

POPULATION PROBLEMS OF PALESTINE¹

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TWO recurrent themes intertwine themselves throughout any demographic analysis of Palestine. The first is that the basic situation is the one typically found in colonial areas; fertility remaining high, the speed of population growth depends primarily on the level of the death rate. The second is that powerful demographic forces have been set in motion by Jewish migrants bearing Western culture, capital, and ideals of political nationalism. It is the impact of this dynamic Western group on the older culture that raises at once hopes and fears for an ultimate solution in a pattern of great complexity. The demographic analysis of Palestine is throughout merely an examination of these interacting forces.

In principle, the basic situation is clear enough. By the end of the First World War the indigenous population had reached a relatively high density in view of its economic resources as developed by somewhat primitive techniques under a backward government. Growth apparently was not very rapid, for high birth rates were heavily cancelled by very high death rates. Modern influences introduced by Western government and Western immigrants in the interwar period brought a substantial decline in the death rate. Meanwhile, as always in such circumstances, the birth rate reacted rather little. The inevitable result was a period of very rapid natural increase, developed at a time of heavy immigration. Only in the speed of transition are the processes involved different from those of other undeveloped regions being opened to modern influences. In such situations the population always grows because of the ready response of the death rate to improved sanitation and rising levels of living, and the inertia of the birth rate. Palestine's situation was abnormal only in the fact that the impact of modernization was intense and the decline of mortality sharp. The inevitable result

¹ From the Office of Population Research, Princeton University.




Figure 1. The age-sex composition of the populations of Palestine (settled population), 1931; Turkey, 1935; and the United States, 1940. (The distributions for Palestine and Turkey have been graduated to eliminate concentrations on round numbers.)

was the launching of an epoch of rapid growth in the indigenous population.

Something of the capacity of Palestine's population for growth may be seen from its age distribution which, together with the distributions for Turkey and the United States, is shown in Figure 1. In the pyramids each bar represents an age group with the males to the left and the females to the right, the ages being arrayed in ascending order. The length of each bar represents the per cent which the population of that age-sex group forms of the total population, so that the sum of all bars equals 100.

The pyramid for Palestine is strikingly similar to that for Turkey. Both of the distributions are broadly based and narrow rapidly with advancing years. The shape is characteristic of growing populations with high death rates. Apart from the groups reduced by catastrophes, every age group was smaller at birth than its successor, and has since been further depleted by high mortality for an additional five years. Catastrophes such as that of the First World War, which reduced births and raised child mortality, introduce notches such as that at age 15-19.² In Palestine immigration has swelled the groups from 20-50, and in Turkey emigration has reduced the males in the thirties and war casualties have cut into the numbers of males 35-40. In both Palestine and Turkey large numbers of survivors at age 90+ reflect merely the exaggerated reporting of illiterate oldsters. The actual proportions were certainly less than in the United States, where there is also some exaggeration. Unfortunately no age distribution of Palestine's population is available for years later than 1931. Since then, however, numbers in the young adult and middle ages of life have been swelled by substantial immigration.

It is immediately apparent from Figure 1 that the populations of

² Probably in Palestine and certainly in Egypt this notch is in part the result of underenumeration and biased age reporting. In Palestine there is no earlier age distribution to compare with 1931, but in Egypt other censuses show that the notch is not completely real. See Kiser, Clyde V.: "The Demographic Position of Egypt," *DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES OF SELECTED AREAS OF RAPID GROWTH*. New York, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944, pp. 97-122.

Turkey and Palestine, as contrasted with the population of the United States, have the potentialities for very rapid growth. For them, it is only necessary to reduce the death rate to reasonable proportions to bring a sharp rise in the number of people that reach childbearing age and contribute to the birth rate. In the United States death rates are already low, and moreover fertility prior to 1940 had dropped so low that the number of births became progressively smaller after 1920-1925. For some years growth of the childbearing groups in the United States will be checked as large groups leaving the childbearing period are replaced by small ones already born. In Palestine, on the other hand, at present births are maintained by large numbers of immigrants concentrated in the childbearing ages. As these pass out of the childbearing period, there will be a brief dwindling of numbers, and then, given even modest declines in mortality, the breeding stock will again increase rapidly. Hence age distributions of Palestine's type mean that the introduction of adequate sanitation and the general improvement of health will initiate a period of rapid growth.

The length of the epoch of growth and the manner of its termination depend on future events. If birth rates prove highly resistant to change, so that growth is rapid and sustained (as it was in Europe for more than two centuries), then very rapid economic development would be required to raise or even maintain levels of living in the face of such growth. If such progressive economic development is impossible, because of the paucity of resources, inadequate capital and techniques, or disturbed political conditions, then ultimately growth will absorb product, living levels will fall, and death rates will rise. The termination of growth would then come about in a highly congested, desperately poor population with high birth and death rates, in a situation not different in principle from that in which Egypt finds itself today. The difficulty facing all densely settled areas having high birth and death rates is clear-cut in Palestine.

If, on the other hand, the processes of modernization of both culture and economy move swiftly, so that the transition from high to low birth and death rates is relatively short (perhaps a century or less), then possibly growth can be held within the bounds of carrying capacity. The presence of an immigrant group bearing Western culture, technology, and capital, and particularly Western small family patterns, greatly enhances the possibility of curtailing the growth period. However, the effect can be obtained only if the immigrant group does not itself build up heavy population pressure. This it could do in two ways: one, by its sheer size in relation to the carrying capacity of the region; and the other, by stimulating a cultural and political clash of sufficient magnitude and duration to block the rapid and prolonged development of the economy.

It is the purpose of this article, first, to document the general course of development described above by considering the demographic structure and processes of recent population change, and then to examine the potentialities for future growth of the present stock and the implications of those potentialities for future policy toward migration.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION

Palestine is a densely populated region, particularly in view of its climatic conditions and resource base. In spite of the fact that almost half of its area is virtually uninhabited desert, the average density of the settled population, i.e. excluding nomads, by the end of 1940 was 56 persons per square kilometer. This figure is about the same as that for Yugoslavia in 1931. It is a little higher than that for Greece and a little lower than that for Bulgaria or Roumania in the early 'thirties. If the desert subdivision of Beersheba is excluded from the area, Palestine's average population density was about 108 at the end of 1940, a figure a little higher than that for Czechoslovakia or Switzerland, and substantially higher than that for




Figure 2. Density of the population of Palestine, by subdivisions, 1940.





Poland, Austria, Denmark, Hungary, or North Ireland in the early 'thirties.


Within the region, the density varies widely with climate, topography, resource-location, and degree of modernization. Figure 2 presents the situation for the end of 1940. It is apparent that Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Haifa, subdivisions of modern development, were very densely settled. They are essentially metropolitan regions, but the whole coast is rather densely populated. Moreover, the population density was rising rapidly between 1931 and 1940. For example, it increased from 93 to 190 persons per square kilometer in Haifa, from 56 to 76 in Nazareth, from 60 to 78 in Tiberias, and from 38 to 54 in Beisan. Further south, the density rose from 434 to 972 in Jaffa, from 87 to 117 in Ramle, and from 79 to 100 in Gaza. Truly sparse populations are found only in the desert sections, and some of these were filling up as reclamation projects pushed ahead. It is evident that a highly specialized and capitalized economy is necessary to support such dense settlement at reasonable standards of living.

The impact of the new on the old, evident in the pattern of rising density between 1931 and 1941, appears in virtually every demographic index. It is reflected clearly in the religious composition of the population. In 1931, the indigenous population was composed of a solid core of Moslems supplemented by a smaller proportion of native Jews, Christians, and other sects. The native Christians have been augmented by government officials and the staffs of Western churches at the holy places to form a somewhat heterogeneous group.³ The Jewish group includes some indigenous population, but it is largely composed of recent immigrants from Europe. In 1931, 73 per cent of the total population was Moslem, 17 per cent was Jewish, 9 per cent Christian, and 1 per cent the affiliates of other religions.

³ Because the Christians are a heterogeneous group of native and Western peoples, the small number of persons of "other religions" have been consolidated with the Christians instead of with the more homogeneous Moslems whom in many respects they resemble in demographic behavior.

**CLASSIFICATION OF SUBDIVISIONS
BY RELIGION, 1931**

-  UNMIXED MOSLEM (MOSLEMS 97%+)
-  MOSLEM, WITH SIGNIFICANT MINORITIES (MOSLEMS 81-85%)
-  LARGE CHRISTIAN MINORITIES (MOSLEMS 54-70%, CHRISTIANS 25-44%)
-  LARGE JEWISH MINORITIES (MOSLEMS 43-61%, JEWS 24-47%)



0 10 20 30 KILOMETERS

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Figure 3. The subdivisions of Palestine classified by the religious affiliation of the population in 1931.

The distribution of the minority populations may be taken as a rough index of the diffusion of Western influences throughout the population. For lack of a census after 1931, the religious composition of subdivisions is not shown for later years, but as Figure 3 shows, in 1931 there was no single subdivision where the Jews formed a majority of the population. However, Jews formed significant minorities, ranging from 24 to 47 per cent, in Haifa, Tiberias, Jaffa, and Jerusalem. Christians formed substantial proportions (25 to 44 per cent) in Acre, Nazareth, and Bethlehem, and significant non-Moslem minorities (14 to 19 per cent) were found in the subdivisions bordering those with heavy Jewish concentrations, including Ramle, Ramallah, and Jericho in the Jaffa-Jerusalem belt, and Safad and Beisan bordering on Tiberias. The remainder of Palestine includes two belts of almost solidly Moslem population, that of the south—Beersheba, Gaza, and Hebron; and that of the middle region—Tulkarm, Nablus, and Jenin. In each of these six subdivisions the non-Moslems constituted less than 3 per cent of the total populations.

The Jewish and Christian populations were heavily concentrated in the cities, whereas the Moslem population lived chiefly in the villages. In 1931 about three-quarters of both the Jews and the Christians lived in incorporated places, which had attracted only about one-quarter of the Moslems. This urban concentration is inadequately measured by the census, which defines "urban" as incorporated places. Thus, on this definition, Jericho subdivision has no urban population. However, as Figure 4 shows, in three of the four subdivisions having substantial Jewish minorities, 40 per cent or more of the population was urban in 1931. At the other extreme, in three of the six solidly Moslem subdivisions, the urban population constituted less than 12 per cent of the total.

The census of 1931 did not give the proportion of the foreign born in the population of subdivisions. However, using the estimated distribution of the urban foreign born by religion, and the




Figure 4. The urban population of Palestine as per cent of the total population, by subdivisions, 1931.






Figure 5. Estimated per cent of foreign born in the settled population of Palestine, by subdivisions, 1931.

**PER CENT FOREIGN BORN IN URBAN
POPULATION, FOR MOSLEMS &
NON-MOSLEMS, 1931**

MOSLEMS | NON-MOSLEMS



0 10 20 30 KILOMETERS

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Figure 6. Estimated per cent of foreign born in the urban population of Palestine, by subdivisions and religion, 1931.

relation between the proportion of foreign born and the prevalence of persons with foreign mother tongue in each religious group, we obtain fairly reliable estimates of the proportion of foreign born in the total population of each subdivision. These estimates, as of the census of 1931, are shown in Figure 5. The belts of heavy foreign infiltration are, of course, in the Jaffa-Jerusalem and Haifa-Tiberias areas.

The proportion of foreign born in the urban Moslem and non-Moslem populations shown in Figure 6 is also instructive. In no subdivision except Ramallah did the proportion of foreign born fall below 7 per cent in the non-Moslem population, and in no case did it rise above 10 per cent in the Moslem population. More interesting than the absolute difference in the proportions of foreign born is the fact that for the Moslems they were relatively high (over 3 per cent) only in the subdivisions having substantial non-Moslem minorities. If the subdivisions are ranked from 1 to 17 (Jericho, having no "urban" population, is omitted) in ascending order of per cent foreign born among Moslems and non-Moslems, the average ranks of Moslem and non-Moslem districts are strikingly similar. The unmixed Moslem districts of Figure 3 have scores of 5.3 and 6.5 for Moslems and non-Moslems, respectively. Districts that were Moslem with significant minorities have average ranks of 8.0 and 7.5, respectively; those with large Christian minorities have scores of 11.3 and 7.8; and districts with large Jewish minorities have scores of 13.8 and 15.3. In general, the foreign born, Moslem and non-Moslem alike, tended to gravitate to the cities of those districts having the largest proportion of non-Moslem population.

The impact of the new on the old patterns is also clearly reflected in the distribution of illiteracy in 1931. Unfortunately the data are available only for the "urban" population, which was undoubtedly much more literate than the rural population. The pattern is shown in Figure 7, which gives the per cent of illiterates in the urban population age 14 or more in 1931. The areas of greatest illiteracy include




Figure 7. Proportion of illiterates in the urban population aged fourteen or more years, Palestine, by subdivisions, 1931.

the six subdivisions with unmixed Moslem population, plus Ramle and Beisan. In none of them were fewer than 66 per cent of the population illiterate. Areas with heavy Jewish minorities—Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem—had the least illiteracy, with regions of Christian and other significant minorities tending to fall in an intermediate position.

In general, the pattern of urban concentration, the distribution of persons of foreign birth, and the incidence of illiteracy are all highly correlated with the distribution of the Jewish minorities, and suggest something of the role that group has played in the dissemination of new influences throughout the region.

POPULATION GROWTH 1922 TO 1931

Between 1922 and 1931 the settled population of Palestine apparently increased by 42 per cent.⁴ This increase amounts to an annual rate of 3.9 per cent, one that if maintained would double the population in eighteen years. Within Palestine the rates of growth diverged widely, as may be seen from Figure 8. (The census data have been adjusted so that they relate to the boundaries of 1931.) The most rapid increases occurred in the middle and northern regions of modernization. Jericho and Jaffa more than doubled their populations in the nine years of the intercensal period, while Jerusalem, Haifa, and Beisan increased by between 40 and 100 per cent. On the other hand, the slowest growth occurred in the "unmixed Moslem" subdivisions of Hebron, Nablus, and Jenin, as well as in Safad, Acre, and Bethlehem, regions with large mixed or Christian minorities. However, even in these regions of slowest growth the increase was actually rapid, ranging from 15 to 24 per cent—rates that would double the population in from twenty-nine to forty-six years.

It is also clear from Figure 8 that there were substantial differences

⁴The exact rate of growth cannot be determined. Probably that cited above is somewhat too high because the census of 1922 was less complete than that of 1931. Another element of uncertainty arises from the fact that border revisions were made which affected an estimated population of about 10,000.




Figure 8. Per cent change of the settled population for the subdivisions of Palestine, by religion, 1922-1931. (Adjusted to boundaries of 1931.)

in the rates of increase of the religious groups between 1922 and 1931. In Palestine as a whole the Jewish population increased by 104 per cent, the settled Moslem population by 29.5 per cent, and the "Christians and Others" by 21 per cent. Contributions to growth between 1922 and 1931 were by no means proportional to the share of the population in 1922. Moslems formed 75 per cent of the population but contributed 63 per cent of the increase; Jews and "Christians and Others" each constituted 12 per cent of the 1922 population, but the former contributed 31 per cent of the growth, and the latter only 6 per cent.

In spite of the differences in the rates of growth of the religious groups, there are elements of similarity in the regional concentrations. For example, there were five subdivisions where rates of increase exceeded 40 per cent. In each of these, with one exception, each religious group increased by more than 40 per cent. The exception is "Christians and Others" in Jerusalem, among whom the increase was only 27 per cent. Conversely, there were six subdivisions in which the increase of the total population was under 25 per cent. With few exceptions each religious group increased less than 25 per cent. The exceptions are Jews in Acre, Jews and Moslems in Bethlehem, and "Christians and Others" in Hebron, the last being a numerically inconsequential group. Broadly speaking, in subdivisions that grew rapidly, each religious group grew rapidly, and in those that grew slowly, each religious group grew slowly.

Figure 8 tends to conceal the relative patterns of population change of the religious groups by subdivision. It shows, for example, that Christians increased least rapidly of the three groups in Jerusalem, but fails to bring out the fact that in terms of the average rate of growth of Christians in all Palestine, this increase was rather rapid. These relations are better shown in Figure 9, where the rate of growth of each religious group in each subdivision is expressed in terms of the per cent by which it exceeded or fell below the rate of growth of the same religious group in all Palestine. In terms of




Figure 9. Rate of growth of the settled population and of each religious group by sub-divisions and as deviations from the average rate of growth of the corresponding group in all Palestine, 1922-1931. (Adjusted to boundaries of 1931.)

this growth in all Palestine, the Jews in Jerusalem increased rather slowly, while the increases of the Christians and Moslems were quite rapid.⁵

Subdivisions in which total populations increased more rapidly than the population of all Palestine include Haifa and Beisan in the north, and Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Jericho in the middle band. Except for the Jews in Jerusalem, each religious group in these subdivisions grew more rapidly than its own group in all Palestine. It is apparent that all religious groups were being attracted to these bands of development. Beersheba, Ramle, and Tulkarm increased only a little less rapidly than Palestine as a whole. In Beersheba, Moslems increased at higher than the average rate but Jews and Christians were leaving. In Ramle both Moslems and Jews increased more rapidly than the average, but Christians were apparently departing. Tulkarm, on the other hand, had a smaller than average increase of Moslems and rapid increases of Jews and Christians, who, nevertheless, were numerically inconsequential.

Population growth was substantially less rapid than the average for Palestine in Gaza, Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Nazareth, and Tiberias. With four exceptions each religious group in each of these subdivisions increased at less than its own average rate. The exceptions were Jews in Nazareth, who increased rapidly but even so in 1931 constituted only one per cent of the population; and "Christians and Others" in Hebron, Tiberias, and Ramallah. In Hebron the Christians remained numerically unimportant. In Tiberias the figures suggest that an earlier attempt at development had lost its attraction to Moslems and Jews while retaining it to

⁵ Since *rates* of growth or decline may be very large and still wholly unimportant because the populations involved are small, Figure 9 also shows the per cent that each group formed of the total population in 1931. For example, in Hebron the rate of growth of "Christians and Others" was more than 100 per cent higher than that of this group in all Palestine. Numerically the change was inconsequential, for, in spite of such growth, "Christians and Others" constituted only 0.2 per cent of the population in 1931. On the other hand, in Bethlehem the rate of change was 50 to 99 per cent lower than in all Palestine and the change was important because the group constituted 63.4 per cent of the total population. Obviously there was a substantial emigration.




Figure 10. Estimated net migration, 1922-1931, per 100 initial settled population. (Adjusted to boundaries of 1931.)

some extent for "Christians and Others." Ramallah attracted Christians, but the very few Jews there apparently left.

The least rapid growth occurred in the subdivisions of Bethlehem, Acre, and Safad, evidently as a result of mixed situations. In Acre all groups grew at lower rates than the average, perhaps because of the attractions of Haifa and, possibly in the case of Moslems, of Safad. In Safad there was an interchange. Moslems exceeded their own average rate of growth, but there appears to have been a definite exodus of Jews and Christians, who had formed substantial minorities. In Bethlehem, as noted before, there was an exodus of Christians, part of which apparently represented migration to the United States. Their place was to some extent taken by Moslems and Jews, the latter increasing most rapidly but remaining insignificant in number.

The above discussion has suggested that various inferences concerning the currents of migration may be made on the basis of deviations of subdivisinal growth from the average for the region. Obviously, the basis of such inferences is slender, since growth represents the resultant of birth and death as well as movement during the period. Given adequate information, net movement between the censuses could be obtained by adding the excess of births over deaths to the 1922 population and subtracting the sum from the 1931 population. In actual fact the operation encounters serious obstacles. There are differences in the accuracy of the two censuses, in the completeness of birth and death registration both over time and between subdivisions, in boundary changes, and between the boundaries of vital statistics registration areas and those of administrative subdivisions. All of these factors introduce errors that focus on the residual estimate of net migration. An attempt has been made to take these errors into account by a somewhat intricate system of adjustments. The results are given in Figure 10 in terms of the estimated net migration per 100 settled population in 1922. It is believed that the pattern obtained is in general correct,

but it must not be closely interpreted. Areas that appear to have had small outward movements may in fact have had small net inward movements.

Clearly there was a net migration away from Bethlehem, Hebron, and Gaza in the south, and Acre and Safad in the north. At the opposite extreme there was a net movement to Haifa, Beisan, Jaffa, the Jerusalem-Jericho region, Ramallah, and Tiberias. In the remaining subdivisions the net balance was too small to make certain of its direction in view of the inadequacy of the basic data. Apparently Beersheba, Ramle, Nablus, and Jenin lost slightly, whereas Nazareth and Tulkarm gained somewhat. These patterns in general conform with those that would be inferred from Figure 9, when it is recalled that, in view of the very heavy immigration to a few subdivisions, other subdivisions may have received migrants and still have grown less rapidly than Palestine as a whole.

In general terms, the religious pattern of population change between 1922 and 1931 suggests: (1) a trend of all groups to areas of rapid modernization, (2) the emigration of minorities from regions that were almost solidly Moslem, (3) a subsiding of enthusiasm for Tiberias, and (4) small centers of rapid development in Tulkarm, Nazareth, and Jericho. In other words, minorities were moving out where they were of negligible size but economic development was attracting all groups to the regions of primary Jewish influence.

POPULATION GROWTH, 1931-1940

The population grew even more rapidly during the nine years from November 1931, to the end of December 1940, than it did in the previous nine years. In the earlier period its increase was 42 per cent. Between 1931 and 1940 it was almost 52 per cent,⁶ a rate that

⁶ No information is at hand by which the comparative accuracy of these figures may be judged. Since the census of 1922 was less complete than that of 1931, the recorded increase of that period was too large. The increase from 1931 to 1940 is taken from the official estimates of the settled population. Since these estimates are made by adding annual natural increase and net immigration, it is likely that they somewhat understate the actual growth.

would yield a doubling in about fifteen years. Actually the population more than doubled in the eighteen years between the census of 1922 and the last of 1940. In the former year it was 671 thousand, by the latter it had increased to 1.478 million. This is a rate of growth far exceeding any observed in the United States since the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The higher rate of increase of the population in 1931-1940 than in 1922-1931 came predominantly from the Jews. The per cent growth rose from 104 in the first nine-year period to 165 in the second. According to the official estimates the rate of growth of Moslems declined from 29 to 27 per cent. However, part of the decline is apparent rather than real as a result of the underenumeration of 1922. "Christians and Others" increased more rapidly than in the previous period, and somewhat more rapidly than the Moslems. Of the half-million increase between 1931 and 1940, 57 per cent were Jewish, 37 per cent Moslem, and 6 per cent "Christians and Others." Differences in rates of growth had markedly altered the religious composition of the population between 1922 and 1940. During that eighteen-year period the settled population had changed from one that was three-quarters Moslem, an eighth Jewish, and an eighth Christian to one that was three-fifths Moslem, nearly one-third Jewish, and one-eleventh "Christians and Others."

It is not possible to trace the regional pattern of growth between the census of 1931 and the end of 1940 very satisfactorily. Data existing are those published as current estimates and refer to current boundaries. Since there were substantial changes in the boundaries of subdivisions after the census, and no explicit description of them has been found, there are possibilities of substantial error. On the basis of such information as is available (for the most part internal evidence checked from inadequate maps) official estimates have been revised to apply to the boundaries of 1931. It is believed that the results are reasonably accurate. They are presented in Figure 11, which shows, for each subdivision, the per cent of growth of the




Figure 11. Estimated per cent increase of the settled population of Palestine, by subdivisions, 1931-1940, and the relation of the increases to those of 1922-1931. (Adjusted to boundaries of 1931 on the basis of unsatisfactory information.)

total settled population. To facilitate comparison with the earlier nine-year period, symbols are also entered indicating the per cent points by which that rate exceeds or falls short of the growth in the corresponding area during the preceding nine-year period.

As in the earlier period, Jaffa and Jericho⁷ doubled their populations between the last of 1931 and of 1940, and Haifa joined the list of those doubling their numbers. The rate of growth in the latter nine years was substantially higher than in the former in Haifa and Jaffa, but may have been somewhat smaller in Jericho. Additional subdivisions with rates of increase exceeding 39 per cent in the latter period probably included Tulkarm, Beisan,⁷ Jerusalem, and Ramle. At the other extreme, seven subdivisions grew by less than 25 per cent. Beersheba and Ramallah were newcomers to the list, having grown substantially faster in the previous period. Bethlehem dropped from the second to the lowest class. The others, which were in the same growth class as before, were Hebron, Nablus, Acre,⁷ and Safad. In general terms, the growth patterns from 1931 to 1940 suggest an intensification of the movement toward the areas of Jewish development and its periphery, with growth occurring most rapidly on the coast and in the northern and middle bands of modernization.

As the regional growth suggests, following 1931 the increase went heavily to the incorporated places. (Figure 12.) Although incorporated places had only 40 per cent of the settled population

⁷ Statements relate to the estimated increase of population within the 1931 boundaries of the subdivisions. Paucity of information concerning the territorial changes makes some error unavoidable. However, with the exceptions noted below, the above statements hold true even if no allowance is made for territorial changes.

Jericho. Without allowance for boundary changes, growth was about 29 per cent instead of 155 per cent. Apparently Jericho lost territory to Ramallah, Jerusalem, and Bethlehem.

Beisan. Without allowance for boundary changes growth was 29 per cent instead of 42 per cent. Apparently Beisan lost territory to Jenin.

Bethlehem. In any case growth was less than 25 per cent. Without allowance for boundary changes, it was 21 per cent instead of 1 per cent. Bethlehem apparently gained territory from Jericho and Hebron.

Acre. Without allowance for boundary changes, growth was 28 per cent instead of 21 per cent. Acre apparently gained territory from Safad and Nazareth, and possibly a little from Haifa.




Figure 12. Estimated per cent increase of the urban population of Palestine, by subdivisions, 1931-1941, and the relation of the increases to those of 1922-1931.

at the census of 1931, they attracted 62 per cent of the increase between the census and July 1, 1941. On the other hand, settled population outside incorporated places had 60 per cent of the population, but only 38 per cent of the increase. This "rural" (actually village) population grew more slowly than during the intercensal period 1922-1931. Then it increased by 39 per cent. Between the census of 1931 and July 1941, it increased only 34 per cent (32 per cent if the figure is adjusted to the number of years between the censuses). On the other hand, the "urban population" grew by 47 per cent between the censuses, but by 85 per cent between the 1931 census and July 1941 (81 per cent, if adjusted to the length of the intercensal period). In 1922, only 39 per cent of the settled population was urban, by mid-1941 the figure was 48 per cent, or if nomads are included the per cent urban was probably about 46 in 1941.

Between the census of 1922 and the end of 1940, the total population of Palestine (including nomads) more than doubled, rising from 757 thousand to 1.545 million, with the increase going primarily to the coastal areas and the northern and middle bands of development. The increase was predominantly urban. Rural population increased only about 72 per cent, whereas the urban population grew by 165 per cent. The Jewish population increase was somewhat larger than the Moslem in spite of the fact that at the beginning of the period Jews formed only about one-eighth of the population while Moslems constituted about three-quarters. By the end of 1940, Jews constituted about three-tenths of the total and Moslems about six-tenths.

THE COMPONENTS OF GROWTH

The population growth thus far traced arises, of course, from both immigration and natural increase, the latter being the difference between births and deaths. Examination of these components will assist in the appraisal of future prospects for growth. Owing to gaps in the basic data, however, the analysis must be limited to the




Figure 13. Settled population of Palestine for 1922, 1931, and 1940, by religion, and the intervening growth distributed between natural increase and net migration on the basis of estimates.

population classified by religion, and to subdivisions grouped in accordance with the classification of Figure 3.

Figure 13 shows the total population for Palestine and the three

religious groups in 1922, 1931, and 1940, as well as the intervening increases distinguished as coming from natural increase or net immigration. The increases were larger in the latter than in the former period both from net migration and from natural increase. Among the Moslems and "Christians and Others," growth came predominantly from natural increase; but among the Jews, primarily from immigration. In total, the Moslem increase from 1922 to 1940 was about 10 per cent less than that of the Jews.

The similar order of magnitude of the Jewish and Moslem total increase arises of course from the smaller Moslem rate of increase operating in the bigger Moslem population. The increases are expressed in terms of the population base in Figure 14, which also takes account of the slight difference in the length of the two time intervals.⁸ It is apparent from Figure 14 that the more rapid rate of increase of the second than of the first period came exclusively from increases in the net immigration of Jews and "Christians and Others." Moslem immigration, never large, virtually disappeared in the second period. On the other hand, a slight net emigration of Christians in the first period was replaced by a rather substantial net immigration in the second. The rates of natural increase in each religious group remained much the same in the second as in the first period, the slight drop in the rate for the total population being chiefly accounted for by the increasing proportion of Jews in the population, so that their lower rate of natural increase obtains more weight in the second period. Throughout, rates of natural increase

⁸ Figure 14 gives the average yearly increases expressed in terms of the average population of the period. It should not be interpreted closely because of defects both of basic data and of the measure used. Birth and death registration was defective before 1926, and the censuses of 1922 and 1931 differed in accuracy. The figure for 1940 is based on estimates carried forward from the 1931 count. The measurement device, which has for its denominator the average of the two terminal populations, is not very satisfactory. The population bases were changing rapidly through migration that was not distributed evenly over the period. Because of these difficulties, one would not conclude, for example, that the average rate of natural increase for Moslems was lower in the second period than in the first. It probably was somewhat higher. The only justified conclusion from this chart is that it was much the same order of magnitude in both periods, and was higher than the natural increases of the other two groups.




Figure 14. Estimated average annual per cent change, natural increase, and net migration for the total settled population of Palestine and its religious groups, 1922-1931 and 1931-1940. (Changes are expressed in terms of the average of the 1922 and 1931 population.)

were highest for Moslems and lowest for Jews. The rates for "Chris-

tians and Others" were a trifle higher than those for Jews.⁹ However, the differences were small in magnitude compared to those in immigration.

Although in the period under consideration immigration was the dominant factor in growth, in the long run differences in rates of natural increase may become of very great importance in determining both the rate of increase of the total population and its distribution between religious groups. It is necessary therefore to examine the components of natural increase. First we may consider mortality.

The crude death rates of the year 1931 for subdivisions classified by the religious composition of the populations are shown by the black bars of the left-hand panel of Figure 15.¹⁰ It is immediately apparent that the unmixed Moslem areas had much the highest death rates, and were followed by Moslem areas with significant minorities, subdivisions with substantial Christian minorities, and finally, with the lowest death rates of all, by the areas with substantial Jewish minorities.

These crude death rates give an unsatisfactory comparison of the risks of death in the different regions because they are influenced by the age composition of the populations as well as by the hazards to life in each age. The effect of the differences in age can be eliminated by a process of standardization. The standardized death rates shown by the shaded bars of the left-hand panel refer the risks of death observed in each age group to the age distribution of Palestine as a whole. It is apparent that the unmixed Moslem districts and the Moslem districts with significant minorities both had relatively unfavorable age distributions, so that their crude death rates were

⁹ It should be recalled that "Other" religions were grouped with Christians to retain a homogeneous Moslem group, not because of their demographic similarity to the Christians. In fact the birth rates of the "Other" group are undoubtedly much closer to those of the Moslems than to those of the Christians. It is possible that they are even higher than Moslem rates.

¹⁰ These death rates are estimated from data relating to health districts which are not precisely coterminous with the subdivisions. Except for the fact that Jericho and Jerusalem are combined, they represent an attempt to obtain the same classification used in Figure 3. The resulting rates are probably substantially accurate.




Figure 15. Estimated crude and standardized death rates for 1931 and crude death rates for 1931 and 1941, for the settled population of Palestine and its subdivisions grouped by the religious affiliation of their populations in 1931.

somewhat too high. The districts with Jewish minorities, on the other hand, because of their heavy immigration, had a somewhat more favorable age distribution, so that their crude rates were relatively too low. The actual differences in mortality were therefore somewhat less than the crude death rates indicate.

It is not possible, for lack of age distributions, to compute standardized death rates for years subsequent to the census. However, for the year 1941 crude death rates have been estimated for areas comparable to those used for 1931. These rates for 1931 and 1941 are shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 15. It is evident that there were sharp declines in the death rates of all regions. Changing age compositions may have been in part responsible, but it is quite unlikely that they were the principal factor. In the ten years considered, mortality declined spectacularly in all regions.

Figure 16 presents the same materials explicitly for the religious




Figure 16. Estimated crude and standardized death rates for 1931 and crude death rates for 1931 and 1941, for the settled population of Palestine, by religion.

groups, bringing out both the fact that the differences in the crude rates were somewhat greater than the risks to life would justify, and the fact that death rates declined sharply in each religious group. It is to be noted also that the decline in the Jewish death rate was less than the decline in the death rate for the total population in subdivisions with substantial Jewish minorities shown in Figure 15. The difference suggests that in the areas with substantial Jewish minorities, mortality was declining more rapidly among non-Jews than among Jews.

Infant mortality is at once the most sensitive index of health conditions, and, in an area such as Palestine, an important part of total mortality. Figure 17 shows the estimated infant mortality rates for the classification of subdivisions based on religion. There is considerable year-to-year variation in the rates. In order to make a conservative comparison, the figure shows the rates for 1931, a




Figure 17. Estimated infant death rates for the settled population of Palestine and its subdivisions grouped by the religious affiliation of their populations in 1931, for 1931 and 1939-1941.

relatively good year, and the average rate for 1939-1941, which combines a good, a medium, and a rather poor year. Again the figures are estimates from data for health districts and considerable uncertainty attaches to the comparison, the more so because there was plainly under-registration in Nablus and Acre. In any case, it is plain that there were very large declines. In 1931 there were wide differences between regions. By 1939-1941, except for the subdivisions with substantial Jewish minorities, the differences had virtually disappeared. Infant death rates were still high by Western




Figure 18. Official birth, death, infant mortality, and natural increase rates for the settled population of Palestine, by religion, 1926-1930, 1931-1935, and 1936-1940.

standards; the current rate for the United States, for example, is about 40. Nevertheless, remarkable progress had been made in reducing infant deaths. By 1939-1941 the districts with substantial Jewish minorities had rates well under 100, and the rates of the other sections were close to 125. However, the rate for Palestine as a whole had dropped from about 175 to 112—a somewhat notable achievement. It is clear that the impact of modernization on mortality has been very large during recent years, and has affected all parts of the country.

It has not been feasible to estimate birth rates by groups of subdivisions, as was done in the case of mortality. However, the differences in crude birth rates by religious groups are given in the upper left-hand panel of Figure 18 for the three five-year periods for which reasonably reliable information exists. Differences of the same type, but of smaller proportional magnitude, as those found

in mortality appear. Rates for Moslems were higher than those for Christians, which in turn were higher than those for Jews. Again, crude rates can be misleading as to the actual level of fertility. Crude rates depend both on age-specific fertility and on the proportion of the population in the childbearing period. To avoid this difficulty we resort to a gross reproduction rate. This rate tells us how many girl babies would be born alive to a woman living through the childbearing period, i.e., the ratio of successive female generations in the absence of mortality and at current fertility rates. Rita Hinden has made the calculations on the basis of the experience of 1931 for Moslems and Jews.²¹ She obtained 3.33 for Moslems and 1.61 for Jews. In other words, if there were no deaths from birth to the end of the childbearing period, no immigration, and the birth performance of the year 1931 continued in force, the Moslem population would more than triple every generation of about thirty years. The Jewish population would increase by 1.6 times. The Moslem fertility is one of the highest recorded in the world. That of the Jews is much the same as that of Italy at the same date. It is to be noted that the crude birth rate of Moslems was only two-thirds higher than that of Jews, but the true level of Moslem fertility was about double that of the Jews. The smaller difference of the crude rate is due to the fact that the Jewish rate was supported by a population recruited by migration that was heavily concentrated in childbearing ages. This advantage would disappear in some years after migration stopped. The same factor has contributed to the higher birth rates of the foreign-born population of the United States.

Unfortunately the data with which to obtain gross reproduction rates for the periods before and after 1931 are not available. We cannot, therefore, get direct evidence concerning the true trend in fertility, and must depend on the crude birth rates. However, that

²¹ Hinden, Rita: "The Fertility and Mortality of the Population of Palestine." *The Sociological Review*, London, xxxii, Nos. 1 and 2, January-April, 1940, pp. 29-49. In the absence of a classification of births, by age of mother, substitute fertility schedules were used.

evidence is striking. The birth rates declined in each religious group, as the upper left-hand panel of Figure 18 shows. It is not surprising that Jewish rates declined. Birth rates were falling throughout the Western world, and the Jewish demographic behavior resembles that of the West from which the majority of the stock comes. On the other hand, as pointed out before, the Moslem birth rate is one characteristic of the peoples of undeveloped colonies. Such rates respond only slowly to the forces of modernization. It is much more surprising to find it declining. Part of the decline may actually have been due to changing age distributions, as the short cohorts born during the First World War were coming into the childbearing period. However, it seems unlikely that this explains the entire drop, and virtually certain that fertility actually declined. It is fair to conclude that even in the short span of modernization, the Moslem birth rate was beginning to respond downward.

The crude rates of natural increase, i.e., the differences between the crude birth and death rates, are shown in the lower right panel of Figure 18. Over the period referred to, the rate declined sharply for Jews because the birth rate dropped more than the death rate. For Moslems, the rates tended to rise, the decline in the death rate having been somewhat more rapid than that in the birth rate. For the whole of Palestine there was little change. Human reproduction had become less wasteful, in that much the same net increase was obtained from lower fertility and lower mortality.

It is also apparent that the differences in natural increase of the religious groups were much less than those in either birth or death rates. They were nevertheless marked. Moslem rates exceeded those for Jews by 11 per cent in 1926-1931, 19 per cent in 1931-1935, and 57 per cent in 1936-1941, a disparity increasingly favorable to Moslem growth.

Actually, the difference in the growth potential of the Moslems and Jews was much larger than the comparison of crude rates of natural increase would suggest. Jews, through heavy immigration,

have developed an age distribution temporarily favorable to low death rates and high birth rates, hence very favorable to high rates of natural increase. Unless the population were constantly recruited by immigration, this situation would not continue indefinitely. The underlying situation implicit in the schedules of fertility and mortality can be seen from the net reproduction rates and the intrinsic rates of natural increase. The net reproduction rate tells us the ratio of two successive female generations that would arise from the maintenance of observed age schedules of fertility and mortality; or, on another view, the ratio of the populations at intervals of a generation that would ultimately be developed from the existing age schedules of vital rates. On the basis of the experience for the year 1931, Hinden obtained net reproduction rates of 1.88 for Moslems and 1.36 for Jews.²² These mean that the age schedules of birth and death of 1931 would yield 188 births in the daughter generation per 100 births in the maternal generation among Moslems and 136 among Jews. Or, looking at it another way, if the fertility and mortality of 1931 remained indefinitely in force and there were no immigration, the Moslem population would grow by 88 per cent per generation, while the Jewish population would grow by 36 per cent per generation. The mean length of a generation is a somewhat variable factor, 30.2 years for Moslems and 29.5 years for Jews.²³ Taking the length of generation into account, we can compute intrinsic (or "true") rates, which show the annual rates of natural increase that, in the absence of migration, would arise from the maintenance of existing age schedules of birth and death for a sufficient time to permit them to establish their own characteristic (stable) age distributions. In the present instance, the age schedules of vital rates for 1931 would ultimately give annual rates of natural increase of 20.8 per 1,000 for Moslems, and 10.3 for Jews.

²² Hinden, *super cit.*

²³ In the discussion that follows we are following Hinden's procedures and using her basic data. The computations have been re-run by somewhat more rigorous procedures, and slightly different values result.

These rates may be contrasted with the crude rates of 27.4 for Moslems and 22.6 for Jews. The intrinsic rate for "Christians and Others" was probably in the neighborhood of 18, with which the crude rate of 23.9 may be compared.³⁴ The lower intrinsic than crude rates reflect the fact that past events have left existing age distributions which are more favorable to growth than those that the vital schedules of 1931 would themselves ultimately set up. Actually the annual increase implicit in the vital schedule of 1931 was about 2 per cent for Moslems and about one per cent for Jews. Clearly, differences of this magnitude have an important bearing on the prospects for future growth.

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE GROWTH

We may approach the problem of prospective growth on the assumption that there will be no migration into or out of Palestine. The assumption is of course false, but it is also pertinent for the reason that the internal capacity for growth should be an important consideration in determining future policy with respect to migration. We may further assume a reasonable state of public order and of economic activity, because the problem of formulating continuing policy with respect to migration will not arise unless the region is in a position to attract migrants.

Given more accurate and complete data than are available for Palestine, considerable progress could be made in showing precisely how the population would grow under alternative and fairly reasonable assumptions. In the absence of such data, we shall have to approach the problem with highly arbitrary and unrealistic assumptions, and then consider their modification.

As Table 1 indicates, if we start with the population of 1940 and assume that growth between 1940 and 1970 is determined by the

³⁴ The intrinsic rate for "Christians and Others" has not been computed. The above figure is merely an estimate based on the assumption that, for that group, there would be the same ratio between the crude and the intrinsic rates as was found for Moslems. Undoubtedly the figure is inaccurate, but it is close enough for present purposes.

POPULATION AND DENSITY	END OF 1940 OFFICIAL ESTIMATE	HYPOTHETICAL POPULATION, END OF 1970 ASSUMING NO MIGRATION AND CONTINUANCE OF 1931 RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE	
		Intrinsic	Crude
		NUMBERS IN THOUSANDS	
<i>Population by Religion</i>			
Total	1,478	2,508	3,191
Moslems	881	1,647	2,005
Jews	464	632	913
Christians and Others	133	229	273
		PER CENT	
<i>Population by Religion</i>			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Moslems	59.6	65.7	62.8
Jews	31.4	25.2	28.6
Christians and Others	9.0	9.1	8.6
		DENSITY IN SQUARE KILOMETERS	
<i>Density</i>			
Total Palestine	56.2	95.4	
Palestine Excluding Beersheba	107.7	182.7	

Table 1. Estimated population for 1940 and hypothetical population for 1970. Palestine, by religious groups. (Settled population.)

crude rate of natural increase of 1931, we would reach a population of about 3.2 million by 1970, of which about 63 per cent would be Moslem and 29 per cent Jewish. Implicit in such growth would be the assumption that the age distributions would remain unchanged, and either that fertility and mortality would remain unchanged at their 1931 levels or that the changes would cancel each other. It has been shown above that in the absence of migration, the age distributions will shift to ones less favorable to growth. For this reason the hypothetical populations based on crude rates are too large. In the case of the Jews it has appeared that by 1941 the crude rates of natural increase had already dropped below the level of 1931. Since the Jewish population is demographically similar to that

of Southern Europe, we may expect the vital schedule to become less favorable to growth. The hypothetical figure of 913 thousand for 1970 is therefore clearly too large if there is in fact no immigration. Among Moslems, too, the rates of natural increase may well decline somewhat, although they will tend to be supported by the fact that the drop of the birth rate will largely be canceled by the drop of the death rate. For some years it is even possible that the rate of increase will rise. But, by 1970, it will almost certainly have dropped somewhat. The hypothetical figure based on the geometric increase at the crude rates of 1931 are clearly too large.

Another hypothesis will serve to change the biases. We may assume that between the end of 1940 and of 1970, the population will increase by the intrinsic rates of natural increase for 1931. In that case the actual rate of increase following 1940 would be 20.8 for Moslems and 10.3 for Jews, instead of the above 27.4 and 22.6 respectively. This amounts to assuming that there will be no change from the 1931 intrinsic natural increase, but that both the Moslems and the Jews forego immediately the existing stimulus to growth offered by the actual age distribution. On that assumption, and an analogous rough calculation for the "Christians and Others," the total population for Palestine by 1970 would be 2.5 million (except for nomads, who are excluded throughout). Of these about 66 per cent would be Moslems and about 25 per cent would be Jews.

In the case of the Jews it seems unlikely that future decline in natural increase will wholly cancel the enormous immediate impetus to growth given by the existing favorable age distribution. We may conclude, therefore, that without further immigration, the Jewish population by 1970 would be somewhat higher than 632 thousand and lower than the 913 thousand obtained from the crude rates, and probably would be nearer the former than the latter figure.

In the case of the Moslems we can perhaps be more definite. The existing age distribution is somewhat more favorable to growth

than the stable age distribution implied by the intrinsic rates for 1931. However, the difference is much less marked than in the case of the Jews, and there is less reason to expect a sharp decline in the intrinsic rates of increase. Given favorable political and economic conditions, birth rates will undoubtedly decline sharply, but for a considerable period of time the effect of this decline on growth may be substantially canceled by further declines in mortality. All things considered, it is probable that the figure of 1.6 million by 1970 is not unrealistic. On the basis of present evidence it would be unwise to count on fewer Moslems by 1970. These conclusions follow from the assumption of continuing economic development of the region. Prolonged political and economic chaos would of course curtail growth. Under these circumstances, the problem of accepting migrants would then be academic.

It follows from the above that plans for Palestine's future should be based on the assumption that without any additional migration the population could be expected to reach 2.5 million by 1970. This figure would mean a rise in the density of all Palestine from 56.2 persons per square kilometer in 1940 to 95.4 by 1970. Or, if Beer-sheba is excluded as of very limited usefulness (and the nomad population has been excluded), the density would rise from about 108 in 1940 to 183 in 1970. The figure that includes Beersheba represents a density somewhat larger than the densities about 1930 of Poland, Denmark, Hungary, and North Ireland, and only a little less than that of Switzerland and Czechoslovakia. If the desert of Beersheba is excluded, the hypothetical population for 1970 gives a density very much larger than that of Italy or Germany in 1930, and one exceeded in Europe only by the Netherlands, England and Wales, and Belgium, which had substantially higher densities.

THE MEANING OF PALESTINE'S GROWTH POTENTIAL

The fact that Palestine, with or without further immigration, is destined to have a truly dense population does not lead easily and

automatically to sweeping conclusions concerning policy with regard to immigration. In a trading world, there are no simple relations between density of settlement and living conditions. Nor is it to be automatically assumed that specified numbers of new immigrants will by that much increase the population beyond the amount otherwise to be obtained.

Probably no insuperable obstacles would prohibit the support of the prospective population at reasonable levels of living if there is a rapid and integrated development both of the economy of the region and of opportunities for trade within the Near Eastern hinterland and with the world. There are considerable possibilities of further developing agriculture provided that the rather heavy capitalization required can be obtained, as hitherto, on the basis of political rather than economic incentives. Even so the population in prospect will have to depend heavily on non-agricultural production, again requiring heavy capitalization. The region has in some respects a favorable location between European heavy industries and African and Asiatic raw materials. There are apparently considerable possibilities of producing light consumers goods for the Near East. Full use will have to be made of these possibilities and also of those for developing highly specialized products based on the somewhat slender mineral resources of the region. In short, it seems probable that a reasonable level of living can be obtained for the growing population, but it will require capital and organizing skill, and will require them on a scale that cannot be expected to be forthcoming on the basis of economic incentives. The needed economic development may be possible; it can scarcely be profitable and certainly will not be automatic. Clearly, therefore, all parties in the region have a stake in the maintenance of Jewish interest, as a means of attracting both the needed capital and skills.

Moreover, continued immigration on a limited scale will not necessarily speed growth. How fast the present population multiplies depends essentially on how fast the Moslems accept the small

family pattern. This in turn depends on how rapidly Western ideas and ideals penetrate the region. Additional immigrants, especially if located away from present centers of Jewish concentration, could serve as new foci for the diffusion of the small family pattern. (It is not essential that Moslems like Jews in order to imitate them. It is only essential that Moslems begin to want the things that Jews have and imitate the Jewish ways of getting them.) Additional foci of Jewish influence might therefore serve to cut Moslem growth, or at least to slow it. In passing, it may also be noted that the rigid segregation of Jews and Moslems presents difficulties if the object is to spread a Western way of life and Western fertility patterns. There are the further difficulties always found when people of widely different rates of increase are located in adjacent rigidly bounded areas.

The above demographic considerations lead to the conclusion that all parties concerned would benefit by the continuation of Jewish interest as a source of capital and skill for the region and of Jewish immigrants on a limited scale. On the other hand, on the basis of the growth prospect it appears that a catastrophe of major proportions is not outside the bounds of possibility if enthusiasm for a Jewish state should result in the really heavy immigration sometimes talked of. There are almost no limits to the population that could be supported, given someone to bear the cost. There are very real limits to the population that has any prospect of being self-supporting at reasonable levels of living over a substantial time. The higher the density, the greater the difficulties and the greater the cost. Certainly, when we realize that the present population will in all probability multiply to yield a density greater than that of prewar Germany in an area with a vastly smaller resource base and with a population much less prepared to participate effectively in modern industrial life, it becomes difficult to wish for an additional substantial increase. If heavy immigration should come about soon, there is even a considerable chance that the whole process

will break down and that within a decade or two there will be an emigration of Jewish population.

The demographic and economic situations suggest conclusions somewhat different from those frequently drawn by either the advocates of a Jewish state or by their Moslem opponents. Contrary to the usual Moslem view, Jewish immigration has not increased population pressure in Palestine. Indeed, it is precisely because of Jewish immigration that the region appears to have a reasonable chance of avoiding the development of very heavy population pressure. Increased production made possible by the introduction of Western capital, modern technology, and enterprise has already yielded dividends, and the pattern of internal migration and the decline of illiteracy and mortality are eloquent testimony that the Moslems have shared in the benefits. Moreover, the presence of the Jewish group with its urban industrial and commercial enterprise, its Western social ideals and small family patterns, should give maximum speed to the vital transition of the Moslem population. Indeed, in the surprisingly short span of twenty years of modernization Moslem birth rates already show signs of declining. In the presence of a more gradual modernization the usual lag in the decline of the birth rate behind the death rate results in a sustained period of rapid growth in which populations can increase many fold. The presence of the Jewish group as an agency for the rapid diffusion of new habits of living should hold this transition period within bounds. Immediately, of course, it has brought very rapid increases to the Moslem population because mortality has declined much and fertility only a little. However, the clue to the future is that the fertility of the Moslems has declined somewhat. It seems likely that the period of growth incident to the transition of birth and death rates from high to low will be held within manageable bounds, thanks to the presence of the Jewish group.

On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine the conditions under which Jews could become and remain a majority group in Palestine.

Moslems have every prospect of continuing to be the majority group. Should the Jews achieve a national state, it is unlikely that in the long run it could be maintained, either as part of the region, whose only hope for economic development is as the center of a substantial hinterland, or as a minority ruling group supported by outside power. Under these circumstances, the chances are great that the Jews, having made possible the development of a modern Palestine and a healthy and relatively prosperous country, would have no share in the ultimate fruits of their labors. They would have neither the good will nor the power required to remain in the area. The demographic and economic prospects of the region point to the need for the cooperative Jewish and Moslem development of Palestine as an integrated region—the trading and light manufacturing center of a Near East in which the process of modernization may be expected to go rapidly forward.