## STATE APPROACHES TO MITIGATING THE HARMS OF PROVIDER CONSOLIDATION

October 21, 2021


Katherine L. Gudiksen, Ph.D., M.S.





### COST OF HEALTH CARE INCREASED MUCH FASTER THAN INFLATION


#### Selected US Consumer Goods and Services, Wages



# "PRICES ARE THE PRIMARY REASON WHY US SPENDS MORE ON HEALTH CARE THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY"

Gerard Anderson et al. *It's*Still The Prices, Stupid: Why
The US Spends So Much On
Health Care. Health Affairs
38:1 (2019)

#### Growth in Health Care Spending per Person (2018 dollars)



Source: Health Care Cost Institute, 2018 HEALTH CARE COST AND UTILIZATION REPORT,

https://healthcostinstitute.org/images/pdfs/HCCl 2018 Health Care Cost and Utilization Report.pdf.



\$57



\$65



\$160


*Source*: Institute of Medicine, Best Care at Lower Cost: The Path to Continuously Learning Health Care in America (2013) updated to 2019 dollars with the Federal Reserve Bank Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator.

### WHAT IF THE PRICE OF FOOD INCREASED LIKE THE PRICE OF HEALTH CARE?

# WHY ARE U.S. HEALTHCARE PRICES SO HIGH?

- Failure to protect to competition and rigorously enforce antitrust laws
- Failure of policymakers to act when competition no longer restrains prices

### **HEALTHCARE MERGER MANIA**



STATE APPROACHES TO MITIGATING HEALTH PROVIDER CONSOLIDATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON PRICE, OCTOBER 21, 2021

### CONSOLIDATION IS INDUSTRY-WIDE





Figure 1: Healthcare Market Concentration Levels 2010-2018


Source: Nicholas C. Petris Center on Health Care Markets and Consumer Welfare (<u>petris.org</u>), University of California, Berkeley, analysis of data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey, SK&A Office Based Physicians Database from IQVIA, and Managed Market Surveyor File from HealthLeaders InterStudy (Decision Resources Group).

### THE EFFECTS OF MERGER MANIA



## HIGHER CONCENTRATION LEADS TO HIGHER PRICES

#### Hospital Prices in California




Source: Glenn A. Melnick, Katya Fonkych, and Jack Zwanziger, The California Competitive Model: How Has It Fared, And What's Next?, 37 Health Affairs 1417 (Sept. 2018)

# WHAT CAN POLICYMAKERS DO TO PROTECT REMAINING COMPETITION?


- Antitrust enforcers should consider unwinding problematic mergers, but "unscrambling the egg" is very difficult
- Antitrust enforcers need additional tools to improve merger review and block harmful mergers

### STATE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROVIDER MERGERS



Source: https://sourceonhealthcare.org/market-consolidation/

### STATE LAWS ON MERGER REVIEW AUTHORITY



- General nonprofit notice and approval (not healthcare specific)
- Notice of limited provider group transactions with no review or approval.
- Notice, limited review, and no or limited approval of nonprofit healthcare or CON-eligible transactions
- Notice, moderate review, but no approval of nonprofit healthcare transactions
- Notice, moderate review, and approval of nonprofit healthcare or CON-eligible transactions
- Notice, strong review, and approval of nonprofit healthcare transactions
- Notice, strong review, and approval of all hospital transactions

Statutes current through 2021 (Click to download)

### **Statutory Authority: Ideal Provider Merger Review**

Notice	Review	Approval	Post Transaction Monitoring
<ul><li>Broad Scope of Entities</li><li>All Provider Types</li><li>Non-profit and for-profit</li></ul>	<ul><li>Waiting Period</li><li>Ability to compel additional information</li></ul>	AG or State Agency with Authority to • Approve • Deny • Impose Conditions	<ul><li>Independent</li><li>Monitors</li><li>Paid for by merging entities</li></ul>
<ul><li>Broad Scope of</li><li>Transactions</li><li>Affiliations / Joint Ventures</li><li>Material change</li></ul>	<ul><li>Substantive Review</li><li>Criteria</li><li>Competition</li><li>Affordability/Prices</li><li>Public Interest</li></ul>		Require Annual Reports  • Compliance • Effect on Market



State Action to Oversee Consolidation of Health Care Providers

AUGUST 2021 ALEXANDRA D. MONTAGUE, KATHERINE L. GUDIKSEN, JAIME S. KING



### FAILURE TO ACT WHEN COMPETITION BECOMES INSUFFICIENT



Mitigating the Price Impacts of Health Care Provider Consolidation

SEPTEMBER 2021 | KATHERINE L. GUDIKSEN, ALEXANDRA D. MONTAGUE, JAIME S. KING

### The Boston Globe

### A handshake that made healthcare history

Partners HealthCare was born in 1993, but its powerhouse potential didn't fully hit home until 2000. That's when the emerging giant cut a quiet deal with Blue Cross to ratchet up insurance costs across the state. Nothing in Massachusetts healthcare has been the same since.

#### THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

### Behind Your Rising Health-Care Bills: Secret Hospital Deals That Squelch Competition


Contracts with insurers allow hospitals to hide prices from consumers, add fees and discourage use of lessexpensive rivals


### ANTICOMPETITIVE CONTRACT CLAUSES

- All-or-Nothing or Affiliate Contracting
- Anti-Tiering/Anti-Steering Clauses
- Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
- Gag Clauses

#### ALL OR NOTHING CONTRACTING (AFFILIATE CONTRACTING)

Health system demands an insurer include all facilities in the network





### ANTI-TIERING AND ANTI-STEERING CLAUSES

 Agreements in which an insurer agrees to place all facilities of a health system in the most favorable tier with the lowest cost-sharing

### MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSES

 Agreements in which a hospital agrees with an insurer to give it the best price or to not to give a lower provider payment rate to any rival


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### GAG CLAUSES

 Agreements in which both parties agree to keep the terms of the agreement, including price information, confidential from any person or entity not party to that agreement









### STATES WITH LAWS RESTRICTING USE OF SPECIFIC CONTRACT TERMS

All-or-nothing or Affiliate Contracting Restrictions




Anti-tiering/anti-steering Restrictions




### STATES WITH LAWS RESTRICTING USE OF SPECIFIC CONTRACT TERMS

#### **Most-favored Nation Restrictions**



#### Gag Clause or Price Secrecy Restrictions



### COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT


#### Increased Agency Oversight

- Review all proposed mergers of health care entities
- Cost-growth benchmarks
- Insurance Affordability Standards

#### Provider Rate Regulation

- Market-based caps
- Inflationary caps
- Out-of-network caps





### PROVIDER MARKET POWER: A PROBLEM THAT IS NOT GOING AWAY

- Increased merger review is critical to protect remaining competition
- States need multipronged approach to restricting anticompetitive contract practices by dominant health systems
  - Litigation
  - Legislation
  - Regulatory Oversight

### THANK YOU!

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https://sourceonhealthcare.org/

### THE SOURCE ON HEALTHCARE PRICE & COMPETITION

