

IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION TRENDS FOR POSTWAR POLICY¹

CLYDE V. KISER

THE changing size and shifting distribution of the world's population will affect in some measure nearly every social, economic, and political problem to be dealt with in the post-war settlement. If that settlement is to be just and durable it is important that it take these demographic trends into account. At the 1943 Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund, one of the round tables was devoted to a discussion of the problem of policy in the light of demographic trends. The discussion began where the previous year's Conference left off. In 1942, the staff members of the Office of Population Research of Princeton University's School of Public and International Affairs presented some of the results of their research on demographic trends in Europe and the U.S.S.R. In 1943, the Population Round Table proceeded to a discussion of policy implications of population trends in those and other areas of the world.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

The Demographic Outlook. Dr. Frank W. Notestein served as Chairman of the Round Table and in his opening remarks he reviewed briefly the outstanding demographic trends of the world. He mentioned first the eastward shift of population growth, a fact clearly apparent from the mapping of demographic data for Europe and the U.S.S.R. and from consideration of the demographic position of countries farther east.

Dr. Notestein interpreted the eastward trend of population increase in terms of the demographic impact of industrialization. To

¹ A report of the discussions at the Round Table on Implications of Population Trends for Postwar Policy, held in connection with the Twenty-first Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund at The New York Academy of Medicine in New York City, April 14-15, 1943. For list of participants, see Appendix.

over-simplify the situation, past experience indicates that industrialization brings reductions in mortality before it brings declines in fertility. It is to this lag in the decline of the birth rate that we owe the phenomenal increases in population since the industrial revolution. Various areas of the world — even various countries of Europe — are in different stages of the growth phase. In countries of northern and western Europe, where industrialization began earliest and has been most intense, the growth phase has most completely run its course. Both birth and death rates are low and population decline is imminent.

Southern and eastern Europe are in an intermediate position. Birth rates were declining rapidly before the war and it is estimated that the period of rapid population growth in that area will come to an end by about 1970. Nevertheless, the outstanding problem for the immediate future is one of surplus population. Careful estimates have indicated something of the order of a 36 per cent increase in people of working age in eastern Europe during the next thirty years, and that in an area where industrial opportunity is limited and where farms are already small. It is believed that even now perhaps a third of the working population in agriculture could be moved from the farms in the region without seriously affecting total productivity. To complicate the problem still further, this area of small sovereignties has long been characterized by sharp cleavages along religious and political lines.

Farther to the east, the U.S.S.R. exemplifies another stage of demographic development, that of rapid growth. The U.S.S.R. is in a growth position somewhat analogous to that of western Europe in the nineteenth century. Its population with respect to age distribution and vital rates is structured to give rapid increase during the next thirty years under almost any conceivable circumstances. Even under assumptions of very sharp drops in birth rates, projection of the U.S.S.R. population yields an increase of around seventy-seven million between 1940 and 1970. This takes no account

of war losses but the results leave no doubt that the focus of European population growth will shift heavily eastward.

In the Far East we find large areas where the vital revolution has scarcely started. Here are vast populations, as in China, where high birth rates tend to be cancelled by high death rates. But there are also distinct situations indicative of heavy growth potential. India, with a modicum of reduction in mortality, piled up an increase of fifty million in the last decade. Japan, the most industrialized Oriental country, is now exhibiting nineteenth century western patterns of population change. The processes of urbanization, the declines in mortality and fertility, are similar to the situation in England in the earlier period. Population projections for Japan must be viewed with reservations. Future developments will depend greatly on the nature of the peace. Under reasonably good economic conditions following the war, the population might increase from about seventy-three million in 1940 to ninety-five million in 1970.

In general, according to Dr. Notestein, the problem in the crowded agrarian countries of the Orient, such as China, India, Java, and in a measure the Philippines, is that of avoiding an all-consuming growth of people. How can one modernize? How can one bring down fertility rates as fast as mortality rates? In short, how can one reduce mortality and also avoid a population that cannot be maintained? This is perhaps the major problem of the area.

Implications of Demographic Trends in Europe and the U.S.S.R. Dr. Frank Lorimer opened the discussion of policy implications of demographic trends in Europe and the U.S.S.R. He expressed the belief that there has been too great a tendency to relate population to static natural resources. Quite different conclusions may sometimes emerge if population is related to technological and cultural changes. For instance, the European part of the U.S.S.R. was overpopulated in 1925. It is not overpopulated now because industrialization has taken place.

Likewise, according to Dr. Lorimer, the present variations in demographic trend, economic activity, and culture are in large part the expression of differential impact of technological change. Dr. Lorimer emphasized that there were important exceptions but there was, nevertheless, some tendency for countries with lowest proportions of population dependent on agriculture to have advanced furthest in the development of democratic institutions and to have attained the greatest freedom from cultural and religious cleavages.

Dr. Lorimer pointed out that the resources of Europe as a whole are tremendous and if properly utilized and integrated could support the people at high and rising levels of living. Two outstanding difficulties are (1) the many sovereignties, and (2) the great regional contrasts in resources and technological development. Nevertheless, these difficulties must be overcome if there is to be future economic and political security in Europe, particularly in terms of its future relations with the Soviet Union. With this introduction, Dr. Lorimer presented the following propositions for discussion:

1. A closer economic and political integration of European nations is clearly indicated. This would make possible the development of public measures relating to economic stability, social security, and stabilization of population trends which have become imperative for nations with a mature technological economy.

2. The primary objective in the treatment of Germany should be the preparation of Germans for *cooperation on a basis of equality* in economic, political, and cultural activities. The conquest of Germany and the destruction of its criminal leaders are preliminary conditions of this preparation. After the destruction of present German military equipment, it will be virtually impossible, in view of present demographic and economic trends, for Germany to launch another war with any possibility of success *except* with the support of England, or the U.S.S.R., or the United States, or a

powerful Asiatic country. The effective cooperation of the four major United Nations would therefore eliminate the possibility of serious military menace by any future German regime.

3. The primary measures for the security of Europe, with respect to the U.S.S.R. are: (a) the creation of conditions that will promote the stable, progressive development of economic life in Europe, and (b) the closer political and economic integration of European nations.

4. The security of Europe and the U.S.S.R., as well as that of other nations, requires the formation of a world organization designed to provide collective security and promote economic and cultural progress.

5. It must be recognized that absolute free trade without governmental direction or control cannot be established in the modern world.

6. International measures should be taken (a) to stabilize the economic relations of the vast populations in areas of retarded economic development that must long remain largely dependent on the production of raw materials, and (b) to promote education, technological progress, appropriate industrial development, and the stabilization of population in such areas. The interests of the people of Asia, America, and ultimately of Europe, would be served by the greatest possible disentanglement of European governments from the prejudiced control of Asiatic affairs.

7. The adequate economic and political organization of Europe would make large-scale emigration unnecessary. On the other hand, freedom of movement within Europe is vitally important. More objective research, however, should be directed to all aspects of international migration. The United States should re-examine its policies with respect to migration from the standpoint of relation to the future development of this country, the progress of other nations, and the maintenance of world peace.

8. The formation of sound international policies and relations is

dependent on increased knowledge and freer cultural relations. No freedom is more vital than freedom from ignorance. A primary implication is the emphasis on all possible measures for the promotion of scientific research, technical and liberal education in all parts of the world, the free interpretation of experience, and the exchange of ideas.

With reference to future relations between the U.S.S.R. and Europe, Dr. J. B. Condliffe stated that there have been marked eastward shifts of population and industry within the U.S.S.R. To the extent that Russia faces eastward, the "security" argument for an integrated Europe loses some of its force. Dr. Condliffe also reminded the group that Great Britain is not simply a European island. It is the center of a world system that embraces about one-third of the world's population. The various dominions of Great Britain view with apprehension the prospect of England being swallowed up in the affairs of an "integrated Europe." Dr. Condliffe agreed that industrialization of certain European countries is indicated, but he stressed the importance of economic development of backward countries which are the areas of population growth, such as China and Latin America, as well as eastern and central Europe. In short, Dr. Condliffe emphasized that he was not arguing for a revival of the nationalistic Europe of the interwar period. He believed that considerable economic modification was needed but that this should be done within the structure of world organization.

Implications of the Demographic Position of Minority Groups in Europe. In opening the discussion of policy implications regarding minority groups in Europe, Dr. Louis I. Dublin stated that much could be learned from the U.S.S.R. regarding the treatment of minorities. No matter what sins the Soviet Government may be guilty of, it at least has had a consistent policy of permitting national cultural groups to retain their identity. He thought that it would not be possible to give independent status to every national group,

but in the postwar settlement the smaller nations must be given and guaranteed their national independence. There might be sound reasons for constituting federated states such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In these circumstances, some degree of political autonomy must be granted to the constituent peoples along with basic rights of citizenship. Minorities must be given and guaranteed equal rights with other citizens of the countries in which they live.

Dr. Dublin also emphasized that the new nations or federations would need guidance. Any international organization entrusted with this function must have the power to enforce decisions. Part of this guidance would undoubtedly have to be directed toward making the minority groups themselves realize that rights are attended with obligations.

Dr. Dublin believed that the Jews present a special problem. He doubted that any sizable number of Jews would want to live again on German soil. Broad international cooperation will be needed for working out places for settlement of Jews. Retraining in industrial trades and farming will be needed and many will need the wherewithal to start a new life wherever the opportunity seems best.

A demographic consideration which will greatly relieve the problem of minorities is the right of a free migration from one country to another. Under any "Council of Europe" economic considerations would demand that the right of free movement be considered a basic right.

The final point made by Dr. Dublin was that minority difficulties flourish in an atmosphere of economic depression and discontent. The implication of this is that national boundaries should be set up in such manner as to make each country able to carry on an effective economic life. The setting of boundaries on this basis will, in many instances, eliminate the difficulties that would arise if purely nationalistic demands were to determine national boundaries.

Several exceptions were taken to Dr. Dublin's proposals. Dr. Lowell J. Reed suggested that before thinking in terms of an international authority to guarantee the "basic rights" of minority groups, we should be careful to define specifically the term "basic rights." He thought that the "basic rights" that could be protected by international authority would necessarily be very simple and primitive, but we need a clean-cut realization of what they are.

The Chairman thought that the policy implications flowing from the demographic and economic conditions in eastern Europe were somewhat different from the propositions suggested by Dr. Dublin. This region faces the prospect of substantial increase of population during the next thirty years. Its population is largely agrarian and the area has long been characterized by small sovereignties and by religious and cultural cleavages. In this type of setting it seems somewhat inadequate to give first emphasis to the problem of protecting "basic rights." The primary emphasis might better be given to programs for economic development. It was thought that industrialization would not only help to meet acute economic problems but that it would help to break up the racial and religious cleavages.

Objections were also raised to the proposition regarding free migration. It was contended that whereas wide areas of free migration within eastern Europe might be feasible, it is unrealistic to think in terms of free migration on a world basis. This problem was discussed in more detail by a later speaker.

Implications of Population Trends in the Far East. Dr. Warren S. Thompson spoke next on population trends in the Far East and their implications for the future. He stated that for more than twenty years a shift has been noticeable in the areas or regions of large population increase. Whereas prior to World War I the western and northern European peoples had long been increasing at a faster rate than most other peoples, since then they have grown slowly or have even failed to reproduce. During the interwar period

the regions of larger population increase shifted towards the East and the South. Poland, the Balkans, the Soviet Union, a number of Asiatic countries (notably Japan, India, Java, and the Philippines) and Central and South America became the areas of more rapid population increase.

Dr. Thompson agreed with the Chairman's earlier statement regarding the Malthusian dilemma in the Far East. Reminding the group that the population of India and Burma increased fifty-two million from 1931 to 1941, he stated that only a little in the way of reduced mortality rates would bring equally striking increases in China. Japan offers an example of growth and power potentials made possible by really substantial progress in industrialization and public health. Despite the apparent emergence of decline in the birth rate, estimates of a population of ninety to ninety-five million in Japan by the end of the century seem quite within the realm of reason.

The upshot, according to Dr. Thompson, is that in the next few decades we face the prospect of tremendous population growth in southern and eastern Asia, increases that may easily be numbered in the hundreds of millions. In contrast, that part of the white race which has previously dominated the economics of the world is going to become a smaller and smaller part of the world's population.

With such shifts in population growth and with increasing industrialization in the Orient, Dr. Thompson believed that new problems involving the distribution and use of the world's natural resources were almost certain to arise. He pointed out that Africa was largely unpeopled, that there were huge areas of possible settlement in the Dutch and British possessions of the Indies, and that Australia could support several times its present population at a relatively high level of living. One can safely predict the attitude of the Oriental people toward these relatively empty places. As the Orientals increase in numbers and get the power to use their re-

sources, what will be their reaction toward the continued possession of their lands by Western peoples?

These emerging problems of adjustment between population and natural resources need exploration. This is particularly urgent in view of the fact that a change in the industrial structure of a number of these now rapidly growing countries has already been taking place. These changes in growth and structure are dynamic and will demand a dynamic political and economic organization of international relations. Otherwise, the world will be unable to avoid repeated impasses where war seems the only way to change a situation "frozen" to the advantage of powers which were once highly dynamic, but which now prefer to maintain the status quo.

In conclusion, Dr. Thompson stated that we are going through a demographic revolution as regards the white man's position on this planet. We must face that. If we make the wrong choice, or if we choose to do nothing about it, we might conceivably find today's developments in Japan duplicated tomorrow in India or even in China.

Implications Regarding Postwar Problems of Immigration. Dr. H. P. Fairchild, who spoke on implications regarding postwar problems of immigration, stated that if anything can be certain about the Peace Conference it is that one of the prominent questions will concern the redistribution of population as a possible feature of peace adjustments. This question will take two main forms: 1. The repatriation of peoples who have been dislodged and dispersed by the exigencies of the war. 2. The attempt to secure relief for overcrowded nations by means of emigration.

Both of these are vital issues, not only because of their immediate and direct bearing upon problems of economic and emotional well-being, but because to a very large extent they underlie problems of a more definitely political and organizational character. Any workable and constructive plan for postwar international organization must take account of the population factors involved.

It is vitally important that the commission which represents the United States at the peace table have at its command the best expert knowledge and opinion on the whole range of population fact and theory. Among all the problems in this area none are more important than those concerning the effects of emigration and immigration upon the economic, political, social, and psychological conditions of the countries involved. Fortunately, some of the more important theories along these lines have been quite conclusively worked out, and are now accepted by the majority of the specialists in the field. Foremost among these is the principle that, in most of the countries involved, a steady, regular, anticipated emigration does not affect the long-time rate of growth or size of the country of source, nor does it increase the rate of growth of the country of destination. Consequently, it has no power of relieving the evils of overpopulation in countries of the former type, but it may have a very prejudicial effect upon the standards of living and economic conditions in the countries of destination. It will certainly have a profound effect on the ethnic composition of the latter countries.

Dr. Fairchild thought it highly likely that in the name of liberalism, emphatic demands will be made that immigration bars be lowered in this country and that relief to the overcrowded countries be offered through the channels of emigration. Such demands, he stated, are already manifesting themselves in certain quarters. They receive definite support from the consideration that we are fighting this war for the sake of democracy, the rights of the common man, the eradication of race prejudice, and the general recognition of human equality. If the findings of science were in accordance with unenlightened liberal sentiment, there might be no particular danger. Since this is not the case, it is essential that the peace negotiators be prepared to recognize, and to make clear to the world, that what may seem like a narrow or illiberal policy is really a liberal policy because it promises the greatest welfare for the greatest number of people over the longest stretch of time.

Dr. Fairchild's point of view in regard to free migration, therefore, was virtually the opposite of Dr. Dublin's. Dr. Philip M. Hauser believed that this, like other divergent points of view evinced in the meeting, was due largely to lack of agreement on a basic frame of reference for the discussion. He thought that if we predicated a strong international order after the war, that if we really had a world organization in an economic, political, and police-force sense, we could reach a lot of unanimity around the table as to how population and resources might be shuffled. If one wants the continuation of a nationalistic type of order, the old policies of excluding the Orientals and of blocking their attempts at industrialization are perhaps the answers.

Although members of the group agreed with Dr. Hauser that much depended on the type of world we have after the war, the point was made that nations with any autonomy will formulate their own policies regarding migration. They will also attempt strongly to make their own decisions regarding trade. But whatever is done regarding trade, the last thing that will be conceded to an international organization is the right to say who comes in and, perhaps, who goes out.

Dr. Condliffe believed that none of these population problems could really be discussed except on the thesis that the United Nations' victory is followed by a powerful world organization. He made the further point that possibly one of the best ways in which to deal with population pressure, particularly in Asia, is to encourage the freer flow of trade. He thought that ours would indeed be an untenable position if we not only shut out the laborers but also shut out the products of their labor. An expanding system of multilateral trade is essential to any plan for industrial development in areas of population pressure and is the most practical alternative to the elimination of migration restrictions.

Summary of Discussion of International Aspects. Without attempting to reconcile the varied opinions expressed at the meeting,

the Chairman summarized the first day's discussion with a general statement that to some extent indicates the level of agreement. The distribution of the world's population is obviously very different from that of its resources. This discrepancy between the distribution of population and resources is being intensified in some instances and alleviated in others by differences in rates of natural increase. There are three principal ways of relieving population pressure of an area: (1) modification of fertility, (2) migration, and (3) economic development. The first is a long and slow process. The second involves human hardship and political difficulties and can be effective only in some circumstances. In cases where fertility is rapidly coming under control, for instance, migration has the possibility of relieving strain and of tiding over the transitional period.

But it should be remembered that trade and industrialization stand in considerable complementary relation to movements of people, and that this complementary relation is becoming stronger as transportation becomes cheaper. Therefore, the fostering of economic development of backward areas might logically be one of the first things undertaken by way of relieving population pressures. This approach has the long-run advantage of setting up a train of social processes conducive to lowering mortality and fertility rates, and in that sense it tends to furnish a preventive as well as a cure. It was the consensus of the group that it would be extraordinarily difficult to work out on a strictly nationalistic basis the questions that world population problems will impose.

DOMESTIC ASPECTS

Needed Factual Bases for Pronatalist Policies. On the second day of our meeting attention was turned to studies of certain problems in this country. The United States is in the same line of demographic development as the western European countries. During 1935-1939 large rural sections were characterized by high birth rates but the rates were so low among urban populations that the net reproduc-

tion rate for the total country was only 0.98, a little below the requirements for permanent replacement through births.

It is a safe prediction that among western nations, including our own, there will be an intensified development of positive population policies during the next decade. In anticipation of this development, a group of students of population and psychology began, several years ago, a methodological study of the social and psychological factors affecting fertility. It was felt that we need more factual data than we now have if any attempt at pronatalist policy in this country is to be based upon something more than wishful thinking.

The field work for this investigation was carried out in 1941 in Indianapolis, under the direction of Professor P. K. Whelpton. Although the data are still in the coding and punch card stage, Professor Whelpton described briefly the setup of the study and presented a few preliminary results based upon hand counts.

The study was restricted to 1,080 married couples in Indianapolis with the following characteristics: husband and wife native white; both Protestant; married in 1927, 1928, or 1929; wife under 30 and husband under 40 at marriage; neither previously married; residents of a large city most of the time since marriage; and both at least elementary school graduates. Most of the analyses will relate to the 860 couples which were classified as fecund for purposes of the study.

The above restrictions were made mainly for methodological reasons. A relatively small total sample was dictated by the expensiveness of the intensive interviews; so it seemed wise to avoid the necessity of breakdowns by nativity, color, religion, years married, etc. Obviously, the sample was not intended to be representative of the United States nor even of the urban population. But it does in a measure represent a segment of the population having characteristics with respect to education, nativity, and perhaps of fertility that probably are going to be similar to those of the bulk line of our future population.

Professor Whelpton emphasized the highly preliminary and tentative nature of the few results he presented. There was, however, no mistaking the virtual universality of at least some contraceptive experience among the couples studied. The effectiveness of this practice in reducing fertility was apparently very large. The average fertility rate for the total group was well below the maintenance level.

Much work remains to be done with the motivational material. The few results presented by Professor Whelpton were based upon certain direct questions regarding the influence of specified factors on size of family. As Professor Whelpton explained, rationalization probably entered heavily in the replies to these questions and the results are subject to confirmation by more indirect types of materials still to be analyzed. The replies to certain direct questions, however, suggested that economic factors in relation to the aspiration level of the people are of importance.

Dr. Thompson said that the replies to questions intended to learn whether the couples felt any obligation to the community in the matter of family size were highly negative. He thought the results indicated that family size was a highly personal matter among this group and that the couples apparently attached little importance to "duty" towards the nation, church, family, or class, in matters of family size. He pointed out that the population policies in Germany, Italy, and Japan were calculated to instill these "duties" in the minds of the people. He recognized, however, that the replies to such questions might have been different had the couples in question been subjected to "duty" propaganda and that at all events only very tentative interpretation is warranted on the basis of the replies to direct questions alone.

Some Considerations Regarding Programs of Child Security. The Round Table proceeded from the consideration of preliminary fragments of factual material from the Indianapolis study to a closely related subject of a very practical nature. For some months

Dr. T. J. Woofter, Jr., Director of Research for the Office of the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, has been working with representatives from a few other federal agencies on the general problem of postwar programs of child security. Our group was privileged to hear him describe some of the aspects of these studies.

Dr. Woofter stated that a few months previously some of the representatives of various federal agencies whose research programs touched rather closely problems of child welfare and child security decided to call an informal conference with the idea of tying together the products of research relating to this problem and of determining what type of postwar program in child security could be agreed upon as reasonably adequate and feasible for public acceptance. Several influences conspired to bring the group together. There was the feeling that after the war there would be a good psychological climate to consider programs of child security. There was also the growing belief that the existing social security system in this country gives security to the individual wage-earner in proportion to his wages and does not put sufficient emphasis on the family as a unit.

Dr. Woofter stated that he and his colleagues are not working toward the development of population policy *per se*. The common denominator of their interests is that of improving citizenship through child security. It amounts to interests in human conservation. He emphasized, however, that programs of child security might turn out to be either natalist or qualitative and that a series of policies might contribute to both roles.

Dr. Woofter stated that the existing sources of support and security for children could be classified under three general categories: (1) the family budget; (2) direct financial assistance to families; and (3) services furnished from the public exchequer. The first meets the majority of child needs. The second form is illustrated in a few European countries by cash allowances for children and by rent subventions. In this country it is best illustrated by allow-

ances to needy broken homes in which there are young children. The third general category is represented by expenditures for public schools, child health, etc.

Dr. Woofter stated that he and his colleagues are exploring the possible approaches through each of the three categories mentioned above. Much of the work has consisted of estimating costs of various kinds and degrees of services. He referred to one of the questions in the Indianapolis survey in which the respondents were asked the extent to which they would be encouraged to have another child if a "mother's wage" were paid for rearing children, beginning with \$15 per month for one child and rising to \$100 per month for five children. Dr. Woofter stated that if such a program were inaugurated on a nation-wide scale it would cost about 6.4 billion dollars and would immediately become a financial issue. To state the cost in another way, if allowances for children were reduced to \$10 per month, the total cost would be about 4 billion and it would take something a little larger than the 5 per cent Victory tax to finance the program on the basis of 1941 national income.

Dr. Woofter made it clear that he was not yet in a position to recommend specific measures. He raised the question, however, concerning the relative merits of cash disbursements and community services in kind. Dr. Woofter stated that he hoped the Department of Agriculture could work out for conference purposes a food-stamp plan based upon number of children rather than on financial necessity and on the provision of basic nutritive foods rather than on what happen to be surplus farm products.

The cost of really adequate programs raises questions regarding methods of financing, regardless of whether the benefits are in cash or kind. One possible approach might be the continuation of some type of pay-roll deduction. It is possible that public opposition to this would not be so great if it were understood that the tax is designed for child welfare and that it serves to remove some of the economic penalty of having children. In the nature of the case,

the benefits directly returnable to families either in the form of cash or community services would be proportionate to number of children.

Dr. Woofter estimated that the cost of the program could be cut in half if the benefits for the first child were eliminated. This type of elimination was provided in the Beveridge plan for England. It is readily feasible, however, only if we think in terms of cash benefits. Dr. Woofter believed that for pronatalist purposes it would be wise to encourage the first child, since couples having the first child early probably tend to have larger families.

With regard to a favorable "psychological climate" for instituting programs of child security after the war, Dr. Woofter mentioned that returning soldiers would probably be interested, for many of them will be confronted with the economic problem of rearing families already started by war marriages. Furthermore, the war losses and the possible deficit in births before the war is over may accelerate popular concern over our population trends.

On the other hand, we will have a tremendous national debt after the war and this will necessitate long years of high taxation. Whether an adequate program in child security is launched will depend on whether the country wants to "return to normalcy" or to go further in social legislation. Another item on the negative side is the danger that this type of program will run into bureaucracy. Dr. Woofter believed that one of the big questions in the postwar period will be that of centralization in Washington. He doubted that a large program of child security could be launched unless the states and localities are brought into the picture in a very real way.

Dr. Dublin commented on the relative merits of cash allowances and services. He stated that we know very little about allowances in this country except at the charity level but that we have had a lot of experience on the score of services. For thirty or forty years the country has built up, at least in certain areas, a sizable body of services in education and in public health. These services have been

extremely effective, at costs relatively small in comparison with the presumed expense of family allowances. He believed it would be wise to build on this experience rather than to gamble huge sums on family allowances.

There was a good deal of agreement with this general point of view but several reservations were voiced. It was pointed out that the line between cash and kind was often dim and that possibly some combination of the two might prove to be the answer. Furthermore, as Dr. Lorimer pointed out, much depended on the specific nature of the aims of child-security programs. For improvements in health and education *per se* one might conceivably give no consideration to family allowances. For inducements to larger families the evidence is not so clear. It may be that service expenditures for health, education, etc. would not only serve those ends but would simultaneously serve as inducements to larger families. Dr. Reed thought that if one agreed that society is going to pay part of the bill and the remainder is to come from the family budget, it is much better to leave to the family those elements that are as detailed as clothing. Services might even be extended to housing, for instance, without getting into the difficulties involved in trying to meet things like clothing.

The discussion of Dr. Woofter's paper formed an appropriate conclusion to our meetings. It brought to a head one of the assumptions underlying our entire session, that is, that in most western nations the rate of reproduction has declined to the point that we can virtually take for granted a postwar public concern over size of family and the welfare of existing children. At the same time, the aging of the population in the demographically advanced countries will tend to strengthen the political pressures behind the protection of the aged. There is indeed some danger that the services for the aged will be overemphasized to the detriment of the child groups on which our future society will depend. No one at our meeting questioned the desirability of developing more adequate programs

of child security. The discussion was concerned with methods of approaching the problem.

APPENDIX

PARTICIPANTS IN THE ROUND TABLE SESSION ON IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION TRENDS FOR POSTWAR POLICY

Chairman: FRANK W. NOTESTEIN, *Director, Office of Population Research, Princeton University*

- BARKHUUS, ARNE, *Milbank Memorial Fund*
 BOGGS, S. W., *Geographer, U. S. Department of State*
 CONDLIFFE, J. B., *Associate Director, Division of Economics and History, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
 DAVIS, KINGSLEY, *Office of Population Research, Princeton University*
 DEUTSCHMAN, S., *Milbank Memorial Fund*
 DUBLIN, LOUIS I., *Third Vice President and Statistician, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company*
 FAIRCHILD, HENRY PRATT, *Professor of Sociology, New York University*
 GOODRICH, CARTER, *Chairman, Governing Body, International Labour Office*
 GUTHE, OTTO E., *Director of Research, Office of the Geographer, U. S. Department of State*
 HAUSER, PHILIP M., *Assistant Director, Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce*
 HUTCHINSON, EDWARD P., *National Resources Planning Board*
 JURKAT, ERNEST H., *Office of Population Research, Princeton University*
 KIRK, DUDLEY, *Office of Population Research, Princeton University*
 KISER, CLYDE V., *Milbank Memorial Fund*
 KISER, LOUISE K., *Office of Population Research, Princeton University*
 KLEIN, PHILIP, *New York School of Social Work*
 LORIMER, FRANK, *Professor of Population Studies, The American University*
 LOTKA, ALFRED J., *Assistant Statistician, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company*
 ROSENBERG, A., *Economic, Financial, and Transit Department, League of Nations*
 REED, LOWELL J., *Dean, School of Hygiene and Public Health, The Johns Hopkins University*
 TAEUBER, IRENE BARNES, *Co-Editor, Population Index*
 THOMPSON, WARREN S., *Director, Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, Miami University*
 WHELPTON, P. K., *Associate Director, Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, Miami University*
 WOOFER, T. J., JR., *Director of Research, Office of the Administrator, Federal Security Agency.*