Milbank Memorial Fund


Long-Term Care
for the
Elderly with Disabilities:

Current Policy, Emerging Trends,
and Implications for the Twenty-First Century

By Robyn I. Stone

August 2000


(To print this report click here for the pdf version.
To see a complete list of Milbank reports, click here).



Table of Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Defining Long-Term Health Care
Relationship between Acute and Long-Term Care
The Role of Residence in Long-Term Care
Care Settings
Who Needs and Uses Long-Term Care?
Who Provides Care?
    Informal Care
    Formal Care Providers

Long-Term Care Financing
Medicaid
Medicare
Private Long-Term Care Insurance

Long-Term Care Delivery
Integration of Acute and Long-Term Care Services
    Federal Demonstrations
    State Initiatives
    Provider Initiatives
Assisted Living
Consumer-Directed Care

Workforce Preparation

The Future of Long-Term Care Demand
The Aging Population
Increased Longevity: Quantity vs. Quality
Geographic Diversity
The Future of Informal Caregiving
The Economic Status of the Future Elderly

The Future Supply of Long-Term Care Services
The Future Supply of Alternative Settings
The Future of the Long-Term Care Workforce

Sinking or Swimming into the Future?
Implications for Long-Term Care Financing
Implications for Service Delivery
Impact on Workforce Development and Training

Conclusion

References

The Author






Foreword

This report arrays evidence and analysis to assist decision makers in the private and public sectors to address three important and perplexing questions about long-term care for the increasing number of Americans who are elderly and frail. These questions are who should pay for long-term care services through what mechanisms; how to design and deliver these services; and how to recruit, train, and retain a workforce to deliver long-term care services.

The Milbank Memorial Fund commissioned Robyn I. Stone to write this report as a result of meetings of leading trustees and executives of both nonprofit and investor-owned organizations in long-term care. The Fund and the American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging (AAHSA) convened these meetings between 1997 and 1999. AAHSA represents 5,600 nonprofit organizations that provide health care, housing, and services to more than one million of the nation's elderly. The Fund is an endowed national foundation that works with decision makers in the public and private sectors to study and communicate about significant issues in health policy.

The leaders convened by AAHSA and the Fund deplored the absence of a synthesis of information and analysis pertinent to developing public and institutional policy for the future. They welcomed an invitation to Stone to write such a synthesis because of her achievements as a researcher and senior public official in long-term care.

Many people reviewed Stone's report in draft. Reviewers included managers and trustees of organizations that provide long-term care services, executives of associations and advocacy groups, researchers, and senior officials in the legislative and executive branches of both state and federal government as well as those in international organizations. Stone made many changes in response to questions and suggestions from this diverse set of reviewers.

Daniel M. Fox
President

Samuel L. Milbank
Chairman


Acknowledgments

The following persons participated in meetings and/or reviewed this report in draft. They are listed in the positions they held at the time of their participation.

Kevin Anderson, Administrator, Mankato Lutheran Home, Mankato, Minn.; Robert A. Applebaum, Professor of Sociology, Scripps Gerontology Center, Miami University (Ohio); Robert D. Armitage, Chief Executive Officer and President, Ebenezer Social Ministries, Shoreview, Minn.; Roger Auerbach, Administrator, Senior and Disabled Services Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources; Susan S. Bailis, Co-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, SolomontBailis Ventures, LLC, Newton, Mass.; Linda Berglin, Member, Human Resources Finance Committee, Minnesota Senate; Jo Ivey Boufford, Dean, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University; Laurence G. Branch, Professor, Center for the Study of Aging, Duke University Medical Center, Durham, N.C.; Richard Browdie, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Aging; James Carlson, Executive Director, Oregon Health Care Association; Reginald Carter, Executive Vice President, Health Care Association of Michigan; Rick E. Carter, President, Care Providers of Minnesota; Christine K. Cassel, Professor and Chairman, Department of Geriatrics and Adult Development, The Mount Sinai Medical Center, New York, N.Y.; Harriette Chandler, Chair, Joint Health Care Committee, Massachusetts House of Representatives; Elbert C. Cole, Executive Director and Founder, Shepherd's Centers of America, Kansas City, Mo.; John J. Costello, Partner, Byrne, Costello & Pickard, PC, Syracuse, N.Y.; William J. Cox, Great Falls, Va.; John E. Curley, Jr., Gold River, Calif.; James E. Dewhirst, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Friendly Home, Rochester, N.Y.; John A. Diffey, President, The Kendal Corporation, Kennett Square, Pa.; Connie Evashwic, Center for Health Care Innovation, California State University; Judith Feder, Professor of Public Policy, Institute for Health Care Research & Policy, Georgetown University Medical Center; Kathleen M. Foley, Chief, Pain Service, Department of Neurology, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, New York, N.Y., and Director, Project on Death in America, New York, N.Y.; Iris Freeman, Executive Director, Advocacy Center for Long Term Care, Bloomington, Minn.; Robert B. Friedland, Director, National Academy on an Aging Society, The Gerontological Society of America, Washington, D.C.; Susan Gerard, Chair, Health Committee, Arizona House of Representatives; Ann E. Gillespie, Senior Vice President, Professional and Organizational Development, American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging (AAHSA), Washington, D.C.; Sheldon L. Goldberg, President, AAHSA, then President and Chief Executive Officer, The Jewish Home and Hospital, New York, N.Y.; Maria Gomez, Assistant Commissioner, Aging Initiative: Project 2030, Minnesota Department of Human Services; Sally Goodwin, Executive Director, Oregon Alliance of Senior and Health Services, Tigard, Ore.; Lee Greenfield, Chair, Health and Human Services Finance Division, Minnesota House of Representatives; Jennie Chin Hansen, Executive Director, On Lok Senior Health Services, San Francisco, Calif.; Mary Harahan, Deputy to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Disability, Aging, and Long-term Care Policy, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Steve Hess, President, Florence Home, Omaha, Nebr.; Peter Hicks, Co-ordinator, Policy Implications of Ageing, Directorate for Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris, France; James Introne, President, Loretto, Syracuse, N.Y.; Alexandre Kalache, Chief, Ageing and Health Programme, World Health Organization (WHO), Geneva, Switzerland; Robert L. Kane, Professor, Minnesota Chair in Long-term Care and Aging, University of Minnesota, School of Public Health; Rosalie Kane, Professor and Director, National Long-term Care Center, University of Minnesota; Mark Kator, President, Isabella Geriatric Center, New York, N.Y.; Sandra Kilde, President and Chief Executive Officer, Michigan Association of Homes and Services for the Aging; Sheila M. Kiscaden, Ranking Minority Member, Health and Family Security Committee, Minnesota Senate; Gayle Kvenvold, President and Chief Executive Officer, Minnesota Health and Housing Alliance; Richard Ladd, Ladd & Associates, Austin, Tex.; Richard R. Lance, Immediate Past President, National Benevolent Association, Stanley, Kans.; Paul J. Lanzikos, President and Chief Executive Officer, Massachusetts Aging Services Association; Monte J. Levinson, Vice President, Medical Affairs, Presbyterian Homes, Evanston, Ill.; Phyllis Lissman, Chair, Governor of Oregon's Commission on Senior Services; Marian Lupu, Executive Director, Pima Council on Aging, Tucson, Ariz.; Robert L. Mollica, Deputy Director, National Academy for State Health Policy, Portland, Maine; Tom Moore, Executive Director, Wisconsin Health Care Association; William Moyer, Chairman of the Board, Presbyterian Homes, Inc., Lewisburg, Pa.; Andrew W. Nichols, Member, Health Committee, Arizona House of Representatives; Charles B. Persell, Chair, Board of Directors Village Center for Care, New York, N.Y.; Kitty Piercy, Democratic Leader, Oregon House of Representatives; Steve Proctor, President and Chief Executive Officer, Presbyterian Homes, Inc., Camp Hill, Pa.; Carol Raphael, Chief Executive Officer, Visiting Nurse Service of New York; Cindy Resnick, Senior Program Coordinator, The Rural Health Office, University of Arizona; Robert Restuccia, Executive Director, Health Care For All, Boston, Mass.; Michael Rodgers, Senior Vice President for Government Affairs, AAHSA; Alan G. Rosenbloom, Acting President/Chief Executive Officer, AAHSA; Peggy A. Rosenzweig, Member, Joint Finance Committee, Wisconsin Senate; John Rother, Director, Legislation and Public Policy, American Association of Retired Persons, Washington, D.C.; Paul Rulison, Executive Director, Healthcare Trustees of New York State; Edward Ryle, Director, Arizona Catholic Conference; Nelson J. Sabatini, Vice President, Integrated Delivery Systems Operations, University of Maryland Medical System; Dallas Salisbury, President, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Washington, D.C.; John Sauer, Executive Director, Wisconsin Association of Homes and Services for the Aging; William Scanlon, Director, Health Systems Issues, United States General Accounting Office; Laurie Sitton, Chair, Services Committee, Oregon Disabilities Commission, Independent Living Resources; Robert Smedes, Deputy Director, Medical Services Administration, Michigan Department of Community Health; Jeanette C. Takamura, Assistant Secretary for Aging, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Dale M. Thompson, Chief Executive Officer, Health Dimensions, Cambridge, Minn.; Deborah Thomson, Director of Public Policy, Alzheimer's Association, Cambridge, Mass.; Joan Van Nostrand, Statistician, National Center for Health Statistics, Hyattsville, Md.; Bruce Vladeck, Professor of Health Policy and Senior Vice President for Policy, The Mount Sinai Medical Center, New York, N.Y.; Arthur Y. Webb, Chief Executive Officer, Village Center for Care, New York, N.Y.; James Weil, Vice President, Mature Market Group, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Westport, Conn.; Terrie Wetle, Deputy Director, National Institute on Aging, Bethesda, Md.; and Chuck Wilhelm, Director, Strategic Finance Office, Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services.


Introduction

Long-term care has become an increasingly urgent policy issue. The number of elderly Americans and their proportion of the nation's population are growing, and Americans who reach age 65 are living longer. Debate over long-term care by policymakers and members of the public has ebbed and flowed during the past three decades. More and more Americans and their leaders face the dilemma of how to meet the needs of elders with chronic disabilities in the United States.

The mass media have highlighted the cost of long-term care and the need to plan for it well in advance; the burden of long-term care on individuals, families, and society; and concerns about the quality of care.

Policymakers are struggling to define the roles of the federal and state governments and the private sector in financing and delivering care to elderly people with disabilities.

Policymakers now face three significant questions: (1) Who should pay for long-term care, and how? (2) How should services to elders with disabilities and their families be designed, and who should deliver them? (3) How can the labor force delivering that care be recruited, trained, and maintained? For long-term care policymakers in the United States, this is the triple knot. Each of these three strands demands equal attention if sound, appropriate policy is to be developed.

The question of financing has received periodic attention from federal policymakers since the early 1970s. The potentially high cost and the lack of political will, however, have impeded serious debate about access to long-term care and about the "right" balance between the roles of the public and private sectors. Except for some federal demonstration initiatives, policy development related to the delivery of services has occurred primarily at the state and local levels. At every level, the availability and quality of the current and future long-term care labor force––both professional and paraprofessional––have received the least attention of all.

This paper describes the current status of the three key dimensions of long-term care policy––financing, delivery, and workforce––and identifies some of the major demographic and policy trends that will affect the demand for, and supply of, long-term care in the future. First I define long-term care, including its range of services and settings, the populations that need care, and the providers who comprise the formal and informal workforce. Next I review the major issues that affect financing, delivery, and workforce development. Then this paper identifies trends and projections that will help shape the long-term care landscape in the twenty-first century. Finally, I discuss the implications of current and emerging trends for long-term care financing, delivery, and workforce development.

While recognizing that long-term care is important to people with disabilities of all ages, this paper focuses on policy for those aged 65 and older––the group most likely to need services. Although the boundaries between acute and long-term care have blurred during the last decade, this paper does not address all the issues related to services required by elders with chronic illness and disabilities; its examination of managed care and integration of services, for instance, is limited to their implications for the development of long-term care policy and delivery systems. This paper does not offer recommendations or prescriptions for an ideal system. It is meant instead as a catalyst for dialogue and debate among policymakers, providers, and consumers at all levels.


Defining Long-Term Health Care

"Long-term care" is not easy to define. The boundaries among primary, acute, and long-term care have blurred. Instead of concentrating on acute care in hospitals as before, our health system is increasingly devoted to chronic care by various providers in various settings.

In acute care, physicians, nurses, and insurance companies choose and deliver treatment. Long-term care concentrates on helping individuals to function as well as possible; it demands intense involvement by family members, particularly wives and adult daughters, as providers and decision-makers. Families are often equal beneficiaries of long-term care interventions, because the care for the elderly person who is disabled is an important respite for the family caregiver (Stone and Kemper, 1989).

Long-term care encompasses a broad range of help with daily activities that chronically disabled individuals need for a prolonged period of time. These primarily low-tech services are designed to minimize, rehabilitate, or compensate for loss of independent physical or mental functioning. The services include assistance with basic activities of daily living (ADLs), such as bathing, dressing, eating, or other personal care. Services may also help with instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), including household chores like meal preparation and cleaning; life management such as shopping, money management, and medication management; and transportation. The services include hands-on and stand-by or supervisory human assistance; assistive devices such as canes and walkers; and technology such as computerized medication reminders and emergency alert systems that warn family members and others when an elder with a disability fails to respond. They also include home modifications like building ramps and the installation of grab bars and door handles that are easy to use.

Relationship between Acute and Long-term Care

Long-term care needs emerge from chronic medical conditions that occur at birth or during developmental stages, such as arthritis, diabetes, dementia, cerebral palsy, and prolonged mental illness, or that result from accidents that cause conditions like traumatic brain injury and paraplegia. Long-term care is not merely an extension of acute care. Because it continues at length and mainly involves low-tech supportive services, it becomes an integral part of the life of the elder with a disability (Kane et al., 1998).

People who need long-term care also require primary care and acute care when they are sick, but these temporary, episodic services focus on curing an illness or restoring an individual to a previous state of better health. Feder and Lambrew (1996) found that among the five million Medicare beneficiaries with substantial long-term care needs, as measured by limitations in three or more ADLs, average Medicare expenditures in 1993 were $8,960 compared with $2,835 for beneficiaries without substantial long-term care needs. Fifty-one percent of the expenditures were for inpatient hospital care, 28 percent for physician and outpatient visits, and 21 percent for skilled nursing facility and home health care. The predominant strategy in long-term care is to integrate treatment and living for elders with functional disabilities––not to undervalue health care for those getting long-term care, but to incorporate health care into the context of the functions of daily life (Kane et al., 1998).

One reason for the blurred boundaries between long-term care and various stages of medical care-acute, post-acute, and subacute––is the confounding of settings with services. (Post-acute care is care directly after a hospital intervention; subacute refers to a vague treatment modality that may bypass hospitals altogether or that focuses on longer-term rehabilitation, ventilation care, and the like.) More and more acute care and high-tech rehabilitation formerly provided in hospitals is being provided in nonhospital settings traditionally used for long-term care, such as skilled nursing facilities, and private homes. It is difficult to know where medically oriented care stops and long-term care begins. Should medical interventions such as intravenous drug therapy, ventilator assistance, and wound care that are delivered in a nursing facility, residential care facility, or the home be considered acute care, subacute care, or long-term care? Should medication management for elders with chronic disabilities, including the administration of injections and the monitoring of adverse drug interactions, be considered long-term care or ongoing medical care? Hospitals still provide long-term care for some patients; as Kane et al. (1998) have noted, perhaps they should do so more often.

Fragmented funding adds to the confusion. Medicaid is the primary public payer for long-term care, particularly in nursing homes, and Medicare is the major payer for acute care. Because services follow funding, a given category has tended to be defined by the reimbursement mechanism rather than by the goals of the care, the skills it requires, or the characteristics of the recipients.

The Role of Residence in Long-Term Care

In long-term care, unlike acute care, housing conditions are as essential as services. The place where people live, including the physical and social environment, can greatly enhance or impede a person's functional disability, independence, and quality of life. Nursing home policies explicitly recognize the residential needs of the long-term care population by including room and board, as well as care, in their costs. The importance of housing is less clear in home- and community-based policies. Housing conditions are often overlooked when care is delivered in an elder's own residence, although there is increasing recognition that home modifications may help keep individuals in the community and reduce their need for formal services. But while housing is crucial to the development of residential care, there is tremendous variation in the extent to which services are integrated with housing needs.

In defining long-term care, then, several points are worth emphasizing:

Care Settings

Long-term care is provided in a range of settings, depending on the recipient's needs and preferences, the availability of informal support, and the source of reimbursement. Much gerontological literature refers to a continuum of care, identifying the nursing home as the most restrictive and one's own home as the least restrictive setting in the spectrum. The literature also stresses the appropriateness of a setting, assuming that a mechanism exists for judiciously matching the individual and setting. The "continuum" and "appropriateness" paradigms have been challenged (Kane et al., 1998; Stone, 1999) by those who argue that services can be delivered in any one of many settings, depending on a constellation of individual, familial, and policy factors. One's own home can be as restrictive as a nursing home, if an individual is homebound and is not getting the services that would facilitate some independence. In theory, a home-like atmosphere can be created in any environment, including the nursing home. Furthermore, "appropriateness" is subjective and should not be invoked to prevent individuals from making their own choices, which are often paramount to them.

Among the care silos that have been created primarily by reimbursement policy, the nursing home––or nursing facility, as it is referred to by Medicare and Medicaid––is the major institutional setting for long-term care. In 1996, there were 16,706 certified nursing facilities in the United States with an estimated 1.8 million beds (AARP, 1998a). A small number of people are receiving care in other institutions, such as long-term care hospitals and psychiatric facilities.

"Home and community-based care" is a catch-all phrase that refers to a wide variety of noninstitutional long-term care settings, ranging from various types of congregate living arrangements to recipients' own homes. One category of home and community-based care, residential care, includes assisted living facilities, board and care, and adult foster homes. The boundaries between institutional and noninstitutional environments are far from clear. Many assisted living and board and care facilities are large buildings that strongly resemble hotels or nursing homes in physical appearance and philosophy. Other residential care options are small, homey settings that offer privacy and choice to residents. Some make services available to disabled residents either directly or through contracts; many, however, are long on room and board and short on care.

In contrast to nursing homes, which are licensed and regulated by the federal government because they receive significant Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, residential care is handled by state and local jurisdictions. Consequently, there is no consensus on the definition of "residential care"; the nomenclature, as well as the nature and scope of services, varies tremendously (Mollica, 1998). One recent national study of assisted living reported an estimated 11,472 facilities with approximately 650,500 beds and 558,400 residents at the beginning of 1998 (Hawes et al., 1999). The definition of "assisted living" in this study includes facilities that have 11 or more beds; serve a primarily elderly population; provide 24-hour oversight, housekeeping, and at least two meals a day; and supply personal assistance with at least two of the following activities: taking medications, bathing, and dressing.

Residential care tends to be regarded as an option for individuals who may not require nursing home assistance but who can no longer remain in their own homes. It is seen as a substitute for living at home and as the next step in a downward trajectory toward nursing home placement. However, states such as Oregon and Washington have been using residential care as an alternative to nursing homes; substantial numbers of elders with severe disabilities have been relocated or placed in assisted living or adult foster homes.

Several forms of adult day care have been established to meet the needs of the elderly long-term care population and their families. The most common form is adult day care, in which elders with moderate disabilities receive supervision and personal care, as well as social integration and companionship in a group setting, usually during the work week from nine to five. A limited number of programs also operate on weekends, and a few are experimenting with evening and night hours. While adult day care serves both physically and cognitively impaired elders, a disproportionate number of people with Alzheimer's disease and other dementias use this option. It has been an important source of respite for family caregivers who would otherwise struggle to maintain their elderly relatives at home. A less common, and more intensive, form of adult day care is the day health model. It combines primary care with long-term care and is used by elders with significant disabilities who often have multiple co-morbidities such as diabetes, heart disease, and stroke. The Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE), which will be described later in this paper, builds its program around the adult day health model.

Most elderly people with long-term care needs live at home, either in their own homes, with or without a spouse, or in the home of a close relative such as a daughter. In this setting, care may be defined as "home health care," which includes some skilled nursing and supervised custodial care, and "home care," which includes personal services like bathing, dressing, and toileting as well as housework such as meal preparation and laundry.

Who Needs and Uses Long-Term Care?

The long-term care population is diverse in terms of age and level of disability. Of the estimated 12.8 million Americans reporting long-term care needs in 1995, as measured by the need for assistance with ADLs or IADLs, 57 percent were over the age of 65. Another 40 percent were adults below that age, and 3 percent were children (National Academy on Aging, 1997). Among the 229 million Americans under the age of 65, only 0.1 percent were institutional residents and 2 percent were living in the community with limitations in either ADLs or IADLs (Figure 1; Komisar et al., 1996). In contrast, among the 34 million elderly in 1995, 5 percent were nursing home residents and 12 percent were living in the community with ADL or IADL limitations. Functional limitations increase substantially with age, particularly for the oldest old. Among those aged 85 and over, 21 percent were in nursing homes in 1995 and another 49 percent were community residents with long-term care needs (Figure 2; Alecxih, 1997a).



The prevalence of dementia and other forms of cognitive impairment is difficult to assess. Many cognitively impaired individuals manifest limitations in ADLS or IADLs, but these limitations do not represent the entire cognitively disabled population. A 1996 consensus panel organized by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research concluded that the rate of moderate to severe dementia is about 2 percent in people aged 65-69, 4 percent in people aged 70-74, 8 percent in people aged 75-79, and 16 percent in people over 85. Researchers analyzing data from the 1994 National Long-Term Care Survey (NLTCS) have reported that almost one million elders are severely cognitively impaired by Alzheimer's disease or another form of dementia (ASPE and AoA, 1998). A smaller study of older people in East Boston, using less restrictive criteria, concluded that 10 percent of the population over 65 and 47 percent of the population over 85 had some degree of dementia (Costa et al., 1996).

The proportion of people aged 65 and older who stay overnight in nursing homes fell by more than 8 percent from 1985 to 1995 (Bishop, 1999). The decline was most striking for those over age 85, a population comprising more than half the total elderly nursing home population. This decline may result from (1) a decline in overall disability rates among the elderly; (2) the increase in Medicare home health use from 5 to 9 percent between 1985 and 1995; and (3) the increased use of assisted living as a substitute for nursing home placement.

Preliminary analyses comparing samples of elderly nursing home residents from the 1987 National Medical Expenditures Survey and the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Study (Spillman et al., 1997) suggest important changes in the characteristics of this population over that period. The population in 1996 is older: the proportion of those 85 and older increased from 43.5 percent in 1987 to 49.3 percent in 1996. Nursing home residents are also more likely than before to be married––13.3 percent in 1987 and 16.7 percent in 1996. The institutionalized elderly tended to be more severely disabled: 33.3 percent had five ADL limitations in the earlier study and more than 50 percent in the later one. In addition, the population appears to be more cognitively impaired: a much lower proportion of the 1996 cohort recognized staff, and a much higher proportion had difficulty making decisions compared to the 1987 nursing home residents.

Approximately 81 percent of the elderly with ADL or IADL impairments live in the community. They tend to be much less disabled than those in nursing homes (Alecxih, 1997a). Sixty percent are disabled only in IADLs. Approximately 17 percent are considered severely disabled, with limitations in three or more ADLs. According to recent unpublished data from the 1994 NLTCS, 37 percent of ADL-impaired elderly people living in the community report that they need help but do not receive it or receive less help than necessary (Jackson & Doty, 1997). The vast majority of this group are people with unmet IADL needs, particularly in the areas of meal preparation, outdoor mobility, and money management. Only 1.4 percent report unmet ADL needs; another 13.1 percent report undermet ADL needs. Additional comparative analyses of previous waves of the NLTCS indicate that the proportion of elderly people who report that they do not receive the ADL help they need has declined, from 5.2 percent in 1984 to 2.6 percent in 1989 and to 1.4 percent in 1994.

These findings are intriguing because they suggest that most elderly people with long-term care needs believe their needs are being met. It is important to remember, however, that most of the care is being provided "free" by family and friends; as the availability of such caregivers declines in the future, unmet needs may grow. This research also identifies a potential way to direct public dollars toward home and community-based care, particularly when state and local funds are limited. Most state programs now use some type of functional disability trigger to determine eligibility for benefits. If assessment tools could be refined to measure unmet and undermet needs, then funds could be allocated on a priority basis.

While a minority of all elderly people need long-term care at any given time, the need for services rises after age 65. The proportion of elders likely to use nursing homes ranges from 39 percent to 49 percent, depending on the database; estimates of those living in a nursing home for at least two years after age 65 range from 16 percent to 25 percent (Alecxih, 1997a; Murtaugh et al., 1990). One recent simulation model found that elderly persons are more likely to use home care than nursing home care over their remaining lifetime (72 percent versus 49 percent) (Table 1; Alecxih, 1997a). The average lifetime nursing home use per elderly person is one year, and the average home care use is a little over 200 visits. Many users receive care for only short periods, while a small proportion uses substantial amounts of long-term services.

Here again are the key points regarding people who use long-term care:

  • At any given time, slightly more than 10 percent of people over age 65 live in the community and need some degree of long-term care. Another 5 percent are in nursing homes.
  • After age 65, almost half of all Americans will spend some time in a nursing home. Almost three quarters will need some home care.
  • The proportion of elderly people spending one or more nights in a nursing home dropped over the past decade, but those in nursing homes are more cognitively impaired than before.
  • Among elderly people living in the community, more than one in three report unmet or undermet needs, although most of these problems involve the less intense instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) rather than activities of daily living (ADLs).
  • The demand for long-term care increases dramatically with age, underscoring the need to pay special attention to people aged 85 and over.

Who Provides Care?

Much long-term care, in contrast to more medically oriented services, is unpaid assistance provided by family and friends, as already noted. This has been true in the past, and despite the persistent myth of family abandonment fostered by many policymakers, it remains true today. Paid providers include both professional and paraprofessional workers.

Informal Care

The major long-term care provider is the family and, to a lesser extent, other unpaid "informal" caregivers. According to the 1994 National Long-Term Care Survey, more than seven million Americans––mostly family members––provide 120 million hours of unpaid care to elders with functional disabilities living in the community. If these caregivers were paid, the cost would run from $45 billion to $94 billion a year (ASPE and AoA, 1998). The overwhelming majority of noninstitutionalized elders with disabilities––about 95 percent––receive at least some assistance from relatives, friends, and neighbors. Almost 67 percent rely solely on unpaid help, primarily from wives or daughters. As disability increases, elders receive more and more informal care. Eighty-six percent of elders at greatest risk for nursing home placement––those with three or more ADL limitations––live with others and receive about 60 hours of informal care per week, supplemented by a little over 14 hours of paid assistance.

Although statistics are unavailable, we know that many additional relatives assist disabled family members living in nursing homes. Still others engage in long-distance caregiving, arranging for the care of a parent or other relative who lives far away. The importance of an informal support system is underscored by the fact that 50 percent of elderly people with long-term care needs who lack a family network live in nursing homes, compared to only 7 percent of those who do have family caregivers (National Academy on Aging, 1997).

Experts on long-term care typically refer to the person who regularly provides the most assistance as the "primary" informal caregiver. Most elders with disabilities have a primary caregiver who provides the bulk of the care and obtains and coordinates additional help from other, "secondary" caregivers, unpaid and paid. Data from the 1989 Informal Caregivers Survey––the most recent national survey of informal caregivers for the elderly long-term care population––indicate that almost 75 percent of primary caregivers are women (ASPE and AoA, 1998). Thirty-six percent of informal caregivers are adult children. Forty percent are spouses; the prevalence of spousal caregiving increases with the level of the recipient's disability. Other relatives and friends are most often secondary helpers, assuming primary responsibility only when spouses or adult children are not available.

The average age of the informal caregiver is 60. The great majority of primary informal caregivers do not hold paying jobs, either because they have retired or because they belonged to a generation of women who "stayed at home," out of the paid workforce. Among the 31 percent who are in the labor force, 66.6 percent work full time. Employed caregivers provide fewer weekly hours of assistance than nonemployed caregivers, but they still invest, on average, 18 hours per week. They are able to assume the primary caregiver's role by relying on additional unpaid help from other family members and friends and by purchasing care, usually to supplement secondary informal assistance. Even with that supplemental help, employed primary caregivers of elders with severe disabilities––those with three or more ADL limitations––provide between 32 and 39 hours of care per week.

Two-thirds of caregivers with paying jobs report conflicts between jobs and caregiving that caused them to rearrange their work schedules, to work fewer paid hours than they otherwise would have, or to take unpaid leaves of absence from work. Nearly half of female caregivers with part-time paid jobs report working less because of elder care responsibilities. Sixteen percent of caregivers with full-time jobs say that caregiving has caused them to work fewer paid hours than they otherwise would have.

Formal Care Providers

While the physician is the primary health professional in acute care, nurses provide the majority of professional long-term care to the elderly. Physicians are directly involved in long-term care as medical directors of nursing homes or home health agencies; they also are required to sign off on home health care plans. According to the 1996 National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses (RNs), nursing homes or other extended care facilities employed 170,856 registered nurses or 8.1 percent of all RNs (BHPr, 1998). More than 87 percent of RNs working full time in nursing homes serve as head or assistant head nurse, director of nursing, or assistant director of nursing (IOM, 1996). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that 112,217 RNs were employed by home health agencies in 1994 (NAHC, 1997). In addition, 182,110 licensed practical nurses (LPNs) worked in nursing homes in 1994, and another 39,774 LPNs worked in home health care. Although LPNs are not allowed to assess or formally plan for care, they often serve as charge nurses in nursing facilities (IOM, 1996). Their major responsibilities include supervising the care by nursing assistants, passing medications and doing treatments, and monitoring residents' conditions.

Rehabilitation in long-term care is most often supplied by therapists. In 1996 there were approximately 115,000 employed physical therapists (PTs), three-quarters of whom were working full time (BLS, 1999d). According to statistics from the American Physical Therapy Association (1999), almost 11 percent of PTs were working in skilled nursing or extended care facilities, 4 percent in outpatient rehabilitation centers, and 10 percent in home care. Only 314 physical therapists were certified in geriatrics in 1998 (American Physical Therapy Association, 1998). Another 73,000 individuals were working as occupational therapists or assistants in 1996 (BLS, 1999b; BLS, 1999c), with an estimated 29 to 31 percent of them employed in freestanding or hospital-based skilled nursing facilities or related long-term care settings (Shank, 1999).

Most paid providers of long-term care are paraprofessional workers––certified nursing assistants in the nursing home or home care workers who deliver the largest share of the primarily low-tech personal care and the assistance with managing daily life. After unpaid caregivers, these workers are the key to helping elders with disabilities maintain their independence and quality of life. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, an estimated 643,080 nursing assistants were employed in nursing homes in 1994 (IOM, 1996). Estimates of home care aides are more difficult to obtain because many aides are hired privately and may not be included in official statistics; many work part time and may hold more than one job during the same period. The BLS (1999a) reported that approximately 697,000 homemaker-home health aides were employed by home health agencies, hospitals, and others in 1996.

Not surprisingly, the majority of paraprofessionals are women. In 1997, an estimated 89.4 percent of nursing aides were female (BLS, 1998a). A 1995 survey of home care workers reported that 96 percent of those employed by agencies, and 100 percent of the self-employed, were female (Leon and Franco, 1998). Nursing home aides tend to be younger than home care aides, with mean ages of 36.6 years and 46.7 years, respectively (Crown et al., 1995). The main points regarding providers are these:


Long-Term Care Financing

Financing is the first element of the triple knot that also includes delivery and workforce preparation. Long-term care costs make up a small but growing proportion of personal health care expenditures, having increased from less than 4 percent in 1960 to more than 11 percent in 1993 (Alecxih, 1997b). The financing of long-term care services is a patchwork of funds from the federal, state, and local levels and private dollars, primarily paid from the consumer's own pocket.

In 1995, approximately $106.5 billion was spent on long-term care. Public resources accounted for 57.4 percent of it. The largest part of public funds, 37.8 percent, came from Medicaid (including 21.1 percent federal and 16.7 percent state dollars). Medicare paid 17.8 percent. Other federal and state funds supplied lesser amounts (e.g., Veterans Affairs, Older Americans Act, Social Services Block Grant, state general assistance). Private insurance accounted for only 5.5 percent of the expenditures, with one out of three of those dollars attributable to out-of-pocket expenses (Figure 3; National Academy on Aging, 1997). These estimates do not place a dollar value on the vast amount of unpaid care, including the value of wages forgone by caregivers (Stone and Short, 1990). One recent study reported that $196 billion a year is contributed to the U.S. health and long-term care systems by familyand friends who provide care at home to people of all ages with chronic disabilities (Arno et al., 1999).


Medicaid

Medicaid, the federal/state health insurance program for the poor, is the major public program covering long-term care for the elderly and for disabled people of all ages. Despite the public's tremendous interest in, and demand for, care in the home, Medicaid continues to exhibit a strong bias toward institutional services. Of the almost $50 billion that Medicaid spent on long-term care services in 1995, $40 billion supported nursing homes and institutions for the mentally retarded (intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded, or ICF-MRs); only $9.9 billion paid for home and community-based care. Even so, the home and community-based care sector has grown tremendously. While total Medicaid spending for long-term care increased by just 8.6 percent between 1993 and 1994, Medicaid waivers for noninstitutional spending on home and community-based care and personal care grew by 26 percent.

In contrast to the large federal role in financing acute care for the elderly, the states are major financiers of long-term care. There are wide variations among states, and within individual states, in funding for institutional, home, and community-based care. Montana had the highest Medicaid nursing home expenditures per capita in 1994, Arizona the lowest. Arizona also had the lowest per capita expenditures for home and community-based care, New York the highest (Graves and Bectel, 1996). In fact, 35 percent of all Medicaid spending on home care in the United States in 1995 occurred in New York (Kenney et al., 1998).

While the bias toward nursing homes prevails in most states, there have been significant efforts to expand the options of home and community-based care. Besides overall increases in home care spending, several states, notably Oregon and Washington, have explicitly recognized nursing homes as the setting of last resort, and have intentionally reduced the number of nursing home beds; in Oregon the ratio declined from 47 beds per 1000 elderly in 1982 to 35 per 1000 elderly in 1995. Having had an aggressive home and community-based care policy since the early 1980s, Oregon has successfully placed many elders with serious disabilities and younger people with disabilities in alternative assisted living facilities and adult foster homes. Oregon also supports a strong case management program that allows many beneficiaries with disabilities to remain in their own homes.

In addition to the federal Medicaid dollars that states match, and the relatively modest sums available for personal care through the Older Americans Act and the Social Services Block Grant, many states augment or create their own separate programs with state funds. Pennsylvania and New Jersey, for example, have relatively large home and community-based care programs, which are supported mainly by lottery revenues. A number of local communities have also been successful in raising funds for long-term care services. In the Cincinnati area, Hamilton County, Ohio, supports elderly people with disabilities through a county levy enacted under the leadership of the local area agency on aging (AAA) (Council on Aging of the Cincinnati Area, 1997). In 1997, the AAA's Elderly Services Program spent $17 million for homemaker services, personal care, home-delivered meals, case management, adult day care, and transportation for frail elderly people living in 88 neighborhoods throughout Hamilton County. This AAA convinced elderly and nonelderly citizens that the levy for long-term care services was necessary, given continuing cuts in federal funds, and that the dollars would benefit the entire community.

Medicare

Medicare has not been considered a major payer for long-term care. Many observers have argued that elderly people are unprepared for long-term care expenses because they believe that Medicare will cover them. In reality, Medicare primarily covers acute care costs. Its skilled nursing facility and home health care benefits are intended as short-term coverage for post-acute care following a beneficiary's hospitalization. However, the belief that Medicare covers long-term care has more validity now than in the past. Through a series of regulatory and administrative changes since 1989, Medicare has come to support more long-term, nonskilled personal care (Komisar and Feder, 1998).

Medicare spending for home health services increased nearly tenfold between 1987 and 1995 (Kenney et al., 1998). A lawsuit and administrative changes in 1989 led to lower denial rates and more liberal interpretations of definitions (like "homebound") and scope of services (like management and evaluation) by fiscal intermediaries––regional contractors for the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA, the agency that oversees Medicare and the federal part of Medicaid) who review and approve or deny all Medicare claims submitted by providers. Most of the growth in spending is attributed to an increase in the number of visits, particularly by home health aides––the low-tech, personal services usually regarded as long-term care. Komisar and Feder (1998) estimated that visits per beneficiary represented 49 percent of the growth in Medicare's home health spending between 1990 and 1996 (Figure 4). Furthermore, the 10 percent of Medicare home health users who received more than 200 or more visits in 1994 were responsible for 43 percent of that year's spending on home health care (Figure 5). The length of home health care service has increased substantially, with a small but growing proportion of users receiving continuous care for two years or more. Recent research has found that these beneficiaries tend to be more ADL-disabled, and to receive more unskilled, home health aide visits, than beneficiaries receiving short-lived services after an acute care episode (Komisar and Feder, 1998).

These findings support the contention by some policymakers that a small but expensive subpopulation of Medicare home health users are receiving long-term care through this program. It is difficult, however, to ascertain from the data how many of these individuals also need skilled nursing that truly warrants home health coverage. It is possible that the need for home health care has shifted since Medicare began in 1965 and that more elderly people with chronic disabilities coming out of hospitals require more unskilled personal care than in the past.

There is also some evidence to suggest that providers participating in Medicaid home care programs are being encouraged by states to help their clients become eligible for Medicare home health benefits in order to reduce state costs for long-term care; states are responsible for part of the Medicaid payment, while Medicare uses federal funds alone (Kenney et al., 1998). New York and Minnesota have explicit Medicare "maximization" policies. Medicare maximization was documented by a series of case studies in which state officials acknowledged that they were under budgetary pressure to help elderly Medicaid clients become eligible for Medicare home health benefits (Kenney et al., 1998). In many southern states, there is strong evidence of maximization; in Mississippi and Tennessee, total Medicare spending on home health care in 1995 was, respectively, 31 times and 36 times higher than Medicaid spending on home and community-based care. This maximization, however, is more likely to be caused by for-profit home health agencies than by the behavior of state officials.

Congress and the Clinton Administration responded to the huge growth in Medicare home health spending by enacting provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that significantly reduced Medicare payments to home health agencies; implemented an interim payment system, with a new payment system for reimbursement scheduled for 2000; and cracked down on fraud and abuse. Public policymakers chose to address the "problem" by trying to retain the post-acute nature of the home health benefit through significant restructuring of reimbursement. Like others, I believe that the federal government may have gone too far in its quest to "rein in" home health agencies. Many home health agencies, particularly the nonprofits, have closed due to insufficient funds to serve their clients. The ultimate loser in this policy decision may be the elderly with disabilities who need long-term as well as post-acute care.

Medicare spending has also increased for subacute care, a vague category between acute and long-term care. There is no consensus about the definition of "subacute." Proponents describe it as a set of intensive, coordinated treatments and services provided to post-acute care patients in order to minimize or even avoid expensive hospital stays; proponents see subacute care as an innovative service delivery mechanism. Critics consider it a marketing strategy by sophisticated providers trying to repackage traditional post-acute care services supplied by a skilled nursing facility, rehabilitation facility, or home health service (Harvell, 1997). "Subacute" may refer to certain types of services, like rehabilitation (Singleton, 1993); to patients, like those who no longer require acute services (Hyatt, 1993); or to levels of services between acute hospital care and skilled nursing care (Gonzales, 1994).

Medicare spending in nursing facilities increased substantially between 1990 and 1993, from 22 per 1000 beneficiaries to 31 per 1000 beneficiaries (Alecxih, 1997a). Gage et al. (1997) found that increased Medicare expenditures for these services resulted in part from administrative and legislative changes and in part from subacute care for medically complex patients in nonacute care settings. The question remains whether subacute care is an innovative practice somewhere between acute hospital care and skilled nursing care or, as Manard et al. (1995) concluded after a series of case studies, strategic repackaging––"old wine in new bottles."

Private Long-Term Care Insurance

Private long-term care insurance pays only a small part of the bill. In 1995, such insurance covered less than 6 percent of nursing home and home care costs (National Academy on Aging, 1997). The market has grown over the past decade; the total number of policies sold increased from 800,000 in 1987 to almost five million in 1996. A 1997 survey by the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), a trade organization, indicated that the number of policies purchased increased by more than 600,000 in 1996 alone, the largest number of long-term care policies ever sold in one year (Coronel, 1998). The estimated total of five million, however, is the cumulative number of policies ever sold. The number in force is a fraction of those sold and could be even smaller, given the high lapse rate seen in this industry.

The HIAA survey reported some fluctuation in the number of companies marketing long-term care products, with 120 insurers selling long-term care policies by the end of 1996 (Coronel, 1998). By the end of that year, approximately 80 percent of the five million long-term care policies that had been sold were individual policies. About 33.3 percent of the 1996 insurers sold policies either through employer groups or as part of a life insurance package, up from 14 percent in 1988. These two types of insurance products represented 20 percent of all long-term care policies sold as of 1996, up from less than 3 percent in 1988.

Long-term care insurance markets vary widely across the country. The 1997 HIAA survey reported that by the end of 1996, half of all individual policies had been sold in only nine states: California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Market penetration rates, as measured by the number of policies sold to people aged 65 or over in each state, were highest in Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Washington.

Twelve companies sold about 80 percent of all individual and group association policies in 1996. All leading insurers offered plans that cover nursing homes, home health care, adult day care, respite care, and alternative care services. Ten of the 12 top sellers also offered a separate assisted living facility benefit. These companies offered plans with an annual 5 percent compounded inflation rate and with a nonforfeiture benefit; that is, plans that pay some benefits even if the policy lapsed because of an individual's failure to pay premiums. The average annual premium for basic long-term care insurance, covering four years of nursing home or home health care beginning after the first 20 days of care, purchased at age 65 was $980; the premium rose to $1,321 with nonforfeiture protection, to $1,829 with 5 percent compounded inflation protection, and to $2,432 with both additional protections.

Controversy has raged around private long-term care insurance for the last decade. The private sector argues that public programs will never meet the demand. Consumers and regulators express concern about high premiums and fraudulent marketing practices. It is somewhat academic to argue about the proportion of income or assets people will, or should, spend for long-term care insurance (Friedland, 1990). One estimate suggests that a single person ought to have at least $40,000 in liquid assets to consider purchasing insurance (Polniaszek, 1997). A recent Consumer Reports article suggests that only about 10 to 20 percent of the elderly can afford long-term care insurance and notes that premiums for two "adequate" policies bought at age 65 cost $3,500 per year, or 13 percent of the median annual income of elderly married couples ("How Will You Pay for Your Old Age?" 1997). Whether this is a high or low proportion of a couple's annual expenditures depends on how much money the couple has and what else they must buy.

Many observers have suggested that private long-term care insurance might play a major role in financing these services only if an employer-based group market develops, in which policies are sold to younger people. Premiums for LTC insurance sold through employers are lower than those sold as individual products because (1) employers can market to younger people; (2) costs for administration and agents' commissions are lower; and (3) employers might use bargaining power to reduce insurers' profit percentages. Employer-based products also offer less stringent screening criteria or eliminate screening entirely. Furthermore, a group market offers increased ease and comfort of purchase due to fewer coverage decisions required.

According to the 1997 HIAA survey, 1,532 employers were offering long-term care insurance to their employees and retirees by the end of 1996, up from seven in 1988 and 1,260 in 1995. More than 500 employer-sponsored plans were introduced in 1995 and 1996.

Preliminary findings from a recent study of 39 employers representing 900,000 employees indicate that most employers required less stringent medical underwriting criteria or guaranteed coverage, at least to current full-time employees (Lutzky et al., 1999). Most also offered coverage to at least one group in addition to current full-time workers, like parents or in-laws, spouses, and retired employees. Nearly all employers used a single long-term care insurer. Most offered no more than three options for benefit amounts. All employers surveyed offered inflation protection. Just over half offered some type of nonforfeiture benefit. All but two of the employers surveyed required the employee to pay the entire premium.

One interesting experiment in combining public and private policies is the Partnership for Long-Term Care, a demonstration program sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to promote the development of private funding sources for long-term care (Cohen, 1997; McCall, 1997). The Partnership, implemented in four states––California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York––uses private insurance to cover the initial costs of long-term care (Meiners and McKay, 1989); Medicaid pays for services after private insurance coverage is exhausted. Two models have been developed: a Dollar-for-Dollar Disregard model in California, Connecticut, and Indiana and a Total Asset Disregard model in New York. In the first model, consumers purchase private insurance coverage equal to the amount of assets they wish to protect. When the private benefits are exhausted, those assets are disregarded in determining eligibility for Medicaid. The New York model requires that consumers purchase three years of private nursing home or six years of home care coverage, and all of the insured's assets are protected once the private benefits have been exhausted.

One major limitation of this demonstration program––and of the development of the private long-term insurance market as a whole––is the time lag between the purchase of a policy and the filing of a claim. Consequently, the Partnership demonstration has yet to obtain empirical evidence of its successes or failures. But interesting information on the purchasers of these products is already available (McCall et al., 1997). Partnership purchasers were older, had smaller families, and were much more highly educated than the comparison sample of individuals aged 55 to 75 who were not covered by Medicaid. They were also more likely to be female, white, in reportedly good or excellent health, and in a relatively high income bracket. The Partnership sample was also more likely than the comparison group to disagree with the statement "Medicare currently provides sufficient coverage for long-term care" and was much less likely to believe that government will pay for long-term care if they need it in the future. This study identified the Partnership purchasers as a self-reliant group, whose decisions to purchase insurance were based upon the desire to maintain independence and preserve income and choice, rather than upon a desire to leave an inheritance.

This discussion of long-term care financing in the United States underscores the complicated, confusing nature of our fragmented system:

  • Long-term care financing is a patchwork of public and private dollars. More than one-third (37 percent) of the $106.5 billion spent on long-term care is paid by the consumer.
  • The value of informal caregiving, worth $45 to $95 billion annually, is not included in the estimates of long-term care costs.
  • Private insurance pays a small fraction of long-term costs. Without significant growth in a group market, it is unlikely ever to cover more than a small population.
  • Medicaid is the primary public payer for long-term care. Despite expanded coverage of home and community-based services, it remains biased in favor of institutions.
  • Due to the blurring of the lines between acute care and long-term care, such as home health care and subacute care, and efforts by states to substitute federal dollars for their own, Medicare now pays more of the costs than before. The extent to which this trend will continue is uncertain, given the changes in reimbursement for Medicare home health and skilled nursing facility care under the 1997 Balanced Budget Act and a federal crackdown on fraud and abuse.


Long-Term Care Delivery

Policymakers, practitioners, and consumers recognize the dual, and sometimes conflicting, needs to finance long-term care while maintaining or improving the quality of care. These two objectives have contributed to several trends in the delivery of care that have important implications for the new century, when aging baby boomers will probably increase the demand for an array of services.

Integration of Acute and Long-Term Care Services

A number of initiatives at the federal, state, and provider levels seek to manage acute and long-term care by integrating services in various ways. There is no consensus on the definition of "integration." Some people insist funding as well as delivery must be integrated. Others argue that the goal of integration is to coordinate all services in order to meet the broad needs of individuals and their families (Stone and Katz, 1996).
Most observers agree that integrated services demand the following elements:

  • broad and flexible benefits, including primary, acute, and long-term care;
  • far-reaching delivery systems that go beyond traditional hospital, physician, and post-acute services to community-based long-term care, care management, and specialty providers;
  • adoption of mechanisms that actually integrate care, such as care management and care planning protocols, interdisciplinary care teams, centralized records, and integrated information systems;
  • overarching quality-control systems with a single point of accountability; and
  • flexible funding with incentives to integrate funding streams and minimize cost shifting (Booth et al., 1997).

Despite the rhetoric of integration, the dearth of experimentation and successful innovation is not surprising. A primary barrier to integration of acute and long-term care is the fragmentation of funding sources, particularly Medicare and Medicaid. While a single source of financing is not essential, integration is impeded when providers lack financial incentives to develop a package of services in various settings that meets the needs of the elderly person with disabilities. Furthermore, Medicare and Medicaid have different eligibility requirements and coverage rules that may impede the development of a rational plan of care for a disabled person who needs acute and long-term care.

A second barrier is the fear of financial risk on the part of plans and providers involved in integrating acute and long-term care. There is no valid and reliable risk-adjustment methodology, or other technique, to ensure that payments will cover the costs of providing care to people with chronic illness and disability. The 1997 Balanced Budget Act attempted to stimulate the Medicare managed care market by introducing Medicare+Choice. But the availability and diversity of managed care options have not expanded. On the contrary, HMOs have been cutting back on attractive benefits, such as prescription drug coverage and plans with no premiums. There are numerous reports of plans leaving many Medicare markets. Given these trends, managed care plans are unlikely to offer long-term care benefits to their enrollees.

Perhaps the most neglected barrier is the lack of knowledge, information, and training that health and long-term care providers need in order to offer, coordinate, and manage an array of services. There is no recognized authority in our current health care system for managing care across time, place, and profession, and little acknowledgment that individuals with chronic disabilities shift among physicians, hospitals, nursing homes, and their own homes. Acute and post-acute care providers generally do not communicate with long-term care providers, even though an elderly person may be getting services from both sectors. The absence of management information systems and patient databases that span time and place is another obstacle to the integration of acute and long-term care.

Federal Demonstrations

Most of the research on integration of acute and long-term care has been conducted through several federal demonstration projects. The Social HMO (SHMO), which began in 1985, adds community care services and short-term nursing home care to a Medicare-HMO acute care plan. Under this program, a broad cross-section of people eligible for Medicare receive acute care and limited community-based long-term care coverage. The Program of All Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) is a publicly funded approach to long-term care for frail elders who are eligible for Medicaid and nursing home certifiable. This program began as a demonstration project funded by HCFA and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to replicate an integrated model of care in San Francisco's Chinatown called On-Lok. The distinguishing features of PACE are: (1) integrated funding and providers' financial risk through capitated Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements; (2) integrated service delivery with adult day care as the focal point; (3) case management through interdisciplinary care teams, from the physician to the van driver; and (4) a vigorous attempt to keep individuals in community care and out of nursing homes (Branch et al., 1995; Cohen, 1997).

The findings from these demonstrations have been equivocal at best, despite their long history (Newcomer et al., 1995a; Wiener and Skaggs, 1995). Researchers have pointed out the failure of the first generation of SHMOs to integrate services by acute and long-term care providers (Manton et al., 1994). Gruenberg et al. (1993), who compared PACE enrollee costs with a national sample of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries, found that PACE provides Medicare with a 9 percent to 34 percent saving, depending on the analytical assumptions and sites selected. Shen (1993) has shown that inpatient hospital use rates for frail elderly PACE enrollees are much lower than a comparable frail population. But others have referred to PACE as a "boutique" model that has tended to serve an average of 200 clients per site and that may have engaged in client "skimming" (Branch et al., 1995).

At the same time, these models are intuitively appealing and have helped shed light on better ways to coordinate care across a broad range of services and systems. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 makes PACE a permanent Medicare provider; many state officials, often without much empirical evidence, have expressed the desire to create systems like PACE in their own communities. HCFA is currently supporting a second generation of SHMOs designed to improve on the first generation (Kane et al., 1997). Rather than controlling for adverse selection by proportional enrollment at various disability levels, the new models will establish reimbursement rates based on an individual's impairment and illness profile at the time of enrollment and annually thereafter. In addition, the new generation will establish geriatric health programs for all enrollees, not just those with long-term care needs. This demonstration will focus on coordinating acute care with a set of flexible, user-friendly, efficient long-term care services.

The EverCare model of managed care for nursing home residents, originally a subsidiary of the United Health Care Corporation, also shows promise for an integrated approach to serving the institutionalized population. Through Medicare and Medicaid waivers, HCFA is currently testing this model in nine sites. The program enrolls nursing home residents in a risk-based HMO, with the nursing home costs covered by Medicaid or private insurance. Teams of geriatricians and nurse practitioners provide more intensive primary care services than usual to nursing home residents, and coordinate this care with the long-term care services provided by nurses and nurses' assistants. Because EverCare pays for all medical services incurred by the nursing home resident, regardless of the site where they are delivered, there is no incentive for the nursing home provider to shift costs to Medicare by hospitalizing a resident. The intent is to maintain enrollees' health and functioning, to treat enrollees holistically, and to prevent medical crises that could lead to unnecessary hospitalizations (Shield, 1996). While no HCFA evaluations have been completed yet, the program appears to save money by shortening the length of hospital stays and paying the nursing homes for the additional costs associated with caring for residents who would otherwise be hospitalized (Malone et al., 1993). Nursing homes participate because they see the marketing advantage in the improved, coordinated health care their residents receive (Kane et al., 1998).

State Initiatives

Motivated by escalating Medicaid budgets and growing numbers of aged, blind, and disabled enrollees, many states have expressed interest in the integration of acute and long-term care. They are particularly concerned about their "dual eligible" population––those eligible for Medicare and Medicaid who account for about 17 percent of the states' Medicaid enrollees and 30 to 35 percent of program expenditures (Booth et al., 1997). As of 1995, 19 states had some type of integration initiative. Several are experimenting with innovative financing and service delivery of acute and long-term care for elderly people on Medicaid and younger people with disabilities. Arizona's long-term care system is part of a mandatory Medicaid managed care program begun in the late 1980s. Medicaid acute, long-term, and behavioral health services are included in the Arizona package, but Medicare funding is not explicitly integrated into the program. The program, however, implicitly achieves a degree of integration at the contractor level, because Medicare services are usually delivered through the organization that provides the capitated long-term care services; Medicare reimburses the contractor on a fee-for-service basis.

Minnesota was the first state to receive Medicare and Medicaid waivers to explicitly integrate acute and long-term care for elders eligible for both programs in seven counties in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. The Minnesota Senior Health Options (MSHO) program offers package of acute and long-term services through a choice of three managed care plans, with voluntary enrollment. Plans pay for the first 180 days of nursing home costs and then are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis with the plan continuing to provide all services. MSHO includes financial incentives for plans to use home and community-based care in lieu of institutional services.

Texas Star+Plus has enrolled 60,000 aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries, including 31,000 people eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, into one of three managed care plans in the Houston area. Two have established Medicare risk mechanisms. Medicaid enrollment is mandatory; beneficiaries may also choose to receive their Medicare coverage through one of the two Medicare risk plans participating in this pilot project. As an incentive to enroll in the full acute and long-term care package, they will receive an unlimited prescription drug benefit.

The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and HCFA are sponsoring evaluations of these programs and demonstrations in other states, but the results of these studies will not be available for some time. Meanwhile, the rhetoric of integration will continue, as policymakers, providers, and researchers struggle to implement the details.

Provider Initiatives

Despite the lack of financial incentives to integrate a continuum of care for elders with chronic disabilities, a number of providers are attempting to create integrated service systems. The motivation is not purely altruistic, although these providers do, for the most part, represent organizations and health professionals that have traditionally cared for the elderly and that understand the need to coordinate and manage care. There are also strong market incentives to develop such systems. Hospitals trying to fill beds, and skilled nursing facilities looking to expand beyond traditional long-term care, see integration as a way to develop business. Hospitals are integrating vertically––buying nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, and home health agencies––in an effort to become an all-purpose provider in the community. Skilled nursing facilities and, to a lesser extent, home health agencies, are more likely to be integrating horizontally––building alliances with hospitals, physicians' groups, assisted living developers, and other community-based providers.

The National Chronic Care Consortium (NCCC) is a strategic alliance of 31 nonprofit health systems in the United States and Canada that share a vision of integrated care for individuals with chronic health conditions and disabilities. The NCCC aims to enable member organizations to serve as laboratories for establishing chronic care networks. Networks are defined as "a set of primary, acute and long-term care providers in a given community committed to working together to collectively prevent, delay, and reduce the progression of disability associated with serious and disabling chronic conditions." To achieve this goal, the NCCC advocates the creation of integrated administration, information, financing, and care management arrangements to help providers work together in minimizing costs while maximizing the long-term health and well-being of the population being served.

One of the major contributions by the NCCC is the development of the Self-Assessment for Systems Integration (SASI) tool, a set of guidebooks and training materials supported by a grant from the John A. Hartford Foundation. SASI identifies nine key objectives essential for chronic care integration and addresses these objectives through sections on goal-setting, planning, self-measurement, and resources. To date, SASI has been used internally by selected NCCC members to assess their progress toward integration. No evaluations have been published, so it is difficult to assess SASI's effectiveness. The NCCC intends to market this package to provider groups interested in developing integrated systems, but SASI has not yet been used by non-NCCC members.

Assisted Living

Another trend that is attracting attention from policymakers, private developers, and consumers is assisted living. One significant problem with this trend is the lack of a consistent definition used by providers, regulators, and policymakers. Some argue that "assisted living" is just a '90s label for a long-term care setting that has been around for centuries––another example of "old wine in new bottles." Homes for the aged, frequently associated with nonprofit fraternal and religious organizations, proliferated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to supply room and board for poor, infirm elderly people. Over the past three decades, sporadic attention has focused on scandalous mistreatment of residents in board and care homes, a version of homes for the aged that also became a refuge for the people with chronic mental illness in response to the deinstitutionalization frenzy of the 1960s.

In the 1980s the term "residential care facility" became fashionable as a catch-all label for places providing room, board, and some level of protective oversight. Hawes et al. (1993) have estimated that about a half million people live in residential care facilities or board and care homes in the United States. Perhaps twice that number are living in unlicensed facilities (Newcomer et al., 1997).

It is somewhat ironic that homes for the aged, board and care homes, and other types of residential care were replaced in the late 1960s and 1970s by nursing homes modeled after hospitals. "Nursing homes" have delivered far less nursing care than the name suggests. Today residential care is again in fashion. It is viewed as a desirable alternative to nursing homes because of its ostensibly less institutional character and its emphasis on a social, rather than a medical, model. A number of states, including Oregon, Washington, Florida, and Colorado, have aggressively tried to use residential care as a less costly substitute for institutions. One recent study estimates that anywhere between 15 and 70 percent of the nursing home population, nationwide, could live in residential care instead (Spector et al., 1996). Kane (1997) has questioned the judgment of hospital discharge planners who refer elders with disabilities to nursing homes, rather than alternative arrangements, because 24-hour care is supposedly available. She notes that remarkably little nursing care is provided in nursing homes. For example, a survey of nursing home residents in six states found that 39 percent of the residents received no care from a registered nurse in 24 hours; residents who did receive such care received an average of only 7.9 minutes; care by a nursing assistant averaged 76.9 minutes daily (Friedlob, 1993). Despite these arguments, empirical research has been equivocal on the issue of the "substitutability" and cost savings of residential care compared to nursing home placement (Kane et al., 1991; Newcomer et al., 1995b; Sherwood and Morris, 1983). In fact, residential care is more likely to be a substitute for living in one's own home than in a nursing home.

What appears to distinguish assisted living from residential care in general and from the somewhat pejorative "board and care" is a matter of philosophy and emphasis on care, not just housing (Kane, 1997). Some have also suggested that assisted living is the rich person's residential care while board and care is for poor people who rely on federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and state supplements (SSP) to cover the costs. A recent survey of assisted living regulations in 50 states indicates that four states-Alabama, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wyoming-use the terms "assisted living" and "board and care" interchangeably (Mollica and Snow, 1996). For the other states, key characteristics differentiating assisted living from other types of residential care are:

  • an explicit focus on privacy, autonomy, and independence, including the ability to lock doors and use a separate bathroom;
  • an emphasis on apartment settings in which residents may choose to share living space; and
  • the direct provision of, or arrangement for, personal care and some nursing services, depending on degrees of disability.

As noted in an earlier section on care settings, Hawes et al. (1999) recently completed the first national survey of assisted living, using a national probability sample of facilities that met several criteria. These include having 11 or more beds; primarily serving an elderly population; and providing 24-hour staff oversight, housekeeping, at least two meals a day, and personal assistance with two or more activities of daily living (ADLs). According to preliminary findings from a telephone survey, most facilities offer consumers a range of privacy options. Single rooms were the most common residential unit (52 percent); the rest of the units were apartments. The most common type of single room was a private room with a full bathroom; the most common apartment was a one-bedroom for single occupancy.

While most facilities reported a general willingness to serve residents with moderate physical limitations, fewer than half were willing to admit or retain residents who needed assistance with transfers from a bed or chair. Furthermore, fewer than half of participating facilities would admit (47 percent) or retain (45 percent) residents with moderate to severe cognitive impairment; only 28 percent would admit or retain residents with behavioral symptoms such as wandering.

In assessing the extent to which these facilities' characteristics match the philosophy of assisted living, Hawes et al. (1999) concluded that only 11 percent offered high privacy and high service. Another 18 percent provided high privacy but low service. Twelve percent offered low privacy but high service. The researchers noted that residents of these assisted living facilities had considerably more privacy and choice than residents in most nursing homes and in the board and care homes they had investigated in a previous study. Nevertheless, facilities varied widely. A substantial segment of the industry provided environments that did not reflect the philosophy of assisted living. Furthermore, the many facilities whose admission or retention policies excluded people with the cognitive impairments or severe physical disabilities suggests that assisted living is not an environment where those who experience significant functional decline can "age in place."

While assisted living does warrant serious consideration by policymakers, providers, and consumers, a number of impediments to its development need attention. Today, the assisted living market is primarily composed of the well-off elderly, with little available to moderate- or low-income consumers, as the recent study by Hawes et al. (1999) confirms. This gap is due, in part, to the limited sources and inadequate amounts of public financing (primarily SSI and SSP), which could help subsidize room, board, and care for financially strapped individuals and their families. The most common monthly rate for facilities offering either high service or high privacy was approximately $1,800 in 1998.

Other impediments to assisted living include concerns, expressed by state policymakers and potential private providers, about balancing consumer choice and privacy on one hand with health, safety, and liability considerations on the other. One major issue reflecting this concern is the degree to which states are willing to moderate their nurse practice acts to allow the delegation of certain tasks, such as administering medication, caring for wounds, and changing catheters (Kane, 1997). A number of states, such as Oregon, Kansas, Texas, Minnesota, and New York, have included nurse delegation provisions, but the latitude and interpretations of the provisions vary tremendously. Not surprisingly, they have met serious resistance by many nurses' organizations, for whom professional turf is as significant as care issues.

The motives of the assisted living industry have also been questioned. The industry includes more real estate developers and hotel managers than care providers. Furthermore, as nursing homes look for new markets and reimbursement strategies that circumvent government regulation, many skilled nursing facilities may simply lay carpet, install door locks, and hang out the "assisted living" shingle. Finally, there are questions about the amount of assistance that these facilities actually provide. According to the study by Hawes et al., 65 percent of the participating facilities supplied "low service"; that is, they did not have an RN on staff or did not provide nursing care, although they did provide 24-hour staff oversight, housekeeping, two meals, and personal assistance. Another 5 percent, categorized as "minimal service," supplied no personal assistance with ADLs. Given that many facilities do not admit or retain people with severe physical disabilities or cognitive impairment, the level of care is additional cause for concern.

Consumer-Directed Care

The 1990s may someday be referred to as the period when the health care and long-term care consumer came of age. Consumer choice is a relatively recent phenomenon in acute care. It has a lengthier history in long-term care, due primarily to the disability rights and independent living movements that started in the 1960s and 1970s. Catalyzed by younger people with physical disabilities who strongly oppose institutionalization and want a range of home and community-based options controlled by consumers, a trend toward more consumer involvement and direction has begun to emerge among the elderly.

The care of consumer direction includes the ability of people with long-term care needs to take an active part in choosing that care. Consumer direction emphasizes privacy, autonomy, and the right to "manage one's own risk." In long-term care, it is seen as a way to level the playing field between institutional care and home and community-based care. A growing number of policymakers also see it as a potential way to save money through more efficient allocation of resources and delivery of care.

Policy options range from consumer involvement in planning and decision-making to the ultimate in consumer direction-providing cash benefits to beneficiaries and letting them purchase their own services. Except for one program administered by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, most consumer direction has occurred at the state level, through Medicaid home and community-based waivers and state-funded personal assistance service programs. California, for example, has a large independent provider component to its In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program, which is funded by Medicaid, for elderly and younger disabled home care clients. Rather than receiving case managed services through an agency, participants can choose to hire and fire their own workers. As employers, they can direct their care and be more responsible for its quality. The state supports a registry of home care workers and also allows clients to hire their own family caregivers.

A recent study funded by the Department of Health and Human Services compared client and worker outcomes for those participating in IHSS's independent provider program with those receiving case-managed services from a county agency (Doty et al., 1999). The study's principal finding is that clients in the consumer-directed model had more desirable outcomes than those receiving professionally managed services within three broadly defined areas: satisfaction with services, feelings of empowerment, and perceived quality of life. No significant differences were found between the two models in client safety and unmet needs. Workers in the agency-based programs received, on average, higher hourly wages and were also more likely than independent providers to receive health insurance coverage and other job-related benefits. A significantly higher percentage of independent providers as compared to agency employees had jobs in addition to the IHSS work. However, workers in both models reported generally high levels of job satisfaction and there were no significant differences between the two worker categories on this measure. The independent providers reported better relationships with their clients than did the agency-based workers.

At least 35 of the 50 states have programs that provide some form of financial payment to relatives and other informal caregivers who perform homemaking, chores, and personal services (Linsk et al., 1992). The programs may compensate for caregivers' work or only for their out-of-pocket expenses (Keigher and Stone, 1992). Wage programs provide compensation directly to the caregiver, although most programs provide neither full-time employment nor fringe benefits to persons caring for one or two recipients. Allowance programs provide a flat grant geared to the financial needs of the family or caregiver and the care recipient's condition. Caregivers may qualify because of their eligibility for public income assistance, shared household status, or relationship to the recipients.

Direct cash payments for long-term care services, including payments to caregivers, have been much more controversial in the United States than in other countries. Germany's 1994 Dependency Insurance Act, for example, provides universal coverage of long-term care for disabled people of all ages, with a choice of cash, vendor payments, or a combination of cash and in-kind benefits (Schneider, 1997). During the first year of operation, 80 percent of care recipients who were least impaired and nearly 66.6 percent of severely disabled recipients chose cash benefits. Since the value of the program's cash payments is considerably lower than the cost of vendor payments, the overwhelming choice of cash helped Germany's care funds keep their budgets within the prescribed limits.

The Medicaid program precludes direct cash payments to care recipients. However, through a joint planning and evaluation grant from the Department of Health and Human Services and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, three states––New Jersey, Arkansas, and Florida––have received Medicaid waivers to experiment with "cashing out" the home and community-based care benefit. The states are now designing their respective programs, including (1) establishing the cash payment rates; (2) developing the marketing strategy for enrolling people eligible for Medicaid into a treatment group and a control group, which will receive case-managed agency services; (3) planning a counseling program to help cash recipients choose how to use the dollars; and (4) creating a quality-monitoring system that balances consumer autonomy with concerns about safety and potential fraud and abuse.

As new managed care initiatives focus on choices made by the informed consumer, it will be interesting to see how rhetoric is translated into reality in the long-term care arena. Historically, U.S. policymakers have been comfortable with cash benefits for certain subpopulations, like veterans and workers with disabilities. President Clinton proposed a $3,000 nonrefundable tax credit for people needing long-term care, measured by having at least two ADL limitations, or for family members caring for them. While modest, this proposal would provide consumer-directed benefits, that is, a cash refund. Policymakers have been less supportive of direct payments to allegedly "undeserving" individuals, like those in specific Supplemental Security Income eligibility categories, including mentally disabled children and substance abusers. Concerns about misuse of dollars as well as potential liability for unforeseen mishaps, such as abuse of elderly clients by privately hired workers or deaths of elders because of insufficient or inappropriate service delivery, have impeded the growth of this trend in the United States.

Consumer direction is not an option for all people with long-term care needs, but it may prove to be an effective and efficient way to allocate precious resources to an important part of this population. Proponents of consumer direction see it as a relatively safe and inexpensive way to meet consumers' needs and allow payment of relatives and friends for important services. Opponents view it as a vehicle for depressing wages, exploiting workers, and jeopardizing the health and well-being of vulnerable consumers who may not be able to supervise their own care adequately (Feldman, 1997). Although little empirical research has tested either perspective, forthcoming findings from the "cash and counseling" demonstration and other studies may shed light on the potential and pitfalls of this emerging trend.
A review of trends in long-term care service delivery suggests the following points:

  • A number of federal, state, and provider-based initiatives have experimented with integrating acute and long-term care services. But integration has been seriously hampered by fragmented financing; a lack of knowledge of, and training in, how to actually integrate service delivery; and questions about whether integrated care would really save much money.
  • The development of assisted living has been hampered by a lack of consensus on definitions and variations in regulation and oversight from state to state.
  • The assisted living market consists primarily of upper-middle- and high-income elderly, who often receive little service for their money.
  • Several states have aggressively used assisted living as a substitute for nursing home care, opening up the market to modest- and low-income elders.
  • Consumer-directed home and community-based care, while not appropriate for all people who need long-term care, offers choice and autonomy for those who prefer to hire and fire their own workers and direct their own care.
  • Preliminary studies suggest that the quality of care is not jeopardized when consumer direction is chosen in lieu of an agency-directed model.
  • Significant ethical issues surround consumer direction, including the balance between autonomy and safety, the potential exploitation of personal care workers, the appropriateness of this option for cognitively impaired older adults, and the potential for fraud and abuse by family members.
  • Other countries, such as Germany and Austria, provide natural laboratories for studying the advantages and disadvantages of consumer-direction.


Workforce Preparation

Financing mechanisms and delivery systems are essential to sound long-term care policy. A third factor is the most important and the most often overlooked: the adequacy and availability of a trained workforce to deliver care. Today's professional and paraprofessional workforce is woefully unprepared to meet the long-term care needs of an aging society. This problem is likely to worsen as the baby boomers age in the first half of the new century.

While physicians are not primarily responsible for the provision of long-term care, their involvement is essential for linking primary, acute, and long-term care delivery. In order to treat elderly persons with comorbidities and functional limitations, physicians should know what long-term care resources are available in the local community to meet their patients' medical needs. Finally, they should be sensitive to the needs of family members, who are often the primary caregivers and decision makers for elderly parents.

Unfortunately, most physicians in the United States have no training in long-term care and do not understand the relationships among their patients' health conditions and their physical, social, and psychological needs. Some physicians are exposed to long-term care when their patients are discharged from hospitals to home health agencies, but most simply sign off on care plans rather than helping to provide and monitor care.

Medical directors of nursing homes generally have formal or on-the-job training in geriatrics, but few physicians choose this specialty, which trains health professionals to understand the unique yet diverse needs of elderly patients. Only 8,800 of the 684,000 American physicians (1.2 percent) in the United States today are certified in geriatric medicine (Larson, 1998). Only 14 of the nation's 126 medical schools offered courses in geriatric medicine in 1992, and fewer than 3 percent of recent medical school graduates have taken electives in geriatrics. In 1992, a survey of primary care residencies found that long-term care experience in geriatrics was required in 86 percent of family practice residency programs, compared with 25 percent of internal medicine programs (Counsell et al., 1994). Most geriatric curricula in the programs surveyed were taught in nursing homes, with little emphasis upon rehabilitation, home care, and coordination of acute and chronic care.

Of the 98,000 medical residencies and fellowships supported by Medicare in 1998, only 324 were in geriatric medicine or geriatric psychiatry. Furthermore, more than 20 percent of slots in the top 16 geriatric fellowship programs went unfilled from 1991 to 1994 for lack of qualified applicants (Besdine, 1994). Only about 500 geriatric specialists now teach in American medical schools. This faculty shortage is exacerbated because these academic geriatricians spend most of their time treating patients. Clinical care, not teaching, makes money.

The shortage of paraprofessional workers––certified nursing aides in nursing homes and home care aides––is currently a crisis for long-term care providers. Ironically, much of this crisis can be attributed to booming local economies, where unemployment rates are low and where nursing homes and home care agencies compete with fast food restaurants that pay higher wages and offer better benefits. Paraprofessionals are among the worst paid workers in the service sector ("Who Makes What," 1998). Unattractive job features include low wages and benefits, lack of career advancement, high potential for injury, and exposure to much emotional stress. According to National Occupational Employment and Wage Data for 1996 (BLS, 1997), the median hourly wage was $7.46 for nursing assistants, $7.51 for home health aides, and $6.48 for personal and home care aides. Furthermore, Crown et al. (1995) reported that 28.5 percent of nursing home aides had no health insurance coverage; the comparable estimate for home care aides was 38.9 percent. Only 35.7 percent of nursing home aides and 24.6 percent of home care aides had employer-sponsored pension plans.

Despite federal requirements that nursing home and home care aides working in organizations certified by Medicare or Medicaid receive at least 75 hours of training (Simpkins, 1997; IOM, 1996), the content and quality of paraprofessional training vary widely across the United States (Feldman, 1994). Nursing aides' incidence rate of injuries and illness that involved loss of work days is one of the highest among all categories of service industry employees (OSHA, 1998); the injury incidence rate per 100 full-time workers in 1996 was 16.2 percent for nursing home aides and 8.6 percent for home health care workers. The most common problems were back injuries resulting from inappropriate lifting and transferring of patients. Workers also suffer abuse in both institutions and homes, often inflicted by cognitively impaired clients with severe behavior problems. Racial tensions between white care recipients and aides who are people of color may exacerbate the situation.

Heavy workloads; a lack of respect, autonomy, and opportunities for career advancement; a lack of extrinsic rewards, such as adequate wages and health benefits; and the availability of other job opportunities lead to high burnout rates. Annual turnover far exceeds that of other types of employees in the service industry (Atchley, 1996; Banaszak-Holl and Hines, 1996). High turnover has significant financial and psychological costs for providers. It also increases the workload and lowers the morale of remaining staff members. Several large studies have confirmed that recruitment and retention would be improved by initiatives that: (1) provide competitive salaries; (2) create opportunities for career advancement; (3) explicitly recognize aides' contributions; (4) involve aides in care planning; and (5) foster a good working relationship with nursing staffs (Feldman, 1994; Banaszak-Holl and Hines, 1996). Research findings suggest that wages, while important, are not the key to recruiting and retaining workers. Many caregivers derive immense satisfaction from caring and nurturing; most respond well to professional recognition and career opportunities within the long-term care system. Salary and benefits, however, are likely to become major factors in this strong economy.

Several key points can be drawn from this discussion:

  • The lack of a well-trained, well-qualified workforce for long-term care is an even graver problem than financing and delivery problems.
  • Despite the aging of the population, a demographic imperative, few physicians or other health professionals are trained in geriatrics. There are few financial or cultural incentives to obtain training or pursue careers in the care of older adults with chronic illness and disabilities. The shortage of paraprofessionals and the high turnover rates are caused by inadequate wages, benefits, professional recognitions, and career advancement opportunities. The shortage has been exacerbated by the strong economy, in which competition from other service industries like fast food chains is fierce.


The Future of Long-Term Care Demand

In the future, a number of factors will converge to shape the magnitude, scope, and nature of the demand for long-term care: changing demographics and the health and functional status of the population; the availability of family members and other unpaid, "informal" caregivers; the financial status of various generations and the degree to which they plan in advance for long-term care; and the availability and cost of institutional care and community-based alternatives. A crystal ball is invariably inaccurate. Projections must therefore be examined cautiously. Major progress in the treatment of Alzheimer's disease, for example, or a pandemic that wipes out a large subpopulation could significantly influence the size and character of the long-term care population.

The Aging Population

The new century will bring an unprecedented increase in the size of the elderly population as the large baby boom generation ages. While most elderly people are not disabled, the likelihood of their needing long-term care increases with age. The population aged 65 and over is expected to increase substantially between now and 2040. Different assumptions about mortality, fertility, and immigration, however, create widely disparate estimates of the size of that increase (Friedland and Summer, 1999), ranging from 59 million to 92 million elders living in the United States (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996). Estimates for those aged 85 years or older-those most likely to need long-term care-range from 8.3 million to 20.9 million in 2040. Older women will continue to outnumber men, although in recent years women have not seen the marked decline in deaths from heart disease that have benefited men (Treas, 1995). If trends like this continue, the gender gap in longevity may shrink somewhat.

The change in the number and proportion of elderly population will be affected, as well, by racial and ethnic diversity. In 1995, 85 percent of the U.S. population aged 65 and over was non-Hispanic white, 8 percent was black, and 5 percent was Hispanic; the remainder was other races. Projections for 2050 are 67 percent non-Hispanic white, 10 percent black, 16 percent Hispanic, almost 7 percent Asian Pacific Islander, and less than 1 percent other races (Figure 6; Friedland and Summer, 1999).

Increased Longevity: Quantity vs. Quality

Part of the projected increase in the number and proportion of elderly people in the twenty-first century is due to an increase in life expectancy at age 65. In 1995, men could expect to live 15.5 years beyond that.

Males can expect to live 17.6 more years in 2020 and 18.5 years in 2030. The comparable estimates for females are 20.6 years in 2020 and 21.2 years in 2030, up from 19 years in 1995 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996).

The extent to which these added years will be free of disability is subject to debate. Studies have indicated that life expectancy at birth in the United States was 72.7 years in 1976 and 75.4 years in 1990 (Colves and Blanchet, 1983; Crimmins et al., 1997). But life expectancy free of disability was only 56 years and 58.9 years, respectively; the other 16.7 years and 16.5 years were spent with a limitation in activity. Some researchers argue that medical advances have increased life expectancy but have not delayed the onset of illness (GAO, 1994). They predict that declining death rates may actually increase long-term care needs if, for example, more people live long enough to develop age-related conditions such as dementia or live longer with existing disabilities.

Researchers have been particularly interested in projecting the size of the long-term care population in an aging America. One recent analysis, which applied 1994 National Health Interview Survey data to U.S. Census Bureau projections, estimates that the number of people aged 65 and over with activity limitations will rise to 22 million in 2020 and to 28 million in 2030; in 1994, the number was 12 million (Rice, 1996). Kunkel and Applebaum (1992) have emphasized the need to use a dynamic model, which does not necessarily assume that the rates of disability and mortality will remain constant over the next half century. Using various scenarios, they note that by the year 2040––when the baby boomers reach their eighties and nineties––the number of older Americans with disabilities will have increased significantly. Their estimates of elderly people with a long-term disability range from 14.8 to 22.6 million people, depending on the assumptions built into the model.

Manton and colleagues (1997) report that disability rates among the elderly may be declining (Figure 7). They estimate that the prevalence of disability among older Americans for 1994, as measured by limitations in ADLs, was 3.6 percent lower than the 1982 standardized rate (21.3 percent, down from 24.9 percent). According to these researchers, the number of elderly Americans with a serious chronic disability grew from 6.4 million in 1982 to 7.1 million in 1994. But if the disability rate had remained at the 1982 level, the number in 1994 would have been 8.4 million. This research team estimates that the disability decline between 1982 and 1994 reduced the population in institutions by 400,000, saving $17.3 billion in nursing home costs in 1994. Using the constant 1982 disability rate, the estimated number of elders with disabilities in 2030 would be 17 million; at the constant estimated 1996 disability rate, the number would be 14.6 million; based on a 1.5 percent annual decline estimated by Manton and colleagues (1997), the number would be 8.5 million.

Geographic Diversity

While estimates of the aging population are usually presented for the nation as a whole, the number of elderly people, and their impact on the demand for long-term care, vary tremendously from state to state. As baby boomers start to reach retirement age in 2011, the size of the population aged 65 and over is expected to increase in all states (Campbell, 1997). California and Florida will continue to rank first and second, respectively, in having the most elderly residents. By 2025, Texas will rank third, passing New York and Pennsylvania.

In 1995, Florida had the largest proportion of elderly (19 percent), and Alaska the smallest (5 percent) (Table 2). By 2025, Florida is expected to remain the oldest state, with more than 26 percent of its population aged 65 or older. Alaska will remain the youngest state, with 10 percent elderly.

Only five states had populations that were at least 15 percent elderly in 1995. The rapid growth in the ranks of older people is further illustrated by the fact that by 2025, 48 states will reach or exceed that proportion. Only Alaska (10 percent), California (13 percent), and the District of Columbia (14 percent) will not meet or exceed 15 percent.

Changes in the geographic distribution of elders are affected by several factors. Growth of the nonelderly population is one factor. Alaska has a very small proportion of elders because many of its newcomers are young. Similarly, Utah had relatively few elders in 1994 (9 percent), due to an unusually high fertility rate and many young newcomers. Conversely, Iowa ranks fifth in the proportion of elderly (15.2 percent), chiefly because younger people have moved away. Consequently, elderly Iowans may face serious long-term care problems because their pool of potential unpaid caregivers has shrunk.

The migration of younger people has more impact than migration by the elderly (Treas and Longino, 1997). Older people are more likely to stay put than the nonelderly (Treas and Longino, 1997), although, contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States in general is a country of "non-movers." In 1994, 94.4 percent of those 65 or older remained in place, compared with 81.7 percent of those under 65 (Table 3). The movers in both age groups tended to remain in the same county. Interstate migration rates have remained stable over four decades, with most migration by older people concentrated in their early years of retirement (Longino, 1998). Almost two million people aged 60 or older moved from one state to another during the five-year period ending in 1990. Florida received the most in-migrants (23.8 percent of the total), followed by California (6.9 percent), Arizona (5.2 percent), and Texas (4.1 percent) (Table 4).



The 1990 census data show a changing pattern of out-migration by retirees. While it is generally assumed that the states people leave are all in the "rust belt," fewer migrants left New York, Illinois, and Ohio in 1990 than in 1980. Surprisingly, some sunbelt states such as California and Florida were rising to the top of the list of states that people leave (Table 5).


If the migration rate remains stable and most of the future movers are recent retirees, the number of elderly who move long distances should grow very little. The median age among current interstate movers is in the mid-60s. Growth in that median age could affect the demand for long-term care, particularly for states receiving an influx of retirees. But people who do not migrate can also affect the need for long-term care. Young retirees who "age in place" in states like Florida and Arizona can require long-term care as time passes.

A countervailing trend is the "return migrant" phenomenon. Older, widowed, and less-healthy elderly people may return to their state of o