than those of the native proprietors, but on the other hand they contained a disproportionately large share of the state's cultivated land. They also were more valuable, in relation to their number, than the farms owned by Brazilians."

constituted a stumbling block to the new policy, because they often had written into them clauses favorable to immigration and to immigrants. But many of the old constitutions have been replaced by new ones, and these either embody a change of attitude toward foreigners or else leave the handling of the matter to specific legislation.³¹ In any case, the change of policy as seen in the recent legal structure is quite sharp.

The main features of the new policy can be summed up under two headings: first, the admission of foreigners; second, the treatment of them once they are admitted. In each case the underlying philosophy is one of protection and enhancement of the state as an integral unit, and favor for its citizens as against the foreigner.

Admission of Immigrants. So far as admission is concerned, the first thing to notice is that the new and more restrictive attitude turns upon the question of assimilability. Whereas the old law took rapid assimilation for granted, or else implied that the immigrants would assimilate the natives, the new law assumes that only certain races, ethnic groups, or nationalities are capable of assimilation in the country concerned. Colombia, which in 1920 had declared in its immigration law that "the territory of Colombia is open to all foreigners," was in 1937 saying that "Bulgarians, Chinese, Egyptians, Esthonians, Greeks, Hindus, Latvians, Letts, Lebonese, Lithuanians, Marocans, Palestinians, Poles, Roumanians, Russians, Syrians, and Turks," could come in only if they had complied with a series of requirements difficult to fulfill, among them the presentation of a certificate of conduct covering a period of 12 years and the deposit of 1,000 Colombian pesos. Gypsies, independent of their nationality, could not enter at all.³² In general the entrance of Asiatics, as mentioned above, and of Africans is categorically forbidden, but restrictions may also be placed on Europeans of particular kinds. Peoples of Latin culture,

³¹ Zorraquin, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25, Boero and Molina, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

³² Zorraquin, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53. The stringency of some of these laws has been modified since the end of the recent war.

especially those who speak the same language as the nation concerned, are likely to be favored, while others are discouraged. The Jews are, for the most part, discriminated against indirectly (through ambiguous laws capable of double interpretation, through unannounced instructions to consular officials, or through a quota system).³³ Three countries—Brazil, Peru, and Mexico—have quota schemes. The Brazilian system, limiting immigrants from any nation to 2 per cent of those entering from that nation during 1884–1933, accomplishes an ethnic selection as well as a quantitative limitation.³⁴ The Peruvian system is simply a quantitative limitation (2 per mil of the total population), and the Mexican is flexible from year to year.³⁵ Argentina established in 1946 an *Instituto Etnico Nacional*, one function of which is to study the kinds of immigrants who should be admitted.³⁶

The restrictions on admission sometimes include occupational requirements. The desire to have immigrants become farmers or estate laborers leads to a preference for agriculturalists as against other occupational types. Paraguay, for example, divides immigrants into two classes, privileged and unprivileged. The first includes agriculturalists, artisans, and such industrialists as have 1,500 pesos (or only 500 if they promise to settle in a rural area). The second includes members of the liberal professions and white-collar classes, who receive none of the benefits of the immigration law and require special permission to enter.³⁷ Brazil requires that 80 per cent of each quota be reserved for persons concerned in some way with agriculture.³⁸ Most other countries, though not this direct,

³³ Zorraquin, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–69, has an account of Jewish-exclusion methods.

³⁴ Brasil, Imigração e Colonização, *Decreto-Lei* No. 7, 967–18–9–45 Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1945, p. 3. The quota of any nationality may be raised to 3,000 for good reason.

³⁵ Zorraquin, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–65.

³⁶ Constanzó, María de las Mercedes: La Antropología y el problema de la población en Argentina. *Acta Americana*, July–September, 1946, Vol. 4, pp. 154–160.

³⁷ Zorraquin, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–50.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

favor cultivators and field workers more than persons practicing other occupations.

Treatment of Immigrants. Legally, the foreign-born resident of a Latin American country no longer has a status equal to that of the citizen. He is subject to certain requirements and limitations that the native escapes. He is, or at least was during the war, likely to be placed under moderate surveillance, *e.g.*, required to carry a card of identification and to keep the authorities notified of his address and his occupation. Ecuador stipulates, for example, that "no foreigner can change his occupation without authorization from the Office of Immigration." Brazil requires that a person entering under the system of directed immigration, contracting to undertake a particular occupation, cannot change this occupation during the period of the contract except by permission of the competent authority.³⁹ In most countries the non-citizen has been forbidden the privilege of political expression. Ecuador, for example, prohibits (or did prohibit) foreigners from associating to discuss political matters, either internal or external, or to draw up petitions or mix in popular elections. Perhaps more important is the prohibition, now frequent, on a foreigner being employed in government enterprise or public utilities. With more and more of the economic life coming under government control in these countries, exclusion from such employment is a serious economic limitation.⁴⁰ But economic restriction does not end there. The same nationalism that reserves public positions solely for citizens is also moving toward the removal of private industry from foreign control. The foreigner's chance to exploit natural resources and to engage in business is now either forbidden or limited. If not forbidden, a percentage of the employees must often be natives. Thus the application of nationalism in business—born of depression, war, and foreign abuse—conduces to a restrictive immigration policy. In addition, certain occupa-

³⁹ *Decreto-Ley* No. 7, 967-18-9-45, *loc. cit.*, p. 8. For a summary of the surveillance laws, see Zorraquin, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-73. It can be assumed that most of these have already been relaxed or will be relaxed as a result of peaceful conditions.

⁴⁰ Zorraquin, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-88.

tions, by virtue of their influence on public opinion or their lucrativeness or prestige, are now being forbidden or restricted in some quarters so far as foreigners are concerned. Among these are journalism, teaching, banking, insurance, the merchant marine, medicine, and law.⁴¹

IMMIGRANTS WANTED BUT NOT NEEDED

It becomes clear that since 1930 a new nationalism, a new self-sufficiency and resentment of outside intrusion, has led to policies that must discourage large-scale migration into Latin America. But this does not mean that immigrants are not desired. Nearly all countries in South America and some in Central America are looking for settlers, and are ready to offer active encouragement in one form or another. The recent policies are not intended to curtail migration, but simply to select and control it in the national interest. Assuming that they can get the kind of individuals they want, and can assimilate them after they arrive, the Latin American republics are ready to absorb millions of strangers.

There is consequently emerging at the present time a new phase of nationalistic immigration policy. Instead of emphasizing national interest through restriction, as was done during the depression and the recent war, the republics are stressing national interest through the promotion of selected immigration. This phase is so recent that assessing or keeping abreast of it is difficult. Some of the restrictive laws cited above are certainly being modified, and will be modified more after a time. There seems no likelihood, however, that the countries to the south will return to the old *laissez-faire* policy, or that they will forget the questions of assimilation, ethnic status, economic competition, foreign domination, and national security in choosing their immigrants. The newest phase of policy still places its emphasis on the immigration of farm workers and colonists, still looks to Europe as a source, and still leaves unsolved the thorny economic problems associated with immigration (especially of Europeans) in the modern world. Above all

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-127.

it is still trying to have selected immigration and mass immigration at the same time, and is still confusing the purpose of increasing its population with that of building its economy.⁴²

Why this continued preoccupation with immigration? Perhaps part of the answer is simply the hangover of old ideas. Another part seems to be the desire of vested interests for cheap but efficient labor. A third, and perhaps the most important part, is a simple illusion or fallacy. The average Latin American contemplates the empty spaces of his country and jumps to the conclusion that they are not economically exploited *because* they are sparsely settled. He reasons that if his country can bring in a large number of immigrants, it will then be able to exploit its vast undeveloped areas and will become rich thereby. Such reasoning, however, places the cart before the horse. It is as true to say that the population of the Latin American hinterlands is sparse because lands are not economically exploited, as to say the reverse. If the economic and social institutions of the original settlers had encouraged thrifty agriculture, a productive industry, and a low mortality, their natural increase and their attraction of immigrants would long since have filled up the favorable areas. Instead a regime of large estates, peon labor, non-productive expenditure, and fixed social classes did not operate to produce the capital and enterprise necessary for adequate exploitation. The tendency was to rely on cheap labor to do what in other frontier regions was done by machinery and advanced technology.⁴³ It follows that the remedy today is not more people, but a new economic and social orientation. To acquire more people without having the latter is to create problems rather than solve them.

If people were all that is needed to fill Latin America's open spaces, they could be supplied from the region's phenomenal natural increase. Many Latin Americans and Latin American

⁴² A good illustration of the current trend is Nieves, *op. cit.* See also Boero and Molina, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

⁴³ The history of rubber is a case in point. See Zimmermann, Erich W.: Resources in Latin America, in *SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF POST-WAR INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS*. Austin, University of Texas Press, to be published soon.

experts do not seem to realize, when they recommend immigration, that the population of the area is growing faster than that of any other major region in the world today. With a 1946 population of approximately 146 million, it has overtaken the United States, which now lags behind by about 6 million.⁴⁴ During the twenty years from 1920 to 1940 the number of people increased at an average rate of approximately 1.73 per cent per year, and the region added approximately 40 million, or about 41 per cent, to its population. The rate of increase today is more than double that of the world as a whole. If it continues the population will be twice as large in 1986 as it is today, for it is doubling every 40 years; and by the year 2000 it will reach over 373 million.

Actually the natural increase has been so large that the stream of migration after 1870, large as it seemed, contributed only a small percentage to the total population growth. In Brazil, for example, it is said that only about 10 per cent of the population growth after 1890 was contributed directly by migration.⁴⁵ In Argentina the contribution was approximately 30 per cent.⁴⁶ These were the countries with the heaviest immigration. The rest of the region received nothing like this proportion of its population growth directly from overseas. Its rapid expansion of population has been predominantly a function of natural increase, and there is every sign that this source of supply will be increased rather than decreased in the next two or three decades,⁴⁷ especially since the native population is now so much larger than previously.

The major subregions of Latin America seem to be growing at roughly the same rate of speed. At least one of them, the

⁴⁴ See Davis, Kingsley: *Population Trends and Policies in Latin America*, in *SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF POST-WAR INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS*. Austin, University of Texas Press, to be published soon.

⁴⁵ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁴⁶ Bunge: *Ochenta y cinco años de inmigración*, Part I, *loc. cit.*, pp. 31-32; *Nuevo Argentina*, p. 96. In Boero and Molina, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, the indirect effects due to the natural increase of the immigrants in the new country are discussed.

⁴⁷ For some time to come death rates will probably decline faster than birth rates. See Kingsley Davis: *POPULATION TRENDS AND POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA*, *loc. cit.*

Caribbean islands, is already showing signs of serious overpopulation. At its present rate of growth, the current population of 14 million will grow to 26 million by 1970, with a density of 290 per square mile, and will reach 50 million by 2000, with a density of 547. The density of Puerto Rico is already more than 550. The Caribbean islands form an area of emigration rather than of immigration, and this tendency will doubtless become stronger. This subregion can therefore furnish the rest of Latin America with many immigrants if conditions are made right.

It is easy to exaggerate the amount of land that is open to settlement in Latin America, and to underestimate the importance of ready markets, technological advance, social institutions. Mexico, with some 22 million people, is pressing hard, in terms of its economy, upon the available land, and is constantly exerting migratory pressure on the American border. It is a typical case of a high pressure area adjoining a low pressure area, with only a political border between the two. In this sense, then, Latin America is, at least in part, an area of out-migration rather than in-migration. Under certain conditions it might become much more so.

The current Latin American demand for heavy overseas immigration seems, therefore, to be based largely on illusion. It assumes that there are open spaces the development of which awaits only more people. It forgets that the current and future natural increase of the region itself is phenomenally great, and capable of filling very heavy population demands; that certain subregions, being already thickly peopled in relation to resources, are tending to be areas of out-migration; that past immigration has not contributed a great percentage to population increase or filled the open spaces; and finally, that Europe is now greatly urbanized and demographically stationary, so that it does not have large numbers of agriculturalists to send to South America.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion seems inescapable that, despite the desire for

immigrants, Latin America will not receive a great deal of immigration in the future. In so far as Europeans leave their homelands, they will probably go not into agriculture but into new industrial areas. In Latin America the new nationalistic immigration policy, undertaking to select the people allowed to enter and to control them after they enter, is likely to discourage many who otherwise might come to this region. Also, the demands of a growing population in Latin America may make it hard for persons from overseas to gain any advantage by coming.

Doubtless there will be some immigration, much of it from Europe. The restrictive policies born of the depression and the war are already relaxing. Temporary conditions in Europe may favor departures. A postwar peak of immigration may be reached. But mass immigration, such as occurred in the past, is not at all likely. The only chance of mass immigration into this region would seemingly depend on one of two alternate circumstances. Either world conditions would get so chaotic that an invasion of land-hungry peasants from Asia would be possible, or a strong world government would decide to remedy the imbalance of population as between the continents and would bring hundreds of millions of Asiatics to the Americas. Both of these alternatives plainly relate to Asia. Asia, not Europe, is the modern source of mass migration, but one that Latin America is likely to stave off, at least for a good while, and perhaps until she has, by her own natural increase, filled her territory with three or four times its present population.

What is said here concerns mass immigration, and does not apply to small but often highly useful migratory currents. Any country, for example, can use persons above the average in training and capacity; and the industrialization program in the republics could profit by their entry. But the number of such persons who want to migrate is small indeed, and they are sought after by all the new industrial regions. Latin America must rely mainly on her own educational systems to provide trained personnel, sending large numbers of students to foreign

countries as a temporary expedient. The need for specific types of personnel and services can be met, perhaps, by short-term, controlled migration schemes. These would presumably be two-way affairs, furnishing an opportunity to give Latin Americans employment abroad as well as foreigners employment in Latin America. In both cases they can have a stimulating effect on the economic development of the region, as well as a beneficial effect on international understanding.

The real question, so far as this paper is concerned, is the desirability of masses of unskilled immigrants. The answer is that they are not needed, that the fundamental problem in Latin America is not lack of people, but lack of skills and capital. Some immigration is likely, possibly of a beneficial sort, but so far as mass immigration is concerned we must end with the brief epitome of the situation as stated at the beginning: The region cannot attract the kind of immigrants it wants and does not want the kind it can attract; and also it does not need mass immigration anyway.